

THE POLICE AND THE MILITARY: FUTURE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN PUBLIC SAFETY

Volume 4: Proceedings of the Futures Working Group

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Editors

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Contents

A Word from the Chairman iv

The Future Is Built upon the Recurring Lessons of History 1
Michael Buerger

Police Functions During Expeditionary Military Operations 11
Kurt E. Műller

The Militarism of the Police Reconsidered 31
Gene Stephens

Convergence: The Changing Missions of Police and the Military 33
Robert J. Bunker

Head Starts: What Policing Can Learn About Leadership from the Military 41
John Jackson

Info Ops: The Importance of Electronic Warfare 44
Scott Curtin

Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) 49
Greg S. Weaver

Seams: Challenges in Interagency and Multilateral Collaboration 56
Kurt E. Műller

Emergency Communications: Mashups or Mishaps 62
Sid Heal

Police and the Military—Lessons Learned and After Action Reports 67
Wayne Rich and Mary O'Dea

Increasing Situational Awareness: Lessons Learned and Technology 70
Bill Maki

Public Perception 73
Nicholas E. Libby

Military and Policing Recruiting and Retention: Common Threads 77
Marshall Jones & Lin Huff-Corzine

Troops to Cops: Changing Uniforms, Changing Missions? 88
Joseph Schafer and Bernard Levin

Paths Forward: Similarities, Differences and Evolution 96
Joseph Schafer and Bernard Levin

A Word from the Chairman

Since its inception, the Futures Working Group (FWG), an ongoing collaboration between the Society of Police Futurists International (PFI) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, has assembled numerous bodies of work relating to the future and policing. Many of these can be found at www.futuresworkinggroup.cos.ucf.edu. The entries in the present volume were initiated at a FWG meeting hosted by the University of Central Florida in the spring of 2006. I thank both Jay Corzine and this institution for its wonderful hospitality in this endeavor.

During this time, a group of police managers and futurists as well as academics and military personnel gathered to consider the challenges and opportunities of fostering further relationships between the police and the military. Their goal: to examine various dimensions in which the future missions of both the military and the police could be enhanced by examining the opportunities for collaboration and borrowing from lessons learned to confront the challenges and opportunities that each institution currently confronts.

At that time, in light of the natural disaster of Hurricane Katrina and other world events, we could not have imagined a timelier topic that could draw upon needed cooperation between the military and the police. To be sure, much has been written about that subject; however, little has concerned itself with the future of policing and the need for the military to engage in policing operations. As our discussions progressed, it became clear that many possible futures exist with regard to this very important area. This volume is an attempt to consider some of them and, further, to articulate strategies to bring about what futurists refer to as “preferred futures.”

As you read the entries contained herein, remember that the goal of futurists is to make others think. As such, some entries are quite lengthy, exploring various details of the complexities of policing and military operations. In contrast, other entries are brief observations that we believe contribute to the discussion of policing and the military. All of these entries serve to introduce new, challenging, and at times disconcerting ideas. You may agree with some authors and disagree with others. You may even feel somewhat unnerved by what has been written. Often, considerations of the future breed these emotive responses. As expressed in prior FWG volumes, ultimately, it is our fervent desire to devise ways to motivate individuals to create their own preferred future…whether military or policing or both…”for yourself, for your agency, and for the communities you serve.”

That goal continues. We hope this volume and the efforts that went into it are helpful toward that end.

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June, 2008

The Future Is Built upon the Recurring Lessons of History

Michael Buerger

Those who do not remember the lessons of history are condemned to repeat them.
-- Georges Santayana

It is commonplace to refer to September 11, 2001, as the day that "everything changed" for American citizens. The attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the unknown target of the terrorists aboard Flight 93 placed the nation "at war," but in a war like no other. We face a stateless agency and a world-wide insurgency linked to ideological rather than national goals. The federal government has undertaken a massive reorganization effort in the name of homeland security, and the national budget priorities have been realigned.

Before 9/11, the United States military had made the most effective effort to adapt to the new reality of international terrorism. In the public eye, military victories in the combat theaters of Iraq and Afghanistan (and the less-publicized covert operations elsewhere) stood in stark contrast to what was depicted as the bumbling of civilian agencies that failed to prevent the attacks. As more and more failures and shortcomings of domestic agencies were revealed, the military seemed to provide a viable alternative to the "stovepipes" of the intelligence communities. In some areas of public discourse, a new commonplace was being floated: if there was to be another successful large-scale terrorist attack, the military might be asked take over the protection of America's domestic security from the police.

That assumption and those factors comprised the starting point for this volume of the Proceedings of the Futures Working Group. In our April 2006 meeting in Orlando, Florida, FWG members identified the threat of international terrorism and the attendant "role of the military" issue as the most visible of a number of trends that already do or soon will affect the American police.

Prior to 9/11, two of the authors in this volume had previously published articles on what was then the emerging concern about the "militarization" of the police—the growing use of police paramilitary units (known more familiarly as SWAT teams in the United States). The issue was first raised by Kraska and Cubellis (1997) and Kraska and Kappeler (1997), whose work was grounded in earlier criticisms of the "war on crime" metaphor. Cowper (2000) addressed the errors that result from the police clinging to a nostalgic and incorrect understanding of "the military model" in their pursuit of legitimacy as a quasi-military force. He proposed that there is greater value in examining the changes wrought within today's military establishment, against which the police vision is but a distorted cartoon. Buerger's (2000) rejoinder examined the potential impact on the police of adopting the newer military model. Both authors (who are also contributors to this volume) are aware that succeeding events have added new dimensions to the issue.

The events of 9/11 moved the debate beyond those propositions and arguments. More important, the new mission of "nation-building" that followed the initial military successes in Afghanistan and Iraq changed the military role. While a new political structure was being created for the nation of Iraq, the

peacekeeping functions required in the face of asynchronous warfare placed the military occupying force in a role much closer to that performed by American police. The greater dangers of an insurgency, sectarian militia, and an uncertain (if not eroding) mandate make the military situation much more perilous, of course. Nevertheless, the command and the troops have responded to their new mission of being a de facto police force as well as military defenders of a nation.

While the organizing theme of this volume is the issue of these evolving roles of the military and the domestic police in the shadow of a terrorist threat, both institutions are touched by much broader social and economic trends. The larger question is whether the respective roles of those two institutions will change from their currently understood dimensions and to what extent: a fundamentally radical shift or more subtly in a series of minor adjustments?

Futures work is not a matter of prediction but an analysis and extrapolation of trends. Though we perforce alter our extrapolation in the face of "wild card" contingencies, futures work examines the arc of important social trends and their potential divergent paths, then attempts to identify intervention points or strategies that might shape the more desirable futures.

Within such a framework, we recognize the possibility that the "war on terror" may be the least important of the social trends affecting the police. Terrorist groups and networks can be tracked, infiltrated, suckered into a honey pot trap, or otherwise interdicted. They can be outlasted, kept on the run by enforcement pressure until the heart and spirit of the organization collapses or drifts back into the shelter of the mainstream, as the domestic radicals of the 1960s and 1970s did. And they may be neutralized by social changes that remove the social support that provided cover for them, as we have seen in Northern Ireland, Spain, and elsewhere (including the erosion of support for the once-nearly mainstream white supremacist organizations, like the Ku Klux Klan in the U.S.).

The international terror of al-Qaeda (Osama bin Laden's organization), its network of sympathetic movements, and the more diffused network that takes ideological inspiration from the organization affects most Americans only at the symbolic level. While far too many Americans have been touched personally by the events of 9/11, the bombing of the U.S.S. *Cole,* and other attacks against American targets, Al-Qaeda is for most of us this generation's Symbolic Assailant (Skolnick, 1966). It is the wolf that lurks on the fringes of the forest and which might attack again somehow, somewhere. As such, it has shattered our complacent feelings of invulnerability and forced us into defensive postures and expenditures that affect our lives. Those impacts are attenuated, however, watered down across time and distance from actual events. The longer we go without another effective attack, the more the danger recedes, and "Condition Orange" becomes the new "Condition Green."

Other trends have a far more substantial impact on our everyday lives, even if we have little or no more awareness of their ongoing influence than of al-Qaeda. Many of those trends are in some way linked to the rise of international terrorism, of course, but they are more easily discussed as individual trends in the first instance. More important to our purposes, each is linked to the present and developing capabilities of the police and the military, though in varying degrees and forms for the two institutions.

Technology

At the core of almost all of the changes in trends is the exponential growth of technological capabilities. The last half-century has seen the slowly rising curve of development arc sharply upward in what futurists refer to as “accelerated change” (Smart, 2004). Microcircuitry, the advance of computer technology, robotics, and a host of associated developments have been bolstered by advances in chemical sciences that have improved agricultural efficiency, medicine, and manufacturing capacities. These advances have changed the world’s economy and with it the world’s politics.

Military needs have driven many of these technological advances, and the U.S. government has made a concerted effort at technology transfers from the military to the police of the nation. The police also represent a secondary market for equipment that the military rejects or no longer needs, as well as for surplus. Whether the technology is appropriate for police use in a domestic theater, worth the price, or simply an enticing new toy that leads to shortcuts and problems are ongoing discussions.

Cyberspace

The rise of the Internet rapidly led to the creation of an entirely new shadow world we call cyberspace. From the comfort of their home or office people can seek information sources from the world’s greatest libraries as well as new entities, communicate verbally and visually with people in almost any corner of the globe, renew old associations, create new identities; and exercise magical powers in virtual worlds once confined to text. They can also trade pornography and blueprints for infernal devices, hatch nefarious plans with confederates, locate and stalk former intimates who fled violent or constricting relationships, troll the ever-expanding universe of chat rooms to groom underage sex partners, and empty my bank account from somewhere in Bulgaria.

The Declining Significance of Work

More important, as robotics and efficiencies in global shipping erode the traditional labor functions of manufacturing, the Internet has led to an increasing number of social dislocations related to the workplace. Some 15 years ago, Joel Garreau described the earlier phases of the relationship between technology, work, and residence:

- early factories were built near rivers for power, and people walked to work from company-owned tenements;
- railroads and trolleys made it possible to reach work from farther distances, as cities began to expand;
- the development of an efficient internal combustion engine led to the mass-produced car, allowing people to live farther from work; the post-WWII rise of suburbia relocated the middle class outside the core cities, leaving the inner cities to the very rich and the very poor;
- as the cities became more crowded and more expensive, more and more corporations built new headquarters where their employees lived, creating new cities (“Edge Cities” in Garreau’s term) that served a more homogeneous population of the middle and upper classes, and abandoned the older core cities;
- highly efficient robotics have since eliminated the need for human labor in many manufacturing processes, shifting the emphasis of human input toward design and development (“cleverness,” in Garreau’s term).

Since the publication of *Edge Cities*, the Internet and other increases in communications technology (satellites, fibre optic lines, etc.) have broadened the divide between work and home. The concept of telecommuting and teleconferencing have been added to our vocabulary as people contributed to companies' work first from the rural and outer suburban areas and now from overseas. Entire industries have been relocated to nations where labor is much cheaper than in America, and the American police inherit some of the social consequences of the loss of meaningful employment.

The rise of globalization has also been paired with the rise of new markets, which benefit at least those Americans wealthy enough to own substantial shares in the prospering companies. Culture travels on the coattails of commerce, however, and has contributed to the clash of cultures, which fuels the present Islamic fundamentalist backlash against American interests. Most dangerous of these is al-Qaeda because Osama bin Laden has ties to both worlds. His operatives are driven by ideological views that reject and are inimical to the technology-driven West, but they are nonetheless technologically savvy and capable of using the West's technologies against us. While the military uses technology with increasing effectiveness against traditional insurgencies around the globe, they must still cope with the intricacies of culture. The intelligence community supporting the military mission has similar challenges. As effective as high technology can be, there are still gaps that must be filled with human efforts, and the role of culture is paramount.

Globalization

Economies are no longer local or national. The American economy was the strongest in the world at the end of the Second World War, primarily because the homeland was protected by physical distances that outstripped the existing mechanical technologies of the age. The Marshall Plan and foreign aid helped rebuild substantial parts of the world destroyed by bombs and invasion, while the Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union held our attention under the threat of mutually assured atomic and nuclear destruction. By the time the Berlin Wall was torn down and the Soviet Union dissolved into the Russian Confederacy, much of the world had been recast in the American model.

We now live in an era of global economies with stock markets in New York and Chicago but also in London, Tokyo, Kuala Lumpur, and elsewhere. Europe has coalesced from a fragmented group of states into the European Union, with a common economy for most member states, more permeable borders, and free trade. A comparable entity is being forged in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The North American Free Trade Alliance has lowered trade barriers and tariffs in the western hemisphere and spawned efforts for duplication in the southern part of the hemisphere.

Free trade agreements and economies in transportation (the emergence of the cargo container that travels by ship and by rail) have reduced the costs of transportation to the point where capital can move its manufacturing base easily to areas of low labor costs, ship the manufactured products back to the U.S. and Europe, and still make a profit. High-technology jobs and service jobs that operate by telephone and the

Internet have been outsourced to foreign labor markets as well.

The Declining Significance of National Borders

Immigration patterns have also changed. Large numbers of persons from South America, Africa, and the poorer Asian states still seek economic advantage in America, Europe, and the oil-rich Middle East. In the United States, immigration is no longer a one-way street thanks to improved technology, lower transportation prices, and freer passage across international border for legal immigrants. Not only does money travel from America to the immigrants' homelands but often the immigrants themselves travel to and from their country of origin. The creation of the Schengen Zone in eastern Europe, for example, is one of the last acts of dismantling the former Soviet Union, but it signifies a very different approach to the balance between national, regional, and global citizenship. Recognized political boundaries are also becoming increasingly nebulous as "human affiliations" that include everything from legal and illegal trade agreements to financial and familial alliances transverse established lines of governance.

Law

Globalization and the war on terror, each in their own way, are creating fundamental changes in the structure of law. As the economy is more and more anchored in global markets, American law no longer serves as the sole standard for conduct. Recent headlines have highlighted Microsoft's conflict with the European Union's laws on intellectual property, which are markedly different from our own, and there is an ongoing debate with the People's Republic of China over their vast market of pirated software, DVDs, CDs, and other "knock-off" goods.

Also in recent headlines has been the conservative uproar over the 2005 United States Supreme Court case of *Roper v. Simmons* (543 U.S. 531), in which Justices noted the evolving world-wide sensibilities against the death penalty. As American law enforcement increases its overseas presence in an attempt to combat international crime (both traditional enterprise crime and the more free-lance cybercrime), they must operate within and cooperate with systems vastly different from our own in order to be effective. While parallel efforts in the political sphere seek to alter the rules in the long term, law enforcement's ability to protect American citizens from predators overseas is still dependent upon an ability to work with and within legal cultures with radically different rules, standards, and expectations from our own (e.g., corruption, political ideologies).

The war on terror has brought similar changes. To extradite terrorists apprehended in foreign lands to the United States, we have been and most likely will be required to forego the option of the death penalty. Because our military actions are now directed against a stateless adversary that rejects Western principles, the rules of war of the Geneva Convention have no grounding. The gap has been filled by a new language of "unlawful combatants" and political maneuvering to create what is essentially a new form of law. This "new law" constitutes a structured approach to crafting appropriate responses to the new situations created by the al-Qaeda movement; it fills the shadowy gap between the battlefield rules governing state agents, criminal law governing offenses against domestic codes, and the realities of the new phase of international terrorism. The language that fills the American media, Guantánamo, military

tribunals, renditions, and the like, all reflect an *ad hoc* attempt to fashion effective responses to armed aggression in an arena that standing law has not addressed and for which current legal conventions are deemed insufficient, while still remaining tethered to the principals governing existing law.[1]

Domestically, there has been a shift away from traditional notions of enforcement. Even regulation has been weakened, giving way to a different form of negotiated conciliation. That model dominates the business sphere and has made inroads even in the realm of criminal justice through restorative justice, community circles, community service, and other forms of non-punitive resolutions of wrong.

An additional wrinkle is the withdrawal from participation in the criminal justice system by the corporate world. Because public trials and the publicity attending investigations can reveal corporate vulnerabilities and intellectual property (read "trade secrets"), many corporate entities elect not to report crimes to the police. They are resolved through civil processes and negotiations, removing (perhaps) important elements of criminal justice from the public sphere.

Cyberspace

The creation of a virtual world has parallel developments in the physical world. Identity theft has become easier and more prevalent as the essential codes that represent individual people (strings of ones and zeros that are the computer code for names, addresses, social security numbers, bank and credit card accounts, and so on) reside in an ever-expanding number of databases, accessible to an ever-expanding number of legitimate users and illegitimate hackers. Internet phishing scams, countless variations of the Nigerian Oil scheme, work-at-home frauds with multiple facets, and a growing list of predators' intrusions expand the reach of age-old bunco operations by reaching exponentially greater populations of potential marks with less effort than ever before. Because cyberspace knows no borders, legitimate and illegitimate commerce alike can span the globe with ease.

The rapid transformation of commerce in cyberspace and of the crime that follows close on its heels dislocates all of our traditional notions of jurisdiction anchored in physical space. The historical expectation that the perpetrator and victim meet at a particular crime, in a particular space over which a certain court and agency has jurisdiction does not apply in cyberspace. While all of the new cybercrimes have analogs in the older crimes of physical space such as theft, fraud, harassment and stalking, and destruction of property, their consequences are of a far different order. The boundaries of physical space were originally broken by the telegraph, and laws dealing with mail fraud have long been a staple of criminal investigation, but they pale before the scale of cyberspace. The sheer volume of Nigerian Oil Scam letters, phishing e-mails, work-at-home schemes involving victims in multiple jurisdictions, and other forms of technology-enabled crime is one distinction. The "hot potato" game of police denying jurisdiction, based in a dual lack of legal authority and financial resources to pursue such cases, is another. The capacity for damage to the

[1] The debate over what does and does not constitute torture, or, more kindly, where the border lies between "pressure" to develop high-value intelligence and outright torture, reflects the extreme edge of that process. We recognize its importance, both in instant and second- and third-level effects on both sides, but it does not fall within the purview of the Futures Working Group's focus for this volume.

nation's banking systems and power grid, for forgery of documents and destruction of any number of electronically-based assets, is substantial. The concept of an "electronic Pearl Harbor" directed against the nation's defense systems and electronic infrastructure is one of the staple "what-if" scenarios of the war on terror.

In some ways, cyberspace is indeed a "wild west" type of frontier in this regard, with modern-day Pinkerton agents (those with the technical savvy to follow a trail in cyberspace) available to those who can afford their services. The average citizen, whose loss is well under the threshold limits that legally-empowered public agencies will accept, have little or no recourse. The more endowed entities, including the military and the corporate world, still play a "Spy vs. Spy" game with the black-hat hacking underworld, with the average citizens the electronic version of the "mushrooms," their communications and finances at risk of a drive-by hacking. The local police forces, the normal agents of prevention, interdiction, and investigation, have little capacity—whether intellectual, technological, or financial—to turn the tide of cybercrime on behalf of the citizens in their jurisdiction.

Privatization

Independent of the other trends, we have also seen a shift in the philosophy of government. Long-held assumptions about the proper division of public and private spheres have been challenged. A conservative belief in the greater efficiency of the private sector (compared to the perceived calcification of the civil service-protected public sector) has been joined to a desire to limit the responsibilities of government, and especially the tax burdens such services create.

As a result, over the last quarter-century, many of the functions traditionally reserved for "The State" have been given over to the private sector. There is now a wide network of private prisons and increasingly of private police. While those agencies employ persons in a limited capacity with training that meets the minimum standards of the state, they have the power to enforce the laws of the state, but only within the bounds (usually defined by property) of a private, proprietary employer.

Limited-jurisdiction police are not a new development. Railroad police have long had limited jurisdiction over a private enterprise that crossed through multiple jurisdictions. Universities have employed their own police; the special considerations attending a self-contained residential city justify dedicated resources, both supplementing the broader powers of the city police and easing the burden on them. What is new in the present day is the increasing number of special police forces and private security guards tending gated communities. Some commentators suggest that the rapid growth of private police is both a symptom of a lack of confidence in the public police and a harbinger of their ultimate marginalization.

Privatization has begun to affect both standard police services and those of the military. Private contractors now provide guards for prisoners in medical facilities and even transportation in some cases. Some guard crime scenes, freeing police officers for other work or to pursue the main investigation. Civilian contractors also provide security for military bases at home and abroad, even in contract zones, like Iraq. Private laboratories provide some analysis of evidence and

forensic services in areas, like computers, where police capacities are weak.

Against the tapestry of the modern age, the pundits aver, the old institution of a professional police is under siege from private competition. Corporate investigation services, not bound by the restrictions of the fourth amendment, have at their disposal a wide array of tools, such as data-mining, which public sentiment denies to law enforcement. Wealthier citizens prefer to pay additional money for private police/security services over which they can exercise more direct control and receive more dedicated services than the public police provide them. Against such a backdrop, perhaps it is time to ask whether we need a "New Police," and if so, what form it might take. Some of the possibilities are explored in this volume.

A New Challenge

This introduction proposes a vision that encourages the reader to turn back the clock to a similar period in history when rapid advances in technology had radically changed the nature of commerce, work, and the daily expectations of life. The existing organs of civil law enforcement, born of earlier ages, proved inadequate to the demands of the new social conditions of mechanization, urbanization, and industrialization.

A similar debate over the need to control a perceived threat took place in England in the 1820s—the rise of "the dangerous classes," dispossessed individuals without adequate employment or social support. It was a period of massive social change, as the new technologies of the Industrial Revolution concentrated a population formerly occupied in agriculture. It created dense urbanization that dehumanized its new, desperate residents: the cities of the Charles Dickens novels, full of David Copperfield orphans and Bill Sykes villains. Crime was running rampant, and a labor movement was growing stronger, agitating for the opportunity to earn a fair living. Mass demonstrations were frequent, crime seemingly unchecked, and riots a constant threat.

The old policing institutions—the Watch, the Constable, and the Justice of the Peace—were all relics of the Agricultural Age, a time when crime was rare. A patchwork of new quasi-policing institutions had grown up in London during the 18th century to try to fill the gap: private police in the form of a paid watch in some of the wealthier parishes and privately paid guards on the private highways and in river warehouses. They protected private interests against highwaymen and thieves, but there was little benefit to London's citizens. In that time, too, there was talk of the need for the military to take over the duties of keeping the peace. They had strength of numbers, discipline, and, if necessary, force of arms. Moreover, they commanded the respect of the country.

Two factors stood in the way. First, the military did not want the duty of policing domestic conflicts. The commanders of the army and navy understood their role as defending the nation against foreign enemies, not defending Englishmen from Englishmen. Second, the public and the military both had vivid memories of two events in which the military had intervened in public affairs with catastrophic consequences. In 1780, the army had suppressed the Gordon Riots in London, firing on the mob and killing a number of English citizens. When the army refused the commission to disperse a large labor rally in St. Peter's Field in 1819, factory owners

appealed to the Yeomanry, a force of retired military cavalrymen who were small landowners. In today's terms, the Yeomanry would occupy a niche between the legitimate National Guard or Ready Reserve and the self-appointed militia groups. When the Yeoman forces dispersed the rally with a cavalry charge, Englishmen again died at the hands of their own.

At that time, Sir Robert Peel proposed that a civilian police force organized along military lines but under civilian control be mobilized to help restore order in the cities. Because the term "police" was associated with the secret police of the French Revolution (especially the Terror and the Directorate), the parliament and the populace alike were resistant to the idea. After a series of compromises and refinements, however, Peel finally won the battle for a "New Police," and in September 1829, the London Metropolitan Police force held its first muster.

There are, of course, significant differences between the two eras. The dislocation of labor during the Industrial Revolution was far more dramatic than the shift from the Industrial Age to the Information Age. The latter is buffered by the emergence of a service economy and a more well-developed social safety net of government assistance than existed in London in the 1820s. Much of the existing infrastructures are able to absorb and enable the transformation; the suburbanization of America produces nowhere near the dire impact that the urbanization of England created.

Nevertheless, there are certain parallels. The existing institutions of law enforcement are ill-prepared to deal with much of the emerging cybercrime, limited as they are by matters of jurisdiction, technical knowledge and capacity, and mandate. For similar reasons, their ability to deal with international terrorist infiltration is scant at the local level, almost limited to happenstance discovery (though the capacities of the federal intelligence networks are more robust in this regard). Although it is under challenge, the Posse Comitatus Act (itself an artifact of a 19th century political situation in fact, but ingrained into the public consciousness, as well as the respective ethos of the police and the military) constrains the use of the military for domestic law enforcement.

There is also a tremendous difference between creating a new institution (which Peel, Rowan, and Mayne did in establishing the Metropolitan London Police) and radically changing an existing one. It seems far likelier that the local police would find themselves in one or another of the alternative scenarios considered herein. They might be subsumed under a larger effort (Homeland Security), extensions of an increasingly federalized system in which local controls are eviscerated. They might be relegated to insignificance, only dealing with crimes of public disorder and remaining (or returning) to the low repute of their 19th-century forebears. They may undergo a collective epiphany that leads them to define, adopt, and pursue a new form of professionalism that allows them to take on the problems of cyberspace, globalization, nanotechnology, the changing demographic and financial profiles of the nation and whatever new challenges present themselves at the turn of the next corner.

It is to these possibilities that the members of the Futures Working Group devote themselves in this volume.

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Police Functions During Expeditionary Military Operations

Kurt E. Müller

The Expansion of Peacekeeping

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the evaporation of the ideological East–West conflict, peacekeeping for the United Nations became a growth industry. Local belligerents lost access to superpower sponsors, who now shared an interest in the stability of states neighboring regional powers. As an example, the Balkans threaten social and economic unrest across Europe, and both Russia and the U.S. have a mutual interest in containing Balkan conflicts. Nations have contributed peacekeeping troops for various reasons. Some found they could maintain a larger military force if the U.N. were footing part of the bill; others, particularly smaller European members of NATO, found that supporting an agenda for peace made good domestic policy while maintaining a military capability.

Peacekeeping is commonly thought to be an innovation in international affairs that dates to the early years of the United Nations. In an article for *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda*, for example, Ambassador Robert Oakley (1998) writes of the "history of 50 years of peacekeeping," a history whose "record is mixed but, on balance, positive." Multilateral intervention actually dates back about a century longer. Rostow (1994) points out the century-long period of relative peace emerging from the 1815 Treaty of Vienna. That circumstance was managed by containing conflict. In two papers on peacekeeping, Schmidl (1997, 1998) delineates two interventions by the Concert of Europe: the first in 1897 on Crete, the second in 1913–14. As Montenegro sought to wrest part of Albania from the Ottomans, Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy sent land and maritime forces to frustrate the Montenegrin plan. Their peacekeeping mission, which included nation-building, continued through the Second Balkan War (1913) until the outbreak of World War I ended their collaboration. Prior to that multilateral deployment, Austria-Hungary had threatened unilateral intervention for humanitarian reasons, though the dual monarchy had clear political objectives in mind on which its public diplomacy was silent (Schmidl, 1997).

The United States has engaged in numerous interventions, primarily in the Western Hemisphere and often with mixed objectives, such as preventing refugee flows by supporting stability in the home country. A prime example of the latter is evident in multiple interventions in Haïti. Despite unilateral interventions and those undertaken by alliances and coalitions as wide-ranging as NATO and ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States), however, the most common interventions undertaken for humanitarian purposes are those conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. A number of observers have commented on the growth of U.N. peacekeeping, particularly since the end of the Cold War. As a representative example, McClure and Orlov (1999) note that the U.N. conducted 13 peace operations between 1948 and 1988 and 36 such operations between 1988 and 1999. The earliest U.N. peacekeeping operation was conducted in the desert of the Sinai, and that environment limited the need for police, but the second operation, in the Republic of the Congo (1960–64), included a police detachment

from Ghana. That Ghanaian unit became embroiled in local confrontations and was relieved by a deployment of Nigerian police, who stayed for a year beyond the U.N. military peacekeeping mission (Schmidl, 1998).

Circumstances of Intra-State Conflicts and Their Resolution

It is useful to review patterns of conflict to uncover the circumstances in which deployed police forces may have to operate and the areas in which post-conflict reconciliation benefits from a significant police presence. Regardless of the source of conflict, such as sectarianism, race/tribe membership, nationality, or ideology, there has often been a pattern of repression by one group of another, of counter-repression, and of post-conflict intervention.

The concept of U.N. Civil Police originates with the U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), deployed in 1964. Ten years prior to the Turkish intervention of 1974, UNFICYP deployed to prevent the re-emergence of previous civil unrest between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In that operation, the military commander is credited with proposing the deployment of a police component to facilitate confidence building among the populace (Schmidl, 1998). To distinguish these international police from constabulary military forces, they were originally called U.N. Civilian Police (CivPol).

The characterization of civil unrest between ethnic groups when one represses the other with police power and administrative discrimination recurs over time and space. Readers may recall that the Sudetenland Crisis was the pretext for Germany to invade Czechoslovakia. Although the Hitler regime abused the Munich Agreement, an intervention was warranted because the crisis was real. Because the victorious Allies of WW I had applied the "principle of self-determination" only to the defeated Central Powers (and not permitted plebiscites in several territories they had promised as spoils), they effectively reversed certain patterns of discrimination. The Czech example is instructive as a baseline. The Czechs were one of many groups of minorities in Austria-Hungary, whose two ruling ethnic groups, in order, are reflected in the name of the dual monarchy. Creating the new state without changing the Austro-Czech-German-Hungarian borders to account for ethnic distribution thereby drew a new state in which the German- and Hungarian-speaking populations were now minorities in a Czech-dominated state, and the Beneš regime egregiously violated minority rights.[1] Although the common memory of the Munich agreement is as an aggressive step by the Third Reich, in fact it resolved a violation of human rights. The situation was compounded after World War II by the atrocity of expelling the German and Hungarian minorities, one of several precursors of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslav republics in the 1990s.[2] Such reversals of power blocs often facilitate retribution; these historical examples are unfortunately repeated across the history of U.N. peacekeeping.

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[1] For a concise discussion of the crisis, see Library of Congress, "Sudetenland." http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+cs0036) retrieved 6 June 2007. For more detailed information, see Arnold Toynbee's article in the *Economist* (10 July 1937) 72; Lord Runciman's report in *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939*, 2.3, 50; and the report toU.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull by U.S. Ambassador to France William Bullit in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1938,* 1: 595.

[2] On the expulsion of Sudeten Germans, see Kopper (2003) and Brunstetter (2003). On the expulsion of Hungarians, see Jeszensky (2003). See also de Zayas (2003).

To prevent or ameliorate repression of out-of-power groups by the new power structure, international police contingents are deployed to provide a non-partisan public-safety force. For example:

- In 1964, UNFICYP created a CivPol contingent with 173 police officers from 5 contributing nations. CivPol elements patrolled jointly with Cypriot police to reassure the local populace that policing was evenhanded between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. To bolster confidence, CivPol investigated cross-ethnic allegations of infractions by Greeks against Turks and vice versa (Schmidl, 1998). That operation continues and as of April 2007 has 9 nations contributing 65 police and 11 nations contributing 856 military personnel (www.un.org/depts/dpko/missions/unficypfacts.html).
- In 1991, after a tortuous journey through the totalitarian rule of the Khmer rouge, a subsequent invasion by VietNam, and a struggle for supremacy among competing groups for power in Cambodia, a peace agreement facilitated the deployment of the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia. In February 1992, UNTAC was authorized a component of 3,600 police monitors (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untacbackgr1.html)(Doyle, 1994). The task of reconciliation was central to the mission of peace-building, and within a 5-month period, UNTAC noted 242 occurrences of "human rights abuses, […] summary executions of suspected offenders," and "immunity from justice commonly enjoyed by the perpetrators" (Plunkett, 1994). International monitors determined "that the main human rights breaches were murders being perpetrated by elements of the police and military of the factions" (Plunkett, 1994). As may be expected under these circumstances, police sponsored by the various factions would not investigate or prosecute offenders allied with their faction (Plunkett, 1994, p. 68).
- Under Tito, Yugoslavia was a federation of republics held together by deliberately building interdependencies and promoting integration. A decade after his death, this precarious structure unraveled, and republics began seceding. Fueled by partisans from Croatia and Serbia, the worst of the conflicts occurred 1992–95 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the republic with the most intermarriages. With acceptance of the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995, the belligerents in the Bosnian conflict accepted the deployment of an International Police Task Force, whose members soon noted the extent to which Yugoslavia had been a police state by comparing the density of police in Bosnia to the norms in Western states. As in Cambodia, factions in Bosnia routinely set up police check points to limit the freedom of movement of targeted groups. The IPTF, to which 38 countries contributed, was authorized 2,015 personnel (Oakley, Dziedzic, and Goldberg, 1998). In 2003, the IPTF was succeeded by a European Union Police Mission.
- In 1999, a secret ballot held in East Timor (now known as Timor Leste) revealed the inhabitants' wish for independence from Indonesia. East Timor had been a Portuguese territory, in which different parties contended either for independence or for integration with Indonesia. When the 1999 ballot revealed a 4:1 margin

in favor of independence, pro-Indonesian militias unleashed a campaign of violence. Indonesian armed forces and police withdrew, and the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor deployed a civilian police component of up to 1,640 members to train and establish an East Timor Police Service; national security was to be supported by creating an East Timor Defense Force. (www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetB.htm)

- Kosovo's recent history is one of alternating repression of one group by another. Milošević's rise to power in Serbia came about by ending Kosovar Albanians' abuse of Kosovar Serbs. The elimination of autonomy for Serbia's provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina saw instruments of Yugoslavia's Ministry of the Interior Police (Ministarstvo Unutarnjich Poslova, or MUP) engage in repression of the Albanian majority. Following the Kosovar Albanian revolt and a NATO intervention, the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was faced with the difficulty of preventing "Albanian revenge acts against Serbs and minorities, which began as soon as Albanian refugees returned to Kosovo hard on the heels of entering KFOR troops […]." (Sage, 2005; see also Honzak, 2006; International Crisis Group, 1999; Mockaitis, 2004; Seybolt, 2007)
- The current conflict in Iraq demonstrates the pattern once again. Under the Baathist regime, the minority Sunni populace repressed the majority Shia. The current regime reflects the Shia majority, and a major challenge is evident in attempts to ensure minority participation throughout government agencies. Police and military units are recruiting from various segments of Iraqi society in an attempt to achieve public support for representative, evenhanded policing.

The police monitoring function is by no means restricted to situations in which there is a reversal of dominant factions that spurs reprisals against the group that had been oppressive and is suddenly subject to revenge. Additional social maladies create the need for inserting international police monitors, perhaps creating entirely new police systems, and overhauling rule-of-law institutions.

At the end of World War II, the liberation of France was accompanied by a new lawlessness as some French citizens directed widespread reprisals at other French citizens who had collaborated with either the German occupation forces or the Vichy government. Thirty years later, the British forces serving in Ulster frequently reported IRA retribution on locals who interacted with British forces or who failed to maintain strict separation from Irish Protestants. On the other side of that conflict, the Catholic population in Northern Ireland had no reason to trust the police force, which was overwhelmingly Protestant.

In consequence of the outside agitation by Croatian and Serbian partisans that tore apart the social fabric of Bosnia-Herzegovina, much of the populace became polarized. In seeking to establish post-conflict democracy, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) may have rushed hastily to elections before building confidence that justice would be forthcoming. Results of early elections simply reflected the polarization that had taken place.

Elsewhere, the cause of conflict between segments of the populace has been based on other distinctions. Both

the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–76, by some calculations) and the Khmer rouge regime of Pol Pot (1975–79) targeted the middle class, certain occupations, or simply urbanites. Still other conflicts, such as those in Angola, El Salvador, and Mozambique, emerged from clashes between Marxist parties and their opponents.

Some of these societies had long histories of government repression of the populace by means of their security structures: El Salvador, Haïti, and Panamá come to mind. In Somalia, a clear distinction could be made that the military had been used for political repression, but the police were well respected by the populace for evenhandedness. Unfortunately, the competition among "warlords" drove the police out of service, complicating the attempt of UNOSOM peacekeepers to restore community policing.

Police Functions in Peacekeeping

Both military forces and police contingents deploy to establish security. The nature of that concept differs significantly between these sectors, but it requires close coordination. The military task of providing a secure environment addresses freedom of noncombatants from attacks by organized fighting formations, particularly attacks with weapons that exceed small-caliber firearms. The police portion of the task to provide security addresses freedom from revenge attacks, from individual assault by authorities and other individuals, and the right to seek justice. In practice, the security task has multiple aspects, and military and police tasks overlap with the potential that the lead agency may alternate as circumstances improve or deteriorate.

Just as the circumstances surrounding each peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-building mission differ, the specified and inherent police tasks differ across missions.[3] Although the tasks may be broad and numerous, they fall into several major categories, of which Broer and Emery (1998) list six:

- Monitoring local law and order forces to ensure that they perform their duties in a manner consistent with the [peace] agreement
- Training local police forces
- Ensuring free and fair elections
- Supporting programs for the reform of local law and order forces or for creation of a new police force
- Investigating alleged violations of human rights either in the context of their monitoring function or in support of the human rights component (p. 370)
- Assisting nations in institution building, specifically law-enforcement institutions.

The primary police function has been to monitor the conduct of indigenous police to ensure they conduct themselves in accord with expected standards of human rights. Next comes support to reform an existing law-enforcement structure or to create a substitute agency, to assist in building the capacity (and character) of local law-enforcement institutions, and to train local police. A police contingent supporting peacekeeping may be tasked with investigations in some operations, but this task may be excluded from the mandate of others. Finally, CivPol are likely to be involved in ensuring that the conduct of elections is free and fair. Insofar as indigenous security elements (military, police, militia) may have a

[3] For a description of distinctions among peace operations, see Boutros-Ghali (1992).

history of repressing members of minority groups, the CivPol contingent is often expected to demonstrate the commitment of the international community to ensuring access to the ballot box by all segments of society.

Monitoring and Other Tasks

The conflicts characterized above demonstrate control of portions of the populace by state-sponsored organizations, such as the police or military. Oppression may also be exercised by militias, that is, paramilitary units that emerge from the populace or from a prematurely demobilized military. Peacekeeping missions under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter often come about when the belligerents are exhausted or there is simply no prospect of achieving either belligerent’s goals, and they turn to mediation. A peacekeeping agreement may well delineate a power-sharing arrangement, which demands cooperation, if not reconciliation, between the parties. Considering that a great degree of mistrust is probably rampant, freedom from home intrusion, personal safety, and the like will demand a police force that treats the populace with dignity and that shows no favoritism to either side of a disagreement. Consequently, part of the task of establishing public safety is to remove the likelihood of crimes against persons and property perpetrated by one faction against another (often identified in the U.S. as “bias crimes”). If the police force or the military is part of a state’s machinery of oppression, it will be necessary to monitor this force for compliance with acceptable standards of human rights. This task often requires the CivPol contingent to remove individual police agents or their leadership, recruit a police force that reflects the population being served, and undertake a training program to ensure policing based on even-handed protection of persons and property.

Where because of their group affiliation, families and individuals have been subject to murder, rape, loss of limb and property, arson, forced labor, and other such predations, victims and survivors will call for justice. Tasks for CivPol contingents may include gathering or safeguarding evidence or facilitating others in doing so. Certainly, the police contingent will want to establish a climate that distinguishes between justice and retribution, a challenging task, particularly if the indigenous populace has endured prolonged exposure to brutality.

Representative calls for such guard duty have included guarding the site of mass graves (e.g., in Bosnia) and protecting institutions (e.g., the National Museum in Baghdad). Even when security forces decline such missions—for lack of personnel, perhaps—the security character of these issues dictates that the leadership (civilian, military, and police) should be able to suggest solutions to such capability gaps.

The Scandinavian countries have been particularly active in U.N. peacekeeping, supplying both military and police contingents. In June 1997, a Swedish Commission on International Police Activities issued a report to support Sweden’s contribution to various peacekeeping and peace-building missions. The report looks at the wider context in which previous conflicts had taken place as well as at the functions peacekeepers need to address to establish good prospects for continued peace. In addition to the primary tasks of monitoring the local police system, educating the local police forces, and establishing or restructuring the local police establishment, the commission enumerated a number of tasks that various sectors —from diplomats to the intervening military force to members of

government and relief agencies—undertake when they aim to reconstruct a society based on humane principles of democratic interaction.

The commission noted a particular category of tasks that it considered a gray zone as to which agency should undertake them to restore security and order.[4] The category contains eight tasks:

- To control riots and disturbances
- To intervene against armed "gangs"
- To maintain civil law and order
- To discover and prevent crimes (e.g., plundering)
- To maintain order and security during election preparations
- To monitor and assist in disarming civilians
- To escort civilians in violence-prone areas
- To protect refugees in refugee camps from armed elements (Billinger, 1998).

The logical considerations behind choosing military or police to take the lead with these tasks will probably address the organization of the perpetrators, the weapons they may employ, and the mission specified for each component. However, one inescapable consideration will be the personnel available to each element of a peacekeeping mission. Many discussions of military intervention indicate reluctance on the part of military planners to address policing issues, but in the face of the deployment gap that typically pertains to establishing a police contingent for a peacekeeping operation, we need to recognize that if a military force does not address these issues, they are likely to escalate to a point that they threaten the success of the mission. We can define this threat and its treatment more sharply if we also consider police functions in combat operations.

[4] An English translation of the report is incorporated into Billinger's (1998), "Report of the Special Swedish Commission on International Police Activities."

Police Functions during Combat Operations

In May 1989, Panamanians elected Guillermo Endara as president and Arias Calderón and Billy Ford as vice presidents. The sitting head of state, Manuel Noriega, attempted to nullify the election. In December 1989, after several additional factors contributed to a *casus belli*, the XVIIIth (U.S.) Airborne Corps spearheaded an invasion of Panama to unseat Noriega and facilitate the installation of the Endara government. Initially policy makers hoped that Panamanians would unseat Noriega and turn the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) against him. Gradually, emphasis changed to invasion plans that included rendering the PDF ineffective (Lord et al., 1993). An October coup attempt might have achieved the goal of separating Noriega from his military support, but the U.S. failed to support the coup (Gray & Manwaring, 1998). As the situation worsened, the U.S. Southern Command gave the XVIIIth Airborne Corps the responsibility of executing Operation Just Cause. Before its execution, the operations plan had a civil-military annex that was removed, erroneously divorcing the battle plan from its political purpose. The Southcom commander focused on the military tasks, and, to preserve operational security, his staff did not consult other government agencies, including the U.S. ambassador to Panama (Gray & Manwaring, 1998; Lord et al., 1993). Military proclivities are to focus on military adversaries, and the

deliberate exclusion of planners whose concern is the civil sector resulted in a lack of appreciation for the security gap that developed when the PDF was removed.

In Panama, the PDF functioned as both a military and police force. Consequently, when the PDF was incapacitated at the invasion sites, the intervention created a police gap, and Panamanians were free to vent their frustrations with Noriega by looting in Panama City and Colón.[5] In rural areas, the PDF continued policing. The U.S. Army Civil Affairs Corps has the expertise to advise commanders and staff planners about the civil-sector influences on mission accomplishment, but for planning Just Cause, they were denied access. Because civil affairs operators routinely address all elements of national power, they frequently work directly with the "country team" that supports the U.S. ambassador. The ambassador was not on site during the operation, and Southcom had no political advisor on station, so the two functionaries who could have broken the planning logjam were absent (Gray & Manwaring, 1998). The looting stopped when sufficient military police and infantry deployed to fulfill the police function.

Some lessons are easier for corporate bodies to learn than others. The size of the military bureaucracy is such that shifting perceptions is akin to turning an aircraft carrier: the process requires time and space. With the rise of Serbian police abuse of Kosovar Albanians, the international community began to look at solutions to the human-rights crisis. The U.N. Security Council, NATO, and the Partnership for Peace all looked into the situation with a view toward a peacekeeping mission. Responsible at the time for civil-military operations planning at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, I cautioned my fellow staff principals in the Joint Operations Center that any military activity in Kosovo to remove the Serbian police would have to address the resulting police gap. Only 1 of the 8 other principals affirmed this concern when it was raised initially; by the time NATO sent in its Kosovo Force (KFOR), the framework documents had addressed the need pointedly, though inadequately.

When KFOR deployed under provisions of U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 and the Military Technical Agreement (MTA), it had the task of "ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task" (UN, S/Res/1244 [1999] 3). Moreover, in contrast to previously identified police tasks, in this instance KFOR had a specific mandate to transfer police tasks to the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), in essence to its police force (UNMIK-P), which would then "carry out normal police duties and will have executive law enforcement authority." Such executive authority has been rare in U.N. police deployments, which have concentrated on monitoring the activities of local police. International CivPol mandates that emphasize monitoring (as distinct from executive authority) accord the recipient state significant recognition of its sovereignty. In accord with fundamental principles of the U.N. Charter, sovereignty can only be curtailed under restricted circumstances. Hence, recognizing the need for U.N. executive police authority is a significant intrusion in

[5] Similarly, there are indications that the looting of the Iraqi National Museum in 2003 was in part motivated by anti-Baathist resentment. See Col. Bogdanos' (2007), "Iraq Museum Investigation."

defense of human rights.[6] The enumeration of this task for Kosovo exceeded the language of the proposed, predecessor Rambouillet Accords. Very much like the Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg proposals that were attempts at a ceasefire in Bosnia, Rambouillet was an attempt to end hostilities in Kosovo that was swept aside by changes in the situation on the ground. Both Rambouillet and the MTA called for deployment of an international CivPol force, but the circumstances and missions differed. Rambouillet would have allowed Serbian police to continue conducting police functions. The MTA provided an intrusive regimen to replace police functions in Kosovo, requiring a complete withdrawal of MUP forces within 11 days of signing the agreement (Gwaltney, 2002). Distinguishing between local police and MUP forces, the MTA allowed the local police to remain (Sage, 2005), but in practice KFOR needed to address police functions immediately.

The current campaign in Iraq should be examined for military–police interface once some time has elapsed, and researchers can derive lessons from a sufficient stock of after-action reports. An early, notable instance helps frame our larger inquiry into public-security issues. Readers are likely to remember the news reports during the spring of 2003 detailing the looting of the Iraqi National Museum, mentioned briefly above. It is generally accepted that General Eric Shinsecki retired as Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, because his projections for the size of the occupation force needed for Iraq exceeded substantially the numbers Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was willing to deploy. International conventions require an occupation force to provide for the security of the populace, including preservation of cultural heritage. As Australian legal officer, Colonel Kelly (1997) points out, an occupation authority cannot escape responsibilities under international conventions by not providing sufficient troops with the appropriate skills; the responsibility remains. The Iraqi looting example differs substantially from its Panamanian predecessor along two dimensions: 1) the booty--cultural artifacts from a 10,000-year-old civilization; and 2) the international outcry that arose in response. Moreover, the thefts quickly became an interagency matter. The U.S. Department of State’s Education and Cultural Affairs Bureau established a Cultural Heritage Program, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Art Theft Program became linked to attempts to recover 170,000 items from the museum’s collection. In addressing the U.S. intervention in Panama, Kelly makes the case that any exemption from international humanitarian law is based only on whether a military force is passing through or if it is engaged in continuing combat. If it is the sole authority in the area capable of exercising control, it has inherent responsibilities to do so. Otherwise, a claim of insufficient forces or of an absence of military government amounts only to an abrogation of responsibility under the law (Kelly, 1999).

Choosing Appropriate Police Formations

Should police functions be undertaken by military police, constabulary forces, or national or municipal police seconded to an international police force? Field and

[6] Schmidl (1998) writes that U.N.CivPol have “occasionally” taken on executive functions (p. 39); Schear and Farris (1998) write that in Cambodia, U.N.CivPol did not initially have executive functions; Broer and Emery (1998) note that “in most cases” CivPol is unarmed and does not do community policing (p. 380).

Perito (2003) point out benefits of deploying constabulary forces rather than individual police or military units, including the advantage of organic transport, communications, and logistical support. Based on U.N. experiences in Cambodia, Eaton (1994) calls for community police rather than MPs. On the other hand, Dziedzic (1999) and Oakley (1998) conclude their volume of proceedings with the observation that military forces "will need to perform constabulary functions on an interim basis […] during the earliest stages of most peace missions" (518). A number of national militaries have constabulary forces: the Argentine and French *gendarmerie,* Chilean *carabiñeros*, Dutch *marechausee*, Italian *carabinieri*, Spanish *guardía civil*, and Turkish *jendarma* come to mind. According to comments at a 1997 National Defense University conference by BG David Foley, then commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police School, the MP corps has an appropriate capability for this purpose as well. A conference participant, Colonel Howard O'Brien noted a similar planning shortcoming for MPs as mentioned earlier for civil affairs. In response to a question at the conference, he noted the image of an infantryman standing by while civilian violence took place in Haiti, causing the President of the United States to call for deploying 1,000 MPs. MPs were in fact scheduled for deployment, but the planners apparently did not accord them very high priority on the force-deployment list (Oakley, Dziedzic, & Goldberg, 1998).

As Colonel Kelly writes, simply scheduling too few troops for a deployment does not exempt an invasion force from its responsibilities under international humanitarian law to provide an environment that keeps noncombatants safe.[7] In peacekeeping operations, these responsibilities are more difficult to ascribe to a lead nation of a multinational force or to nations contributing troops to that force. Individual nations volunteer to deploy troops for peacekeeping, and the force commander usually can accept or decline the organizations offered. Small units with special capabilities may be welcomed (e.g., a Czech company-sized element with a snow-clearing capability used in Bosnia), and a diversity of nationalities is often welcome to indicate broad support for an operation. But, the force commander is also likely to match troop contributions with similar military cultures and language combinations and may establish a certification process to ensure compatibility and adequacy of support (as General George Joulwan insisted for non-NATO troop contingents before they were accepted in the Implementation Force [IFOR]). Thus, if Morocco offers a battalion and France has offered a brigade, the Moroccan battalion is likely to be paired with the French brigade, just as Pakistani and British organizations might be paired. Despite the observation that military police should be part of peacekeeping contingents (Oakley, Dziedzic, & Goldberg, 1998), they are often absent from the deployment packages nations offer.

Inasmuch as there is frequently a requirement to build a capacity for "community policing" as an inherent part of a peacekeeping mission or post-conflict transition, there will be a role for police monitors and trainers, and their skills will need to include investigation and community relations. Consequently,

[7] The doctrine of "noncombatant immunity" under international customs comprising the law of land warfare seeks to protect the civilian populace from the ravages of war. This practice is widely followed, and its transgression is the domain of the International Criminal Court at the Hague.

even when a military deployment includes constabulary forces, a police contingent is likely to be a key part of the transition to local control.

Donor nations may draw a CivPol contingent from any level, local to national, depending on the donor's circumstances. Others have addressed the qualities needed for CivPol assignments and consistent failure to meet the qualifications specified, leading the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (1997) to publish a pamphlet on *Selection Standards and Training Guidelines for UNCIVPOL*. This paper will not address such issues as inability to communicate in either the mission language or the local language, but will comment on both mission sensitivity and interoperability with partnered police and with the military force.

Usually smaller than the military force, police contingents often display a diversity of nationalities to that of the military. Police commanders will also attempt to construct compatible combinations of cultures in building teams to monitor and train local police. A review of literature has not yielded a description of a police commander who had an opportunity to ascertain the acceptability to the mission at hand. Rather, the literature indicates efforts to replace problematic contingents or to mitigate deficiencies. Considering the "deployment gap"—the delay between assigning the mission and achieving full operational capacity of the police contingent—this opportunity to ensure appropriate assignments is likely to remain a challenge in the near term.

In some instances, the CivPol commander may pair police officers less to facilitate cultural compatibility than to ensure that patrol teams will address the core and supporting issues for their deployment successfully. Prior to the creation of the IPTF in Bosnia, there was a previous police monitoring mission that accompanied UNPROFOR in Croatia. Broer and Emery (1998) write of a Finnish police monitor appalled at Serbian militia members in Croatia beating a detainee while his partner, from another nation, apparently accepted such treatment as a routine part of interrogation.

Such differences among police cultures need to be addressed as part of orienting the contingent to the mission. Not only is mistreatment a human-rights issue, it also undermines the purpose of deploying the police on these missions. From a comparison with counter-insurgency doctrine, we recognize that support of the populace is key to ensuring stability in a contested region. When the populace is terrorized by government agencies, it will seek relief by supporting insurgents or others who oppose the government. In Latin America, the complicity of U.S. agencies in human-rights violations led to legislation terminating the USAID Office of Public Safety and prohibiting the training of foreign police except in limited circumstances (Section 660, Foreign Assistance Act).[8] Because proper policing contributes to stability and public security, police capacity must be addressed in any comprehensive attempt to rebuild post-conflict societies. But, the potential for abuse also requires appropriate oversight. Consequently, the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) of the Department of Justice receives funding through USAID and policy guidance from the Department of State, and its authority, as with other programs, is by explicit exception to the ban on training foreign police (Call, 1994).

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[8] For criticism of U.S. programs in Brazil that were seen to support repressive policing, see Huggins (1998) as well as Cottam and Marenin (1989).

Benefits to the Donor Departments

Inappropriate police officers for CivPol missions are found not only among those from the developing world, as one might expect. Broer and Emery (1998) indicate that retired New York City police supplied by a contracting firm to the IPTF had the highest rate of absence without leave of any IPTF contingent. This circumstance points out two issues: (1) filling these positions must become a matter of selection, rather than recruiting along an industrial model (the "warm body" syndrome) and (2) proper recruiting should also address a longer-term benefit to the police department or agency supplying its officers. The first issue is fairly straightforward. The second may require some attention to recognize the benefits the department will derive.

Domestic police investigations have had an international component at least since the 19th century. This market niche facilitated the establishment of the Pinkerton agency. More recently, American anti-narcotics investigations demonstrate perhaps the most visible growth overseas: in 1967, 12 drug-enforcement agents were stationed in 8 foreign cities; by 1991, the number grew to 300 in 70 locations. In the same period, the number of attorneys in the Justice's Office of International Affairs increased tenfold; and the U.S. central bureau of Interpol increased staff from 6 to 110 (Nadelmann, 1993). The FBI investigation of Libyan involvement in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988, involved "dozens" of agents, working with English, Scottish, and German police "in tracking down leads in over forty countries from Sweden and Malta to the Far East" (Nadelmann, 1993). Moreover, the U.S. Postal Service, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau of the Department of Homeland Security, the Secret Service, and the Department of Commerce all benefit from international police connections.

Local police departments also benefit from having officers with international experience. Police intelligence contributes to combating crime syndicates, of course. But, even when detectives look into the foreign connections of individual persons of interest, they need an understanding of differences among legal systems to obtain evidence in a form admissible in an American court. Professional experience in a foreign environment sensitizes them to the types of issues they will encounter in seeking international police cooperation.

Police–Military Coordination

Sharing information subject to security restrictions has been a long-standing challenge among agencies within the same government as well as between parallel organizations of different governments. With the recognition that military operations are highly multilateral and likely to remain so, futures-oriented thought on security matters is currently engaged in trying to shift security culture from a "need to know" to a "need to share." Within the military, as within the police, similar professional cultures acknowledge the structures to safeguard information to provide operational security. The expectation of confidentiality and the procedures for sharing information—as well as the trust factor—differ significantly in crossing these groups. In dealing with the local police being monitored or trained, it is nonexistent (see "Sharing Intelligence," below). Because new police hires in the culture being monitored are likely to demonstrate loyalties and values that may be at odds with the international CivPol or military element that is

supporting them, there may be operations to which the indigenous police will not be privy, but building trust for safeguarding information will remain a milestone to be achieved in the transition to local control.

Delayed sharing of a common operational picture should not be true of the coordination between the CivPol and the international military, but it often is. Writing for the National Institute of Justice, Berkow (1997) opines of military and police cultures that “We do not speak each other’s languages; nor have we created the necessary interface between our senior military command and our policing institutions” (p. 15). But, in peacekeeping operations we work together on the same problems. Berkow believes the military sees a transfer of responsibilities to CivPol as part of its exit strategy. If so, that attitude integrates military and CivPol tasks more closely than may often have been true. When a peace agreement calls for disarming factions, storing weapons, and the like, both the military and CivPol will need to share information to determine whether a faction is trying to find a loophole in the agreement or to deliberately violate its provisions. During the ONUMOZ mission in Mozambique, for example, the Mozambican government claimed that the Presidential Guard was neither a military nor a police force and therefore outside the monitoring responsibilities of either the military peacekeepers or the CivPol operation. CivPol became aware that the government was transferring equipment to the Presidential Guard, but was denied access to verify the activity (Woods, 1994).

In Bosnia, SFOR[9] elements found practical means to share information with the IPTF, but such descriptions of work-arounds indicate the absence of a written policy facilitating such information sharing. If the security situation deteriorates, CivPol will likely need to call the military, which will usually designate a quick-reaction force. Particularly, when CivPol are unarmed, a rapid security deterioration puts them suddenly at risk. Similar situations pertain regarding indigenous police. Thomas and Spataro (1994) note regarding the Auxiliary Security Forces in Somalia (ASF) that:

> UNOSOM II (United Nations Operation in Somalia) did not have any CIVPOL on its staff to manage the ASF and had no funds to pay them. Military personnel were removed from the ASF stations and joint patrolling ceased just as factions brought weapons out of hiding into Mogadishu and resumed escalating violence. Outgunned by the militia and organized bandits and demoralized by the loss of military support, the ASF became incapable of performing viable missions except in the Bay Region where they received strong Australian support (p. 202).

There have been examples of a need to deploy a quick-reaction force to quell a disturbance in which the operation injured newly recruited indigenous police because there was no coordination between the military and police. Czech Army Lieutenant Colonel Honzak (2006) relates an incident in Kosovo in which a Kosovar Albanian mob targeted a Serbian Orthodox church, and the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) was unable to stop their approach. The international force responded with tear gas but failed to warn

[9] The initial military force deployed to Bosnia was known as the Implementation Force (IFOR); after the initial year, it was called the Stabilization Force (SFOR). Subsequent phases of the campaign did not rename the force; among the reasons for keeping the name was the simple observation that repainting the insignia alone would have cost $1,000,000.

the KPS, whose members were more affected by the tear gas than was the mob. Moreover, the lack of coordination between UNMIK (United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) riot police and KPS contributed to a significant incident: an Italian policeman was shot in the leg, possibly by a KPS member, and a KPS officer was shot three times by an Italian (Honzak 14). The potential for fratricide demands substantial procedures to avoid killing or injuring friendly forces who may stray into the field of fire. Air operations in particular pose significant dangers and devote attention to means that identify other aircraft as friend or foe (IFF devices) or connect "blue-force trackers" to identify friendly troops. From this one incident alone, the risk of military–police confrontation requires liaison between the two contingents.

Sharing Intelligence

Contributing to the incident between KPS and UNMIK-P was an inability to share intelligence information among security organizations. Honzak writes of "problems with the synchronization of actions between KFOR and police (both UNMIK-P and KPS)," which he characterizes as the "most significant cases of local failures" (p.13). The lack of coordination was no accident, however, and this circumstance underscores one of the challenges in the transition to local forces of responsibility for security. In the Kosovo circumstances, Honzak points out, the screening for eligibility for a position with KPS was poor. Many applicants had "an unclear past" for various reasons. UNMIK did not accord much recognition to Serbian documents, official records had either been destroyed or were otherwise unavailable, and applicants with criminal records or whose conduct during the Kosovo conflict was questionable were hired as KPS police (Honzak, 2006). Given these circumstances, their loyalty to the policing values UNMIK needed to promote was often doubtful. Honzak (2006) writes that any "joint KFOR-KPS operation became a public secret after initial planning," UNMIK-P agents investigating serious crimes could trust very few KPS members, and "KFOR units planning search operations could not declare the place of the operation in advance." Because KPS members had to participate and "actually lead the search," KFOR units […] had to pick them up, ask them to turn off their mobile phones, and took them to KFOR vehicles without telling them where the units were going to operate" (pp.14–15).

This U.N. CivPol experience in launching an indigenous police force was by no means new in Kosovo. Plunkett (1994) reported similar concerns in Cambodia. While we all find the plight of refugees and displaced persons such that we want the international community to alleviate their suffering, reality demands we also recognize that the fluid nature of a concentration of refugees also facilitates militants' hiding among noncombatants until they find an opportunity to attack their enemies. These circumstances provide both the base to recruit future leaders of an emerging society and the danger that unfulfilled expectations will just as easily become the impetus for joining an insurgent group. And although there is often a call to "stop the killing," the international community must recognize that peacekeepers cannot disarm only one faction to a conflict. Thus, the commander of the U.N. mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) recognized that disarming the Rwandan Patriotic Army faction would have disabled the counteroffensive that ended the genocide perpetrated by the radical Hutu militias.

From Kosovo we also draw an example in the opposite direction: of coordination that facilitated police patrolling. UNMIK-P was able to call on the artillery of Task Force Falcon to fire illumination rounds to enable night police patrols. Moreover, the police and military security concerns were so intertwined at times that soldiers detained civilians for infractions that could easily be recognized as crimes and engaged in basic criminal investigations. Military legal personnel (JAGs) created vignettes for basic law enforcement and investigative training, and civil affairs and psychological operations elements disseminated information to the populace on KFOR policing policies (Gwaltney, 2002).

For Haïti, mission objectives for the military and police contingents were so sufficiently intertwined that close coordination was self-evident. The 10th (U.S.) Mountain Division was the lead element of a multinational force, and it was to hand off responsibility to the U.N. Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) once the security situation permitted a transfer. The division was supported by a MP brigade of two battalions, supplemented by a Caribbean Command battalion and 326 International Police Monitors (IPM). The IPM was to be relieved by U.N. CivPol, which would be subordinate to UNMIH. By its 1987 constitution, the local police force was supposed to work under authority of the Ministry of Justice, but the military regime had not allowed a transfer from military control to take place. Consequently, the police would have to be reorganized, using as many of its members as could be screened for appropriate retention. This construct would be called an Interim Public Security Force (IPSF), to be replaced eventually by a new Haitian National Police (HNP) force (Bailey, Maguire, & Pouliot, 1994).

Joint patrols were common, both under the multinational force and under UNMIH. During the military phase, MPs conducted an average of 160 patrols per day with the IPMs and the IPSF (Bailey et al., 1994). But, that was just the beginning of military–police collaboration. Military information support teams shaped public perception of the multinational force and produced materials to recruit for the IPSF and test applicants for positions. Special Forces teams were dispersed across 27 locations, conducted patrols in 866 towns and villages, and initiated public-health and community-development projects supported by USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives. SF teams were supported by civil affairs and psychological operations troops. The IPMs were led by former New York City Police Commissioner Ray Kelly, who reported to the multinational force commander. The military commander supported the IPMs with a staff to coordinate logistics, communications, and operations (Bailey et al., 1994).

The Larger Context of Public Security: The Triad

Finally, we need to consider the coordination among police, judiciary, and penal institutions, which may be facilitated by military forces as well. Of the experience of U.N. CivPol in Cambodia, Eaton (1994), of the Australian Federal Police, writes that U.N. CivPol were:

> sent into an anarchic nation without law and even the most rudimentary of justice systems, let alone a general public appreciation of the need for it. It was a task that was not only poorly articulated but also one set in a structural vacuum. U.N. police in Cambodia had none of the tools that underpin their role in their domestic country: no laws, no

> justice administration, no courts and no jails (p. 61).

Schear and Farris (1998) agree, attributing to CivPol Commissioner Klaas Roos the observation that decades of strife had destroyed the criminal-justice system, with its courts, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and prisons. Of the situation there, Plunkett (1994), who served as UNTAC Human Rights Officer and later as U.N. Special Prosecutor, writes of the great irony that:

> given the recent tragic history of Cambodia, one of the greatest human rights needs was the building of prisons. Many foreign governments had difficulties in accepting requests for funds to build prisons in Cambodia after all the tyranny the Khmer people had endured in such places (p. 62).

Moreover, as with the example cited earlier of the constraint UNMIK-P faced concerning the need to collaborate with the KPS, whose sieve-like security procedures undermined police operations, U.N. CivPol in Cambodia had to "rely on the Cambodian police forces, which were significantly politicized and not covered by the detailed provisions of the Paris Agreements, as were the armed forces of the parties" (70).

Politicization of police and the judiciary is a common problem in post-conflict reconstruction and should be a routine concern in planning a transition to peace. The police cannot function for long in the absence of the other two legs of the security triad: the judiciary and the penal institutions. Miscreants can be detained, but detention is supposed to be a temporary measure. Justice demands they be held accountable for any crimes or released in a timely fashion, but to do so requires the judiciary and a prison system. If the pre-existing system is politicized, it must be reformed or rebuilt.

The UNMIK mission foresaw such issues for Kosovo. Concomitant with the revocation of autonomy for Kosovo, Yugoslavia had undertaken a "judicial cleansing" that led to a circumstance in which only 30 Albanians could be counted among the 756 judges and prosecutors in the province (Gwaltney, 2002). The International Crisis Group reported in 2002 on the public-safety situation confronting UNMIK and KFOR:

> A climate of impunity reigned when UNMIK and KFOR arrived in Kosovo. Police lacked the strength to secure public safety; no judicial system existed to conduct trials, and no prisons could incarcerate criminals. … UNMIK took these issues so seriously as to establish the Police and Justice Pillar (known as Pillar One) in May 2001 (2002, p. 9).

Captain Gwaltney (2002) writes that Task Force Falcon, the American element of KFOR in 1999, found it needed to "police criminal misconduct, provide judicial review for those arrested, and establish and run prisons" (p. 233). To help transition these tasks to an indigenous construct, the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General established an emergency judicial system, appointing 30 judges and 12 prosecutors in 6 months.

Similarly, several years before in Haïti, the first of several Army civil affairs Ministerial Advisory Teams (MAT) addressed the justice triad, and its assessment formed the basis for USAID (United States Agency for International Development) programs and mentoring teams (Bingham, Rubini, & Cleary, 2001). A second MAT focused on the judiciary and facilitated coordination between the

Haitian Ministry of Justice and the U.S. Ambassador's interagency justice task force to support this sector of Haitian society. The relatively quick deployability of U.S. Army Reserve civil affairs elements allowed the country team access to subject-matter expertise more quickly than could be accomplished through other government agencies, addressing in effect for the judiciary the same kind of deployment gap that has been identified repeatedly for CivPol contingents.

Conclusion

The mandates under which U.N. CivPol operate have often been negotiated with gaps left to be worked out on site. This situation is not unusual in international diplomacy. One of the challenges of interpretation of deliberations and translation of documents is to capture in each language nuances of possible meaning rather than to choose terms that would preclude acceptance by the parties to the negotiation. Expansive meaning may facilitate acceptance of an agreement, but implementation may then require more negotiation. To avoid unacceptable risk to the peacekeepers, military staff often ensure that the tasks for the peacekeeping force are clearly understood and agreed on by all parties. In an environment in which the intervention force is prepared to impose its will by force of arms, it may issue a demarche to one side of a dispute. Such a threat must be credible and cause a potential opponent to consider that the risk of violating the intervention terms is too great to move against that force. Police mandates have been less well defined, and the interests of CivPol members often have been less defended than those of the military. This gap is to be expected when the international community often has no idea which nations will provide CivPol forces and their leadership. But, the police function is a significant element in the transition from conflict to peace. Its interests must be represented if its mission is to succeed.

The military education system provides a wealth of information that addresses everything from tactical leadership to preparing to mobilize industry for high-intensity wars. Senior service colleges address grand strategy and the interaction of various elements of national power. Recent military publications have been addressing this range of functions and sectors in discussions of joint interagency task forces and their employment with military operations. Washington-area discussions, particularly among civilian leaders in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, keep socializing the concept of legislation that would achieve for interagency coordination the same result that flowed from the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, through which the individual services overcame rivalries to operate together. There is discussion as well about the desirability of a National Security University that would draw candidates for senior leadership from across executive departments to facilitate future interagency coordination to achieve foreign-policy objectives.

Senior military leaders are now schooled in flexible-deterrent options, policy alternatives that can be used to avoid conflict, and in ending conflicts, as well as in indirect leadership, the anticipation of third-order effects of policy decisions, and the myriad influences on military campaigns. But, the most understudied aspect of national-security education must be the complex of diplomatic, economic, industrial, military, public-health, justice, and social issues

that must be addressed in concert to help a society emerge from war into peace. Peace is far more than the absence of war, and a bad peace is but a prescription for a subsequent war (Müller, 1999). Peace must be planned with the same care as we take to defeat an enemy in war. No single government agency can accomplish these tasks alone. Neither can the panoply of agencies accomplish them separately. They must coordinate their responses if they are to replace the causes of conflict with the infrastructure of opportunity.

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The Militarism of the Police Reconsidered

Gene Stephens

All we are saying is
give peace a chance.
—John Lennon, 1969

We have met the enemy and he is us.
—Pogo Papers, 1952–53

The traditional military model imposes unacceptable assumptions and expectations on police agencies. Major among the assumptions is that there is an "Enemy." Major among the expectations is that that "Enemy" must be contained or defeated.

The truth is there is no Enemy and thus there is no need to expect containment or defeat.

In a democracy, police are the servants of the people and often are given the responsibility of protecting their persons, their property, and their civil liberties. Indeed, police may be asked by the public served to further accept responsibility for numerous "quality of life" tasks desired by the citizenry. These constituents, thus, are the decisionmakers, and the police are the servants (see Neighborhood-driven Policing volume).

All citizens, including past and present offenders—caught or uncaught—are part of this constituency because everyone at times violates the law, and everyone at times is a victim of law violation. The public cannot be neatly divided into law-abiding or law-breaking citizens.

If police only protected the life, property, and liberty of constant law-abiding citizens, their role would be simple indeed. No one would qualify for services. Acceptance of this "dualistic fallacy" (that good citizens and evildoers are totally separate people), postulated by criminologists, indicates the further fallacy of using traditional military tactics in policing the community.

Indeed, given its new mission of peacekeeping and nation building in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has itself adopted new nontraditional tactics designed to "win the hearts and minds" of the people and are even looking to American police agencies for models. Those models lie within the realm of community-oriented policing (COP).

The task here is to offer an alternative to the traditional military approach—a model that combines COP, problem-solving, neighborhood-driven, and restorative justice approaches into a seamless system based on bringing peace, not war, to communities everywhere.

Important Questions that Remain

I. Who is the criminal? This should examine different perspectives on the question and adopt a specific definition.

2. How successful are war model efforts to contain/defeat the criminal element? (Perhaps using UCR clearance rates to examine the "success" of current policing efforts.)

3. What have national commissions found about the causes of crime and successes of crime suppression efforts? (Conclusions of several commissions concerning the reasons crime suppression has not worked well.)

4. How do proactive approaches differ from reactive approaches to crime control? (Here literature on how COP, etc. differ from law and order approaches may be most useful.)

5. How would a proactive peace model policing system work? (Outline a theoretical model.)

6. How would a proactive peace model policing system dovetail with a restorative justice system? (The basics of restorative justice postulate that if police fail to keep the peace, restorative justice seeks a 'balanced' approach to minimize damage and avoid further occurrences of the problem.)

7. How would a peace model make us safer and more secure than a traditional military policing model? (Perhaps a comparison of the two models plus a narrative would be useful here.)

Convergence: The Changing Missions of Police and the Military

Robert J. Bunker

For decades, both professionals and lay individuals alike have recognized that the missions of the police and the military have been changing. In an idealized world, the mission of the police is to maintain law and order within a healthy and functioning nation-state. Crime is committed only by a small percent of the citizenry and is perpetrated by criminals acting alone or, at best, in small groups. While organized crime may exist, it embraces a symbiotic relationship with the state, much as a small parasite lives off of a larger host, and wants neither to draw attention to itself nor to threaten the survival of the state. When unorganized and organized criminal activity reaches unaccepted levels, it is targeted by reactive police forces that rely upon criminal intelligence models. This reactive nature of policing results in short-term societal resource conservation because expenditures do not have to be made until after an incident has taken place. Further, the lack of a sentient opposing force (enemy) for police to contend with has resulted in the lack of an operational art developing. Consequently, police primarily function at either the tactical (individual patrol) level, focusing on person-to-person interactions, citations, and arrests, or the strategic (police chief) level, focusing on political considerations and budgets. Policing itself closely follows an industrial model based on a hierarchical form of organization. However, with over 18,000 individual public policing entities in the United States, the vast majority of departments are extremely small in size.

On the other hand, again from the perspective of an idealized world, the mission of the military is to win our nation's wars against belligerent nation-states. Such wars are best fought overseas. The First and Second World Wars represent the archetypical examples of how and where these wars should be conducted. Peace between nations is viewed as the natural condition of an international system dominated by the West, and wars have distinct beginnings and ends defined by international law and the rules of war. The military services also operate under an industrial model based on a hierarchical form of organization; however, because only a handful of services exist, they are extremely large in size. Intelligence follows a military model that focuses on enemy intent and capabilities and is forward looking and proactive in contrast to policing intelligence models.

Defined as it was by the decades-long Cold War, the world that most of us grew up in is no more, yet it largely established our modern policing and military missions and expectations. That world was far more idealized than the one we currently find ourselves living in today. Within its constructs, policing and military missions were for the most part separate, although it is recognized that more than a few overlaps did exist. The Vietnam conflict was a "police action" and did not play out like the World Wars with mass industrial forces waging battles of annihilation and attrition. On the home front, large-scale rioting took place in urban centers during the Vietnam conflict, overwhelming policing capabilities and requiring military-like intervention to restore civil order. From time to time, natural disasters have also required direct National Guard and military participation to ease suffering, provide humanitarian aid, and help with reconstruction. Even with these noted overlaps, policing and

military missions were still considered distinct activities. The Vietnam conflict and resultant outbreak of domestic urban rioting were considered anomalies of limited duration and consequence, at variance with the more historically representative idealized views of that era.

This has all changed now. With the end of the Cold War, rise in societal conflict, and subsequent 9/11 attacks, dominant perceptions have changed. The continued convergence of policing and military missions represents the new world in which we increasingly find ourselves. The need for such convergence can be explained at both the operational and strategic levels of analysis. This document will use four conceptual figures to aid understanding of the convergence.

Operational Trends

The overlaps between policing and military missions can be viewed in Figure 1, Threat Environment. These overlaps represent what is known as the “blurring of crime and war” or the “gray area” operational environment. This operational environment readily exists in failed states and failed communities. It is also the environment within which non-state or criminal soldiers exist. Heavily armed and armored (bulletproof vest wearing) drug gangs, drug cartel enforcers, terrorists, and insurgents all exist within this gray area between traditional policing and military missions. Rather than fleeing pursuing police forces, these criminal combatants, such as suicide bombers and terrorist assault teams, will actively close in and engage police officers much as military forces do. Over the course of the last three to four decades, this environment has increased in size and scope, and the capability gap that it represents has become more of a challenge to the security of nation-states.

Figure 1 Threat Environment[1]



Source: Courtesy of Counter-OPFOR Corporation ©

To contend with the new operational environment, the convergence of policing and military missions has taken place (see Figure 2 New Security (Response) Environment). From the public safety side, this capability gap has resulted in the development of specialized skills and units that promote missions that are more military-like in nature. An early example of this trend is evidenced in the formation of Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams that first emerged in the late 1960s in Los Angeles. The Los Angeles Police Department’s (LAPD) SWAT team was created as a reaction to the capability gap apparent when it had to contend with urban guerrillas, such as the Black Panthers and Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), lone wolf snipers, and mass urban rioting. SWAT teams based on the Los Angeles model have since been replicated throughout the United States with well in excess of 500 teams now in

[1]This figure was first published in Robert J. Bunker and Matt Begert, “Overview: Defending against enemies of the state.” Robert J. Bunker, ed. Special double issue on “Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers.” *Global Crime, 7 (3–4),*. August-November 2006. p. 311.

existence. At a much greater level of organization, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) emerged after 9/11 due to the organizational capability gap recognized following the Al Qaeda attacks. Interestingly, the 9/11 attacks can be simultaneously viewed as both criminal and warlike acts.

From the military perspective, the rise in the use of non-lethal weapons (NLW) by military forces is just one portent of the need for more police-like capabilities. Rather than the previously clear cut mission of killing an enemy in wartime, military forces are increasingly being deployed to failed and failing states to conduct peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR). In those unstable environments, it is also imperative to have a rheostatic ability that includes NLW capabilities. The increasing importance placed on military police, PSYOP (psychological operations), and public affairs units—in addition to the growth and importance of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)—is additional evidence of the need for police-like capabilities in the military. Focusing on the domestic side, the rise of Homeland Defense as a component of our U.S. National Defense posture is quite noticeable. Fielding specialized National Guard Teams with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) response capabilities and creating U.S. Northern Command, with its responsibility for homeland defense and civil support to the U.S., provide another two examples of the attempts to close the gray area gap between police and military activities.

It should be noted that the previous lines between police and military intelligence requirements have also blurred with growing police interest in military intelligence and growing military interest in criminal intelligence. The more successful policing counter-terrorism intelligence entities that now exist, such as the Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) group model, utilize both forms of intelligence in their fusion processes. Outside of the U.S., Holland has already blended military-police mission and organization with the creation of the Dienst Speciale Interventies (DSI), a joint police and military anti-terror squad that targets both terrorists and organized crime.[2]

Figure 2 New Security (Response) Environments[3]



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Strategic Trends

If the threat and response environments previously discussed were solely operational-level issues, the expectation exists that the capability gap would be fully closed as police and military converge missions. This has been far from the case, however. In fact, the capability gap appears to be growing with more nations of the world failing and more "no go" policing areas emerging in urban centers—especially in the massive

[2] "Police and Army form joint anti-terror squad." EXPATICA. 2 January 2006. http://www.expatica.com/actual/article.asp?subchannel_id=1&story_id=26470
[3] See note 1.

slums found in much of the developing world.

It may be that the United States, indeed the global community, is facing a deeper change than at first glance. Fourth Epoch War research conducted over the last two decades theorizes that the United States is facing a historic era of change, equivalent to that during the transition from the Classical to the Medieval era and the Medieval to the Modern era (See Figure 3 Epochal Change). Prior periods of epochal change also manifested the blurring lines between crime and war along with the rise of non-state or criminal-soldier forces that challenged the dominant state-form type. These eras of change were characterized by policing and military mission convergence and, ultimately, the deinstitutionalization of defensive state functions to private armies and security groups. Present operations in Iraq and the extensive fielding of such private military companies (PMCs) as Blackwater Worldwide have direct historical parallels to the Roman fielding of Germanic and Hunnish mercenaries and Medieval contracts let to the infamous Black Company and other mercenary groups.

Epochal change functions at all levels of human social and political organization and is ultimately facilitated by a qualitative change in the energy foundations of civilization. Another term for epochal change is a “Revolution in Political and Military Affairs” (RPMA). The following attributes of epochal change have been identified with notes on probable post-Modern characteristics in *italics*:

- Advanced energy foundation *(post-mechanical)*
- Advanced economy *(informational)*
- Social class reorganization *(middle-class culling)*
- Advanced technology and weaponry *(advanced less lethal & directed energy)*
- Emergence of the non-state or criminal soldier *(global proliferation)*
- Advanced battlespace *(5th dimensional)*
- Advanced warfighting concepts *(network disruption & bond-relationship targeting)*
- Advanced force structure *(network based)*
- Blurring of crime and war *(9/11 as criminal act and act of war)*
- Convergence of policing and military missions *(police SWAT, military NLW)*
- Privatization of the police (corrections) and the military *(e.g., Blackwater, Wackenhut)*
- Failed states *(e.g. Lebanon, Somalia, Iraq)*
- New emerging state forms & nation-state challengers *(e.g. European Union, Al Qaeda)*
- New sciences *(string theory, dark matter, nanotechnology, biotechnology)*

Figure 3 Epochal Change[4]

Source: Counter-OPFOR Corporation ©. Appears by courtesy of copyright holder

[4] The Epochal Change model was developed in the late 1980s. This model is a component of Fourth Epoch War theory initially developed by Robert J. Bunker and Lindsay Moore. This theory was created for applied use by U.S. military and, later, U.S. law enforcement agencies.

Figure 4 (OPFOR Threat Potentials) analyzes threat potentials over time, expressing the intensity of military challenges to the United States. This analysis is based on an elaboration of the *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) Challenges model (p. 19) based on the four quadrants of traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges.

Figure 4 OPFOR Threat Potentials[5]



Source: Counter-OPFOR Corporation ©. Appears by courtesy of copyright holder

Little convergence of policing and military missions existed during the modern era in which traditional challenges dominate. It is projected that in the post-modern era, in which disruptive challenges (i.e., what will someday become future conventional warfare) dominate, this will once again be the case. The reason for this is that the dominant state-form of each epochal period has built effectively functioning institutions that draw upon the prevailing energy source of the era. The epochal transition we now find ourselves in, if 9-11 can be considered a firebreak, sees the domination of irregular challenges to the United States. Because the latter are primarily non-state or criminal-soldier based, are targeted against the U.S. globally (i.e., OCONUS and CONUS), and blur the crime and war operational environments, they result in policing and military mission convergence. During this period of epochal change, legacy challenges and still emergent disruptive challenges will also exist. Catastrophic challenges derived from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) can be applied to all of these forms. The addition of catastrophic to irregular challenges, such as when combined into WMD terrorism, offers an especially threatening potential for domestic policing and responder assets to contend with.[6]

From a Fourth Epoch War perspective, the epochal change we are now undergoing will likely last into the late 21st century, if not into the early-to-mid 22nd century. For this reason, policing and military mission convergence will most likely become far more pronounced before it begins to subside. With this heightened convergence and the need to respond to the crime and war capability gap, issues of police and military privatization need, at the very least, to be touched upon.[7]

[5] Modified version derived from diagram found in Robert J. Bunker, "Beijing, Unrestricted Warfare, and Threat Potentials." Hearing on "China's Military Modernization and Its Impact on the United States and the Asia-Pacific", Panel II: Beijing's Doctrine on the Conduct of "Irregular Forms of Warfare" U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission website www.uscc.gov. Posted 29 March, 2007. In Final Report: Hearing before the U.S.-China economic and security review commission, One hundred tenth Congress, First Session, March 29–30, 2007. United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission. www.uscc.gov United States–China economic and security review commission, Washington: May 2007.

[6] OPFOR Cocktails are a blending of traditional, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges with the potential for the addition of catastrophic challenges.

[7] While these proceedings of the Futures Working Group (FWG) focused on Police and the Military, the significance and impact that private police and private military corporations will have on those institutions of the nation-state cannot be ignored.

Privatization of the Police and the Military

While the crime and war operational environment is the non-state or criminal soldiers' playground, it is also the natural environment in which private security and private military corporations conduct their missions. This is in sharp contrast to institutionalized policing agencies and the military services except, of course, for specialized units, such as traditional SWAT teams; the integrated SWAT, bomb squad, and airborne law enforcement bureaus, which are emerging; and military special operations units that were specifically created with this capability gap in mind.

The potential for contemporary private military companies (PMCs) to function effectively in today's gray area environment was first witnessed by the achievements of the South African mercenary firm Executive Outcomes (EO) in Angola and Sierra Leone, primarily in the early 1990s. EO feats were even more impressive given earlier failures by United Nations peacekeepers. The latter were unable to bring about any form of peace to troubled Sierra Leone prior to EO being brought in to route the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and stabilize the country enough that mining operations could continue. PMC potentials were magnified by the U.S. Army's doctrinal usage of the term "Operations Other Than War" (OOTW) in the early 1990s to characterize missions outside of conventional war as not being true warfare and, hence, not worthy of professional soldiers. While the U.S. Army later reversed this doctrinal position and the U.S. Marines Corps became increasingly interested in Fourth Generation Warfare thinking focused on non-state threats, PMCs quietly emerged to support U.S. deployments overseas. Some of the largest and best known are the Vinnell Corporation, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), and Blackwater Worldwide. Additionally, given the downsizing of U.S. standing forces, strict troop limits set on foreign operations, and the extent of operations expanding, PMCs have become an indispensable component to the projection of American power abroad.

On the domestic side, a trend towards increased private policing along with the privatization of prisons is evident. However, unlike in the military realm, private security personnel and guards have outnumbered sworn law enforcement officers for many generations now. Thoughts also exist that, while a backlash against privatization of prisons may be occurring in the U.S., on a global scale, prison privatization may just be picking up momentum.

Another collateral trend is the increase of gated and walled commu-nities in the U.S., and many other parts of the world, especially in developing regions dominated by social structures based on the haves (the rich) and the have-nots (the poor). These commu-nities have removed themselves from free public access, with the wealthier ones typically hiring their own security to man the gates and patrol the protected areas behind the walls. Of note is the more recent trend seen with Blackwater Worldwide's deployment of armed guards to protect the wealthy neighbour-hoods of New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Interestingly, no convergence of policing and military missions needed discussion or debate in this instance. To a corporation, such as Blackwater Worldwide, a contract is a contract with little distinction between foreign or domestic deployments--they define gray area environments as pretty much all the same. The lack of such nuances should

be more than a little troubling to the poor in New Orleans.

The short-term benefits of utilizing PMCs and private police are many and include quick-surge ability, fielding trained and qualified personnel, mission focus with few bureaucratic restrictions, and, in the case of overseas deployments, little public outcry over private security contractor deaths as opposed to U.S. troops. The political advantages of outsourcing are readily obvious domestically, with the “Bring the Troops Home” signs and demonstrations. We have never once seen “Bring the Mercenaries Home” signs; however, the present firestorm in Congress over PMCs in Iraq has created political heat for the current presidential administration.

The long-term benefits to such outsourcing are unknown, but if we consult historical lessons learned, we quickly see that the old mercenary motto *Point d'argent, point de Suisse* (French) or *Kein Geld, kein Schweizer* (German)—which translates into “No Money, No Swiss”—still haunts us. Currently, the large U.S. PMCs draw their employees principally from former U.S. law enforcement officers and service personnel and, in the case of Blackwater Worldwide, require an oath of allegiance to the United States. In the future, there is a real possibility that these groups will either train recruits from within, breaking the current bond the present recruits have to the state, or they may undertake a wholesale reliance upon foreign recruits as individual sub-contractors. The latter trend is already occurring in Iraq because of the cost effectiveness of relying upon foreign nationals whose contracts are cheaper than those of U.S. personnel. Concern that, in the future, these large PMCs may merge with or be acquired by foreign-aligned multinational corporations is also not unwarranted.

The primary issue concerning the privatization of the police and the military will be its interrelationship with the convergence of policing and military missions. This is not only an operational issue but ultimately a strategic issue. The nation-state form is undergoing a period of increasing outsourcing and privatization. The historical antecedents of today’s private security corporations became ascendant on the new battlefield. The nation-state form is very much caught up in a cyclical process of civilization advancement. Thus, the question we must ask ourselves is whether it can survive the transition to the post-Modern era intact or if we will witness the rise of a nation-state successor form. While these broad historical events play out, our key concerns are to protect the liberties inscribed by our Constitution, our government, and its people. To succeed in this endeavor, the proper mixture and usage of police, military, and private security forces, based on some extremely well-informed choices, will be required.

Summary and Conclusion

Policing and military missions are witnessing an increasing convergence due to operational and strategic trends. At the operational level, the capability gap posed by the crime and war operational environment is readily apparent. To contend with this gap, the missions of the police and the military are moving toward each other. This convergence will likely continue for many decades to come. At the strategic level, the most pertinent issue will be whether the nation-state can survive the epochal transition into the post-Modern era or if it will be forced to evolve into a new form of social and

political organization (i.e., state form). During this period of deinstitutionalization and privatization of state functions, the ascendant role of private policing and private military organizations must also be factored in. Their increasing use will pose many implications for U.S. policing and military institutions. Corporate police and warriors ultimately have the potential to be either the most trusted allies or the most feared enemies of the nation-state form. At some point in the future, most likely in the late 21st century or early-to-mid 22nd century, current operational and strategic issues will likely be solved, and state-based police and military forces will once again dominate. At that point, we can expect them again to have separate and distinct missions just as they did prior to the era of epochal, though cyclical, change we are now undergoing.

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Head Starts: What Policing Can Learn About Leadership from the Military

John Jackson

Cops frequently point out the differences between policing agencies and the military. In no subject is the difference more clear than in views toward leadership; it is also the area in which police can learn the most from the military. The state of leadership in law enforcement has long been lamented. Curiously, IACP has endorsed the West Point Leadership Program as a solution. This endorsement recognizes a simple fact: the military is miles ahead of law enforcement in developing leadership throughout its ranks.

Leadership is probably one of the most variably defined concepts in modern society. Leadership literature is abundant, and a great many gurus have their own particular brands. The variation informs us of an important aspect: leadership comes in many forms, each more or less suited to particular situations. Consequently, terms like "servant leadership" and "orchestral leadership" have emerged to describe the approach of leaders in modern Information Age organizations. As a complete survey of leadership is beyond the scope of this essay, I will restrict myself to a recommendation of Clippinger's (n.d.) concise articulation of different leadership roles.[1]

Leadership is not a function of rank. The military recognizes this fact, attempting in its training and culture to encourage leaders to act. The military adopts a total career perspective in its development of leaders. With separate paths for officers and enlisted, each service provides an incremental array of training designed to reinforce socialization, develop leadership, build management skills, and improve awareness of the strategic environment. For officers and enlisted, the journey begins with an accession training in its various forms (service academies, ROTC, officer candidate school, or basic training). For officers of each service, the training is remarkably similar: (1) a commander school as a senior lieutenant or junior captain, (2) a staff officer school as a senior captain or major, and (3) War College as a colonel (or lieutenant colonel). Typically, enlisted will complete an introductory course before becoming an NCO (non-commissioned officer). An NCO and a Senior NCO course follow at subsequent grades. The curricula of these courses are similarly structured, with higher-level courses covering subjects in greater detail and with increasing emphasis on managerial skills and strategic awareness.

While exceptions may exist, most police agencies spend little time on developing leadership. At best, cops receive training when they reach middle management,[2] yet even this training is predominantly focused on management, rather than leadership. As Warren Bennis[3] so ably distinguished, management and leadership are not synonymous; the activities activate completely different perspectives and skill sets (Nanus, 1992). Generally, police agencies are seen to be flush in managerial skills and impoverished in leadership.

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[1] Clippinger, J. H. (n.d.). *Leadership*. Retrieved from http://www.socialphysics.org/images/leadership.pdf.

[2] For example: California's Command College requires applicants to be "employed in a management position or higher."

[3] Nanus, B. (1992). Visionary *leadership*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc.

Ironically, the operational mode of modern policing (in which we deploy units of one or, less frequently, two officers in response to calls for service) makes the need to recognize, encourage, and shape leadership even more important. Leaders exist at every level, and the “natural” leaders who influence their peers can greatly influence the behavior of police agencies. At best, such leaders are untapped resources; at worst, they are free-roaming agents driving the organization in a direction counter to the values of the public.

We are living in interesting times. We are nearing a historical threshold: the point at which the knowledge economy supersedes the industrial economy. Only twice before have economies transitioned at such scale: the move from the hunter-gatherer economy to the agrarian and, subsequently, from agrarian to industrial. Amidst this transition is an accompanying fact; we live in a time of accelerating change. The first signs of agriculture occurred around 9,500 B.C.,[4] more than 11,000 years ago. Although incomplete information makes identifying a point at which agriculture became the predominant economic activity difficult, it was well established in most civilizations by 5,000 B.C.. Industrialization emerged in the United Kingdom in the mid 18th Century and became dominant in the 19th Century. The time between transitions has shrunk from around 6,900 years in the first case to 150 years in the present transition.

The pace of change challenges modern organizations. Industrial Age hierarchies are proving too intractable to be able to process the information demands placed upon them by the rapidly changing environment. Agility is emerging as a critical attribute for success in the Knowledge Age, which creates a tension with the need to manage. *Management* imposes structure and institutionalizes relationships and procedures; the installed base that results impedes adjustment. Management resists change; physicists call this phenomena inertia. Organizations pursuing agility are transitioning “management” from a human resource to a software asset in their information infrastructure. In these organizations, leadership comes to predominate. Management is a necessary skill, but supervisors are, nevertheless, leaders rather than managers. In order to enable the operational edge[5] of the organization to adapt rapidly to changes in the environment, the edge must be empowered to act independently. How do we entrust them to do so in the appropriate way? Knowledge Age leadership exists in two places: the center (command) and the edge. The center shapes the organization through constant expression of command intent that sets the boundaries of behavior. The center shapes the culture of the organization by controlling its membership (through recruitment and termination), making known its value preferences, and defining the training. Edge leadership employs operational resources within the boundaries set by command through coordination, collaboration, and reinforcement of cultural norms. Information infrastructures that enable broad communication help to create a condition of shared awareness. With shared awareness, shared experience (through common training), trust, and clear command intent, the conditions for agility are created. Once again, the

[4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agriculture#Ancient_Origins

[5] The edge is the portion of the organization that interfaces with the external world.

military is at the forefront of leadership in the Knowledge Age (see also Alberts & Hayes, 2003; Alberts, Garstka, & Stein, 2000).[6]

In the coming years, police will likely continue to face constraints on resources, particularly its human capacities. At the same time, they will face a rapidly changing world that creates new problems for order maintenance and new opportunities for criminals to exploit. In the face of such challenges, organizations will adapt agility or fail. While failing organizations may not disappear altogether, the public will lose faith in their police, political bodies (particularly municipalities) will suffer, and police substitutes, such as private security will prosper. Ordered agility will require a revolution in leadership, at the top and at the bottom of the enterprise. Leadership must be emphasized among all ranks, and promotional processes must be redesigned to select leaders over managers. In all this, police should look to the military for guidance.

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[6] See the Department of Defense Command and Control Research Project: www.dodccrp.org. Includes:

Alberts, D. S., & Hayes, R. E. (2003). *Power to the edge.* Washington, D.C.: DoD Command and Control Research Program.

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Info Ops: The Importance of Electronic Warfare

Scott Curtin

Addressing the changes in society over the past decade will ultimately bring any discussion to the technology behind those changes. So much of what society does on a day-to-day basis is tied to ones and zeros that provide binary systems the information necessary for them to act. Like Latin, the binary language is rarely understood but critical to the functioning of society. The military is tasked with protecting national security against all enemies and U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), in particular, is tasked with our national security concerns within cyberspace. Although cybersecurity, cyberwarfare, and cyberpolicing are terms that are gaining more media attention recently, there has been a concerted effort to address concerns within the digital realm since the original Internet was created. Today a large part of this effort in the military is found in Information Operations (IO).

Information operations — The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. (JP 1-02)

While the definition above is understood by military members, to most readers it can be difficult to wrap oneself around all of the different ideas included. In simple terms, IO is the protection of friendly information environments and the undermining or destruction of the enemy's information environment. The 2006 release of Joint Publication (JP) 3-13 – Information Operations has helped the military to break down the information environment into three interrelated dimensions that can be acted upon in order to be successful. The information environment is defined in JP 3-13 as the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.



While these documents and definitions focus on addressing the concerns facing the military today, they will help address the future concerns of the military as well. While the physical and informational dimensions will change in the future, the changes will be supported by business models that can easily be analyzed and integrated into a

course of action. The only area that will need further study and consideration will be the military's definition of operations in the cognitive dimension, and, more important, the integration of non-military partners, such as local, state, and federal policing, into effecting the cognitive aspects of the information environment.

The importance of the informational environment and its dimensions when discussing information operations cannot be understated. All military actions require a common perspective of the operating environment in order to best decide on multiple courses of action. Unlike conventional actions of the military, the environment of cyberspace cannot be viewed on a map or built into a scale model. Information operations, both offensive and defensive, require an unconventional ability to function in a semi-organized vacuum and discern the nuances of multiple cultural and technical players simultaneously. The future will contain enemies that are on par with or exceeding in their abilities to utilize the cyber domain to further their aims. The primary reasons for this capability edge are reduced technology costs and the lack of management oversight on cyber-based activities. Consider the hypothetical description in the adjacent text box.

To win the future IO battle, both within the United States and abroad, the military must embrace three concepts: 1) intelligence gathering and forensic sciences are the same within the information environment; 2) business and cybermarketing techniques are more useful than traditional information operations in the virtual community; 3) identifying centers of gravity both in the information environment and in the real world must lead to corresponding and fitting actions in both.

Intelligence gathering and forensic sciences have many similarities in the real world. Within the digital world, those similarities disappear, and the arts of both intelligence and forensics become one and the same. All intelligence must be looked upon from a crime perspective, and all forensic material must be used for developing intelligence. Although many would say that this already occurs or that the two work well with each other, it only takes an organization chart to see that the two functions are almost always shown separately. Fusion of experts in both traditional fields must begin at the organizational level with immediate replication in the training realm. The future demands that we correctly capture the forensic data in order to properly prosecute or attack a threat, but that the same data serve to create personality

Financially, policing faces an uphill battle with regard to technology. The enemy is better resourced and less constrained in the usage of new technology. A cell of 5 terrorists can better communicate, collaborate, and execute crimes in the virtual and real world by simple economics. Five reasonably priced laptops will cost no more than $5000. Connectivity is provided by wireless fidelity (WiFi) in free hot spots (Starbucks, Panera, and some gas stations). Advanced hacking tools can be downloaded for free off of many Web sites and used to gain the advanced intelligence for a crime. Some cheap and effective methods can be utilized to mask the users from tracking and remove digital fingerprints once they leave. The manuals to build weapons can be downloaded from known terrorist Web sites, and online courses can be utilized to help the terrorists know how and where to buy components needed to assemble a bomb to include those that use Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) elements. If they are rather inept, they can actually get online assistance and troubleshooting on other terrorist web sites from experienced bombers. For less than $10,000, a terrorist team can set up shop in Anywhere, U.S. In contrast, police entities must purchase standardized equipment through a procurement process that raises the typical computer price to a premium, with outdated or disparate integration with existing or legacy systems. Systems are often not customized for the operations required and include many useless add-ons that can reduce the functionality of the system. Cross-jurisdictional issues also apply because of local, state, and interstate funding sources leading to ineffective management and collaboration in geographically related areas. The extremist, non-state actors already have an upperhand when it comes to cyberspace.

models, orders of battle, cultural understandings, and identification of communities that can be encouraged to support or targeted for deception operations.

The WWW (World Wide Web) serves as a source of entertainment for many, news for others, and economics for still others. Many people utilize it for all three and more. For this reason, the WWW is a large medium for business style marketing. Where people visit, spend, and add information on the WWW are all easily tracked and analyzed for targeted marketing. This construct is essential to future information operations because it allows military and cultural experts to identify, exploit, and recruit from the right sources. Imagine a future when the forensic/intelligence fusion allows information operations to target an extremist group with the messages necessary to keep them from escalating to violence or providing the necessary targeting to recruit and train others to do the same without direct links to the United States. While there have been some forays into online recruitment for the military, the lack of targeted marketing reduced the benefits that could have been reaped. The future use of the Internet to help provide national security must be supported by and targeted at a younger community than is currently used by the military. With age comes maturity, but it also reduces the level of marketing savvy necessary to address and target the growing youth bulge in the troubled regions. Most marketing firms look to younger recruits to keep them plugged in to the pulse of fashion, music, and other entertainment concerns. The firms have also begun to use emerging digital mediums to solicit ideas, poll audiences, and hook their buying public. The majority of users in the information environment get their news online (not from newspapers), express their interests in blogs and "wikis" (not in diaries or notebooks), and search for guidance in life among the many online resources (not in their neighborhood church, synagogue, or mosque). To be successful, the military must continue to look for the next new forum and begin to collaborate more with the marketing culture.

Center of Gravity - The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.

JP 1-02

While the concept of "centers of gravity" elicits active debate, within this discussion the definition provided in the adjacent textbox will be used. Focusing only on real-world centers of gravity or only on digital centers of gravity is a misuse of resources and personnel. The future will create greater dependency between the two environments and a failure to address both simultaneously would be akin to pulling off a single leg from a centipede and believing that you have immobilized it. The growth of a digitally savvy enemy has surprised many, and the future will better empower those that are willing to immerse themselves on the fringes of societal norms. The proof of cellular organizations within terrorist groups being a successful model in the real world is mirrored in their practices and organization within the virtual world. This model of success will become the model for future criminal and extremist activities. The marriage between real and virtual models also ties together the groups' centers of gravity and offers an opportunity to act with greater impact against these groups. However, many efforts focus on using the virtual intelligence/forensics to act within the real world, without taking action

against the other parts of the cell in the digital realm, and vice versa. The future requires that we determine those centers of gravity that effect the real and world organizations simultaneously and create multiple second and third order effects.

> A cell of terrorists is controlled and contacted by one higher person through cell phones or digital messaging (emails, chat rooms, etc.). While investigating the terrorist cell, the military determines that the person who receives the information is the same all of the time. By monitoring communications they are able to determine the funding methods and isolate other members of the cell. Continued analysis helps to create a greater organizational and process-based model of the cell. Where the lines cross becomes a possible center of gravity. If funding goes to the primary cell leader and is deposited in a single online banking account, then an arrest of the cell leader and his upper-level contact, the simultaneous draining of the cell leaders bank account, and beginning a trace of activity on the upper level contacts bank account produces immediate and long-term ripples in the organization.

The military model for determining centers of gravity has helped to produce effects that support the national security mission and also reduce our enemy's capacity to effectively operate against us. Once the model is adapted and acted upon in both worlds, the rates of success and length of impact will increase dramatically.

The discussion of this paper has focused on the military model today and forecasts for the future. However, the question most likely to be asked is how it applies to policing. The military definition of the information environment, the dimensions of the environment, and how information operations will need to adapt for the future all have common sense applications to policing. The difference is in culture and not in concept. The military model was developed for the military, and any adaptation of the model to policing must include an analysis and modification for the culture of policing. The benefits of adopting the military model within the policing community are as numerous as those that the military will gain, but the policing-adapted model will require multiple adjustments to meet local, state, and federal laws and restrictions. Collaboration within the model will face the same cultural and physical barriers that policing faces between jurisdictions today, and those must be met with political and legal efforts to change authorities and laws. Finally, police adoption and adaptation must be integrated into the training models so that the next few generations of officers grow up with the mind-set of information environments and operations. Resistance is futile when we discuss globalization, and the failure of policing to immerse itself into the information environment will lead to a chasm between the community and the police.

> *I think we're critically dependent on the Internet today, and the depth of that dependence is constantly increasing. Aside from the obvious media and entertainment use of the Internet, from which we derive pleasure, the Internet is now central for communications, for commerce, for government, and for defense and utility industries. Pretty much all sectors of our society today have embraced the Internet and are now critically dependent on it -- and this will only increase going forward*. – Professor

Tom Leighton (Gardner, 2006, June 2)[1]

The military and policing have a role in the future of security operations within the information environment. While mission focuses will often be different, they will also likely overlap in many areas. As policing has been active in cyber-related activities since the World Wide Web first became public, much of the efforts to remain relevant in that effort are developed locally and fail to create a united front. The future requires that we adopt a collaborative nature between policing and the military.

[1] Gardner, D. (2006, June 2). Full transcript of Dana Gardner's briefings: Direct podcast on Akamai and cyber security. Message posted to http://briefingsdirect.blogspot.com/2006/06/full-transcript-of-dana-gardners.html.

Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)

Greg S. Weaver

Intelligence is a process as well as a product, the end result of transforming information into knowledge (Peterson, 2005). This statement also applies to open source intelligence (OSINT). Open source intelligence includes the synthesis of information available from outlets accessible to the public. Important examples of relevant information include that which is obtained from media outlets, publicly available documents and data, the Internet, professional and/or academic reports, articles, books, and “grey literature” which refers to academic and professional reports that are more difficult (but not impossible) to obtain from public outlets (Jardines, 2002; Lowenthal, 2003; Soule & Ryan, 2002). The terms *information* and *intelligence* are often used interchangeably when describing that which is obtained from open sources, but there are important differences. Just as putting flour, eggs, milk, sugar, etc., into an oven does not automatically result in a cake, open source data and information must be turned into open source intelligence. OSINT results when analysis and research is applied to open source information (Peterson, 2005). However, the utility of intelligence, including OSINT, cannot be realized unless it is also disseminated to those agencies that need it (Gunaratna & Chalk, 2002).

A North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2001:2-3) review outlines a taxonomy that shows how information and intelligence are not one in the same. In making this distinction, NATO identifies four primary categories, with subsequent categories building upon the previous one(s):

Open Source Data
↓
Open Source Information
↓
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
↓
Validated OSINT

Open source data consists of the plethora of raw materials that may be obtained from one or more sources, including oral and printed communication and/or documents as well as visual information (e.g., maps, photographs, and satellite images). Data that have been compiled and broadly organized constitute *open source information*. Open source Information has been subjected to a limited level of review and validation. Upon further analysis, open source information may be condensed, synthesized, and verified to produce open source intelligence. OSINT is usually distributed to a restricted and selected audience. The final category – Validated OSINT – consists of the final product that has been subjected to further verification/validation, often with corroborating evidence obtained from sensitive or closed sources. The repeated “distillation” and validation increases the accuracy and utility of the finished product. In that respect, OSINT can then be utilized by the collecting agency and others as a tool for a number of tasks.

OSINT is a valuable resource, but in some ways it can be a “double-edged sword” in that its benefits are also liabilities. A primary advantage of OSINT is that it is widely available from a number of sources. Because of few (if any) restrictions on use and distribution, open source information can be rapidly collected and, depending on the extensiveness of the accompanying

analysis performed, communicated or forwarded to others (Lowenthal, 2003; NATO, 2001). On the other hand, the sheer volume of available data and information can prove to be an impediment (Lowenthal, 2003). Identifying the relevant piece(s) from such a large body of data/information is a daunting task indeed. Vast amounts of data are difficult to organize and process, and the quality of some sources is suspect (Soule and Ryan, 2002).

One pertinent example of this issue can be found in information obtained from online sources. The Internet is becoming an increasingly important channel for obtaining open source information. However, the validity of some Web-pages or of documents contained in them is at best questionable. Some sources may contain inaccurate, biased, or misleading (unintentional or intentional) information. Also, documents and sites may be removed entirely from the Web, making it necessary to regularly archive entire Internet pages (Jardines, 2002). Another confounding issue is known as *echo*, when unsubstantiated information contained in one source is cited (without verification) by another. As a result, the relevance of a piece of inaccurate or unverified information may be exaggerated if it is reported in multiple outlets.

The amount of available information has increased exponentially, but development of actionable intelligence from it has not occurred at a similar pace (Lowenthal, 2003). While the military and law enforcement at all levels are under increasing pressure to develop and enhance intelligence capabilities, Peters (2006) warns that intelligence is not a panacea, suggesting that unrealistic expectations on the part of the public, agencies, and politicians alike must be tempered. Intelligence is but one of many tools that can be employed, but it does not replace the human element.

In the United States, the bulk of information contained in intelligence documents comes from open sources. OSINT is particularly valuable when coupled with other forms of intelligence or restricted materials. The latter (sensitive or classified information) is value added to the context and framework provided by the OSINT (deBorchgrave, Sanderson, and MacGriffin, 2006; Johnson, 2003). OSINT is a key piece of the figurative intelligence puzzle, yet its importance is often understated by the intelligence community (IC) itself (deBorchgrave et al., 2006). As mentioned elsewhere, the nature of crime is changing in important ways including that some activities transcend jurisdictional and geographical boundaries. Therefore, the responses to them must also be adjusted. In some ways, the use and sharing of OSINT is a possible mechanism through which cooperation between agencies and departments, laterally and vertically, can be improved.

The traditional IC is viewed as having a preventive or proactive function, whereas law enforcement has a greater reactive or investigative role. These different but complementary missions have, no doubt, affected the respective cultures of each. An unintended and unfortunate consequence is the lack of trust between agencies (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2005; 2007).

In some ways, intelligence as a process and as a product is viewed as a function of national security interests, not law enforcement. The former is designed to prevent harm and to protect the interests of the country, whereas law enforcement agencies have traditionally fulfilled an investigative role (Markle Foundation, 2003). The distinction of two categories of intelligence, tactical and

strategic, assists in illustrating this issue. Tactical intelligence refers to that which is typically associated with a particular case or investigation. In many instances, this intelligence may be archived or stored upon completion of an investigation, but it is usually not re-examined in the context of the larger law enforcement mission. Strategic intelligence, on the other hand, is more closely associated with the proactive elements of intelligence, focusing on the “big picture,” as opposed to a specific incident or case (Best, 2001; Peterson, 2005). The following example related to drug trafficking illustrates this distinction. Strategic intelligence would include knowledge about trafficking organizations, methods, and routes, whereas information on a specific shipment illustrates tactical intelligence (Best, 2001). Similarly, strategic intelligence is not limited to the enforcement function only. It is also a key component in planning efforts, staffing decisions, and in the development of policy and priorities (Evans, 2005).

However, Osborne (2006) correctly asserts that the process of taking information and, through research and analysis, producing actionable intelligence, differs little for law enforcement, intelligence agencies, or the military. This point is relevant for two key reasons. First, the boundaries between crime and issues related to national security have become increasingly blurred. For example, it is a widely held belief that proceeds from illegal drug trafficking are an important source of funds for terrorist organizations (Sullivan, 2001). Second, some acts, such as terrorism, human trafficking, and cybercrime, transcend geographical and jurisdictional boundaries. As a result, the need for cooperation between countries is increased. Deflem (2006) points to Europol as one such example. The jurisdiction and authority of Europol is defined in part by agreement between the member states of the European Union. Liaisons from one country are stationed in another. Similarly, the FBI has begun to assign attaché offices in a number of foreign countries. These arrangements not only increase the capacity to investigate crimes that cross national boundaries but also serve to provide a medium for information exchange as well as to strengthen relationships between individuals and agencies alike (Best, 2001). Studeman (2007) asserts that the intersection of different elements of the intelligence community is a function of cross-jurisdictional boundaries.

Beginning in the 1970s, an increasing number of restrictions were placed on domestic agencies in terms of having access to or collecting information on U.S. citizens unless that material was pertinent to an ongoing investigation or if reasonable suspicion warranted such action. However, these restrictions have been eased somewhat since 9/11 via changes authorized by the USA PATRIOT ACT (Markle Foundation, 2003). Clearly, the concern over compiling and accessing information on U.S. citizens is legitimate, but given that the boundaries between crime and national security have become increasingly blurred, balancing these concerns is of utmost importance. For example, since 9/11, law enforcement agencies have been allowed more leeway in terms of collecting intelligence, such as conducting public surveillance and performing Google searches (Markle Foundation, 2003). Both of these examples arguably fall under the general category of OSINT.

McNamara (2007) notes that at the present, a national, unified system for distributing unclassified information does not exist. Legal concerns and the cultures

of constituent agencies contribute to this problem. Until such a system has been developed, information sharing, laterally and vertically, will be less than optimal. A report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction suggests that the FBI, because of its dual role as an investigative and intelligence agency, is particularly well-suited to become the point through which intelligence is shared, provided that the long-standing practice of "stovepiping" information and a general sense of mistrust are ameliorated (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2005). Since 9/11, the FBI has, in fact, assumed a greater intelligence function, in part because the Bureau falls under the purview of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. As a member of and in conjunction with the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) units established throughout the country, its potential as an information conduit to other agencies has increased (Johnson, 2003; Markle Foundation, 2003; Markle Foundation, 2006). Additionally, it is suggested that because of the law enforcement role of the FBI, the concerns over collecting information on U.S. citizens and their civil liberties will not be ignored (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2005).

As mentioned previously, a long-standing bias in the intelligence community is that OSINT is inferior to classified or "high side" material. Also, for a number of reasons, there has been a tendency to overclassify or to restrict the availability of intelligence. This "need to know" approach limits the distribution of material that may be of benefit to a number of agencies. It is apparent that clear guidelines are necessary to facilitate the sharing of both open source and sensitive/classified information. Just as the definition of *law enforcement sensitive* differs across jurisdictions and agencies, so, too, does the question over who can have access to this information (Markle Foundation, 2003; McNamara, 2007). It has been suggested that an important change lies in moving from a philosophy of "need to know" to one of "responsibility to provide" information to those agencies that need it (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2007).

Another step in addressing these concerns lies in increasing the use of and access to OSINT. The Markle Foundation (2003) recommends that the emphasis should be placed on creating distributable products whose access can be restricted as more sensitive or even classified information is added, as opposed to automatically restricting this information at the onset. The dissemination of OSINT can be regulated via guidelines established beforehand, so development of consistent and usable policies is important. For example, the use of a virtual private network (VPN) dedicated to OSINT could greatly enhance the intelligence capabilities of various agencies and departments. Because the information contained in them is not classified per se, it is not necessary to hold a security clearance in order to access it.

Conclusion: "Where do we go from here?"

Clearly, a number of challenges must be addressed in order to better use OSINT. However, it accomplishes little to lament what has not been done in the past or to recommend unrealistic measures that are not feasible within the existing intelligence system. Perhaps one way to move forward is to acknowledge and learn from mistakes of the past. The following discussion takes this approach.

In *Sharing the Secrets: Open Source Intelligence and the War on Drugs*, Holden-Rhodes (1997) offers a compelling, yet controversial, account of how “round five (p. 2)” of the War on Drugs beginning in the 1980s was hindered by a lack of coordination, cooperation, and information sharing between various departments, agencies, and the military. The alleged under-utilization of OSINT is central to these claims. For example, Holden-Rhodes contends that OSINT can provide valuable information on drug trafficking and distribution.

In Holden-Rhodes opinion, one of the factors contributing to the failure of the War on Drugs occurred years earlier. From 1969-74, the Nixon administration characterized anti-drug efforts as an issue of national security. However, local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies have a prominent role in domestic drug issues, and its relationship vis-a-vis the military is complex. Poorly defined goals and unrealistic expectations led to political wrangling in a number of areas, and policy suffered. During the 1980s and beyond, the emphasis on anti-drug efforts resulted in large increases in available funding. According to Turner (1999), various agencies and departments scrambled to secure their share of the figurative financial pie. This competition resulted in a lack of cooperation between agencies, both horizontally (federal) and vertically (federal-state-local).

The “national security versus crime” debate is apparent in terrorism policy as well (for a recent review, see LaFree & Hendrickson (2007)), and there is no dearth of compelling arguments in support of either position. A detailed discussion is not needed to recognize that at times, the similarities between the war on drugs and the developing policies related to the global war on terror are unnerving. In essence, the author argues that the War on Drugs has been ineffective in large part because a rational, unified strategy is lacking. Furthermore, without a clearly defined system of command and control, the objectives at hand can be lost. He agrees with Wilson (1983, p. 49) who asserts that a rational policy must clearly identify goals and objectives and be geared to recognize the ones that are attainable (and those that are not) and what level of influence the government has to manipulate those goals or conditions to achieve the desired results. In short, the “Global War on Terror” falls on the collective shoulders of a number of agencies and departments, and cooperation is of utmost importance.

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Seams: Challenges in Interagency and Multilateral Collaboration

Kurt E. Müller

In major combat operations, in which two forces oppose each other on a “linear” battlefield, the intelligence section of each organization attempts to determine the identity of the opposing forces and where the boundaries between neighboring battalions, brigades, or divisions lie. These boundaries are inherently weak spots that require close coordination to ensure neighboring organizations pursue their tasks in tandem. Consequently, a tactical commander often seeks to weight an offensive operation to penetrate a defensive line at the boundary between two defending organizations. At the operational level (theater, front, field army, defined differently by various nations), intelligence informs the commander about movements of major forces and their ability to pose a threat or an opportunity to exploit. A salient example of the successful exploitation of such a seam was the 1914 victory of the German Eighth Army over the Russian First *and* Second Armies at the Battle of Tannenberg.

A comment attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte is that he preferred fighting against allies to campaigning with allies (Silkett, 1993).[1] The observation holds whether one considers the inherent weakness of the seam between allied fighting formations or the political goals that hold them in an alliance. Both the tactical and the political dimensions of such observations, not to underestimate an inherent cost-effectiveness, have led some NATO allies to establish multinational formations to refute this perception and enhance their effectiveness together. The political-military dimensions of both conflict and foreign relations lead us to consider the seams in the organization of diplomacy, as well. Finally, as I shall show, seams are also evident in complex operations that cross agencies outside the domain of national-security interests. First, let’s look briefly at the diplomatic realm.

An ambassador is the personal representative of one head of state to another. As such, ambassadors and their country teams facilitate bilateral relations, but not necessarily in close coordination with policies toward neighboring states. At the geostrategic level, major governments may organize their foreign-affairs ministries to aggregate these bilateral relations across a region. A European nation may consider North America as one region, Central and South America as another, and so on. For the U.S., the State Department organizes six regional bureaus: Africa; East Asia and the Pacific; Europe and Eurasia; the Near East; South and Central Asia; and the Western Hemisphere. In addition to bilateral assignments, ambassadors are also appointed to various intergovernmental organizations. Thus, we have “permanent representatives” (though any permanence applies to the mission rather than the individual) to the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the World Trade Organization, and others.

In the pursuit of foreign policy goals, it should be obvious that an approach to regional issues that coordinates relations with multiple regional states is at least helpful, if not essential. The mitigation of suffering in Darfur requires collaboration among several neighboring states, for

[1] Silkett, W. A. (1993). Alliance and coalition warfare. *Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly*, *23*, 74–85.

example. Similarly, if insurgents in Afghanistan come from Pakistan and build a support base there, then Pakistan's collaboration can help remove the threat to Afghanistan's security. Those who remember Vietnam will relate this issue to the Vietnamese use of Laos for sanctuary and supply lines during both the French-Indochinese war and the American involvement in Vietnam. On the other hand, failure to assess accurately the interests of regional powers led Germany to disregard the British interest in guaranteeing Belgium's neutrality and integrity in World War I, bringing the British into the war.[2] Similarly, MacArthur's pursuit of North Korean troops beyond a simple restoration of the integrity of South Korea led China to enter the Korean War.

In countering terrorist activity, numerous states share an interest in apprehending those who would unleash an attack on the normal routines of their citizens. Disparate groups with unrelated goals may share information, logistics, training, and financing because they employ similar tactics in attempting to force targeted governments to meet their demands. They may share facilities in an undergoverned territory—a remote location in which the "host nation" has little control over the local populace—to exchange expertise and to evade military or law-enforcement agencies that would pursue them.

In the pursuit of international criminals and their supporters, collaboration is essential in tracking the movement of individuals, their finances, weapons, communications, and so forth. But who are the partners in this effort? First, though often left out of consideration until later, is the sovereign nation in whose territory the target is operating. Not only should coordination with this host government be a priority; in most instances, this regime should get a large share of the credit for apprehending the terrorist, breaking the narcotics network, or whatever the goal is. There should be few instances of ignoring state sovereignty when there is no intent to treat the state as a belligerent, such as in the fruitless 1916–1917 pursuit of Pancho Villa.

A variety of agencies may have mutually supportive capabilities in achieving a goal. If the mission is to restore a post-conflict or post-disaster society, likely partners in an operation conducted by the U.S. government would include the military, the Department of State's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, its Agency for International Development, or its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, and perhaps programs within the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Justice, Transportation, or Treasury. A multilateral operation would include intergovernmental organizations in addition to, not in lieu of, these national executive agencies. Of course the participating nations are likely to add their own agencies parallel to those cited. Representing development or disaster-assistance agencies, for example, may be the Canadian International Development Agency, Britain's Department for International Development, and Germany's Technisches Hilfswerk. For political-diplomatic issues, a contact group or a high representative's office may be established, and entities, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, the Organization of American States, the Economic Community of West

[2] In stark contrast, under the skillful leadership of Bismarck, Prussia had used the same British interest to its advantage in the Franco-Prussian War to cause France to fear that if it invaded Belgium, Britain would side with the German states.

African States, or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, may have a significant presence. Just about every type of operation will see the participation of nongovernmental organizations, both NGOs within the country affected and others from the sending countries.

Geographic Seams

Similar coordination applies across a range of interventions in one country by another or a group of others: from peacekeeping to disaster assistance to internal development to war. Returning to the earlier remarks concerning the interests of neighboring nations, it is also notable that unless their opposition has already been expressed or there is other reason to discount their policy objectives, these neighbors should be consulted if they are not participants, or they should be welcomed to contribute staff to the multilateral task force if they are. Discounting the interests of non-belligerents entails significant risk. Thus, the Iraq Study Group recommended the U.S. overcome its reluctance to engage Iran and Syria in developing a regional solution to the challenge of political relations in Iraq (Baker & Hamilton, 2006).[3] This attention to states with which the U.S. has testy relations paints the picture of multilateral diplomacy in *chiaroscuro*. Security challenges and diplomatic relations are not just highlights and shadows; they require attention to subtleties of color as well. The case of Iraq requires closer coordination with neighbors with whom the U.S. has friendly relations, such as Turkey,[4] whose interests in Iraq's stability are vital to Turkish security.

How are these consultations undertaken? Recognizing that most diplomatic relations are conducted bilaterally, we expect embassy staff to work with appropriate agencies in the country to which they are accredited. But what about ensuring that our interests in each country are working in tandem with those in the neighboring state or at least that competing policy interests are coordinated and prioritized? Ambassador Michael Lemmon recalls first encountering an effort at such coordination and prioritization while posted in Islamabad—with periodic consultations among the U.S. embassies to Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—gathering staff in one of the region's capitals for 2 to 3 days of discussions (both structured and informal) to consider an agenda of mutual interest. As ambassador to Armenia, he and his colleagues replicated this approach during annual conferences among the missions to the South Caucasus region, with invitations extended to the embassies in Ankara and Moscow and to DOS personnel in Washington, as well. Discussions were also extended to senior host-nation officials. Such gatherings can be contentious, but ultimately productive, and Lemmon advocates them to facilitate discussion and coordination across the seams: between Washington and the field, between the staffs in different nations, and across agencies on a country team within each mission.[5] Moreover, representation from the geographic military commands may be included productively.

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[3] Baker, J. A., & Hamilton, L. H. (2006). *The Iraq study group report*. New York: Vintage-Random House.

[4] Terril, A. (2007). *The evolution of U.S.-Turkish relations in a transatlantic context* (Colloquium Brief). Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute.

[5] E-mail, Lemmon to Müller, 13 November 2007.

The Department of Defense organizes its interests both geographically and functionally.[6] Differing from the regional delineations the Department of State uses, DoD's regional commands—Central, European, Northern, Pacific, and Southern—have just been joined by an African Command, with a senior foreign service officer as deputy commander. This innovation recognizes the primarily political nature of challenges to U.S. interests in Africa.

DoD's regional commands have significant influence over the activities of Defense personnel in specific countries and routinely engage in developing regional assessments. Consequently, a defense interest that develops across borders is easily tracked, but the very success of regional assessments leads to concerns for the seams between regions. If Defense is charged with tracking a terrorist organization, members of that organization should be expected to cross those regional boundaries in the hope that our agencies lose them. Because the commands treat regions according to priorities, a challenge can easily arise when an issue is not accorded the same priority across regional boundaries.

Agency Seams

Attention to coordination within a country team addresses one of the bigger challenges in government: harnessing the capabilities of disparate agencies to apply a "whole-of-government" approach to a national goal. The desire for grand strategy drives occasional calls for a "Goldwater-Nichols II." This reference to the most significant defense legislation since the National Security Act of 1947, passed to overcome service parochialism within the Defense Department, attempts to induce Congress to undertake a similar effort to coordinate disparate interests across the federal bureaucracy.[7]

Efforts to facilitate interagency coordination are appropriate at multiple levels. As the authority for executive organization and keeper of the purse, Congress contributed to the bureaucracy and can demolish the walls between agencies. Executive agencies can look to national imperatives first, rather than to institutional priorities, and point out to Congress the constraints precluding collaboration with other agencies. Congress erected some walls to ensure insulation of activities where it saw a need to redress deficiencies or correct excesses by some agents of government. Thus, as indicated elsewhere in this volume, Congress banned the training of foreign police in reaction to the use of such training in Latin America to repress dissent. Similarly, bans on intelligence agents' consorting with nefarious characters were seen as correctives to guilt by association. The isolation of foreign intelligence from domestic law enforcement—once seen as necessary—contributed to the intelligence failure preceding the 9/11 attacks. Consequently, the pendulum is swinging in the opposite direction, but the legacy of bureaucratic constraints is one of several influences insulating agencies from each other. Expertise resident in some agencies that could help achieve stability

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[6] The Department of State also has functional bureaus, e.g., the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration.

[7] The National Security Act of 1947 created the Department of Defense. The Goldwater-Nichols National Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, PL 99-433, increased the power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that of the unified combatant commanders and reduced the role of the services. As a result, joint military operations became the norm.

in Iraq may be housed in bureaus that by statute are precluded from deploying personnel abroad. On other issues, collaboration between agencies is easier among personnel serving together on a joint task force or country team than it is between their respective departments in Washington.

Because one agency has an institutional culture and values that differ from those in the next agency, and because each government entity must abide by constraints on their authority to support various activities (sometimes referred to as “the color of money”), institutional perspectives sometimes inhibit reaching consensus on the means to accomplish a common goal, or even to agree that a given agency has a role to play in solving a problem. Recently, Congress has been more supportive of military expenditures than it has been of other agencies with a role in achieving national security goals. Defense has often taken positions in favor of expanding particular programs in other departments because they contribute as well to national security. But support for expanding these agencies may not play well with constituents at home. The topic of foreign aid, for example, can easily influence a Congressional election. Support for expanding the State Department falls into this category (see Adams, 2007).[8] But if it is supposed to lead Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq, DOS will need more funding. The Department of State has asked Defense to detail personnel to fill many of these billets. When Defense succeeds in doing so, institutional State interests may decry the “militarization of foreign policy.”[9] If State fills many of the remaining billets with contractors rather than its own continuing employees, the degree to which DOS culture permeates the work product in these PRTs will be questionable as well.

This interaction between Defense and State is of long standing. The close interaction between diplomatic and military elements of national power has been articulated best by two classic strategists, Sun Tzu (544–496 BC) and Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), but even before their appreciation by the U.S. national security establishment, our patterns of senior leadership already evidenced the interaction. Six individuals have served as both Secretary of State and Secretary of War/Defense. More recently, two senior commanders became Secretary of State, and seven presidents had earlier served as Secretaries of State prior to their election (one, James Monroe, also as Secretary of War). With the creation of the intelligence bureaucracy and the office of the National Security Advisor in the mid-20th century, the interaction of these offices with Defense and State have been added to the mix and have shown a similar fluidity in diplomatic and military leadership.

[8] Adams, G. (2007). The politics of national security budgets (Policy Analysis Brief). Muscatine, IA: Stanley Foundation. Retrieved from http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/pab07natsecbudget.pdf.

[9] For examples of antagonism to the growing influence of the War Department during World War II, see “Special Staff, U.S. Army, “History of Training—Military Government,” (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, n.d.), vol. 1, 1939–1944 (typescript); Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1964, rpt. 1986), United States Army in World War II, Special Studies, esp. pp. 25–29; or for a summary, chapter 3 of Kurt E. Müller, *Language Competence: Implications for National Security* (New York: Praeger/CSIS, 1986).

Seams Within Missions

We have indicated the challenge of communicating across agencies dealing with a common issue. A variation on this theme is coordination among agencies on a country team. Here the team-building challenge begins with the Chief of Mission, who will want to facilitate the teamwork of each agency represented in the embassy. But, like the concept of commander's intent in the military, ambassadorial priorities may not always be clear to those whose work should reflect this ranking or its more subtle nuances. This teamwork becomes more complicated when agency priorities in Washington collide with embassy priorities. Every agency with a presence on the country team expects rightly to use that entrée as the means to facilitate its members' work in the country. As with the pejorative example of militarizing diplomacy, any agency pursuing an agenda that may collide with the ambassador's wishes runs the risk of being perceived as overstepping its bounds. Ambassadorial wishes may range across a broad set of domains affecting the deployment of executive-branch personnel: which agencies are represented, whether personnel are armed or uniformed, access to the embassy compound or restriction to/from various facilities, access constraints to specific host-nation ministries, and the like. From the agency's institutional perspective, these wishes may strike deploying personnel as the ambassador's meddling in their business. Correcting that opinion requires a process the military knows from its post-Goldwater-Nichols experience: deconfliction. Most advocates of joint operations would probably say the military has moved from deconfliction of missions across the services to joint development and execution of these missions. Similarly, the process of planning and deploying a task force, whether military or interagency, may require deconfliction with embassy priorities by exploring among country-team members the scope and extent of missions and the impact of proposed constraints on the goals to be achieved.

Transition: From Deconfliction to Multi-Agency Operations

Forecasts concerning future concepts of command and control in the Defense Department currently identify a shift from an understanding of linear military missions to a perception of the complexity of the national-security environment that foresees networked interagency contributors addressing a complex network of factors and reacting to the complexity of adversarial responses, as well. Projecting the interagency ripples of actions taken to achieve a desired end-state will be an inherent task in these operations. Whether the focus of a campaign is economic development to replace a narcotics industry, pursuit of criminals, stabilization of a post-conflict society, or inhibiting the proliferation or transfer of weapons of mass effect, the complexity of achieving the desired effect will require whole-of-coalition dedication to the mutual goals agreed by the participating nations. Identifying the seams that present inherent vulnerabilities is the first step in projecting the responses to future challenges.

Emergency Communications: Mashups or Mishaps

Sid Heal

For better or worse, the success of any tactical or disaster response operation will be judged on the culmination of the decisions made. Accordingly, anything that enhances decision making becomes a force multiplier. Of all the prerequisites for effective decision making, none exceeds the importance of an ability to communicate. Consequently, the military identifies communications as the "voice of command" and for good reason: you cannot command when you cannot communicate. Many a fiasco has been averted when good communications enabled corrective measures in a rapidly changing situation. Consequently, it would seem self-evident that establishing reliable and secure communications would be an imperative. Nevertheless, an inability to quickly and reliably exchange critical information across jurisdictions and between agencies and disciplines is consistently cited as a major shortcoming in handling major disasters.

While the problem is an aggravation between agencies, it is particularly troublesome when multiple disciplines are involved, such as law enforcement, fire services, public utilities, transportation, and so forth. Indeed, effective communication between disciplines occurs so rarely that it is a noteworthy achievement on the rare occasions when it does happen. Nowhere, however, is the problem more challenging—or exasperating—than when it is needed between domestic law enforcement and the military services. As domestic law enforcement and the military services increasingly collaborate in protecting our communities in the war on terrorism (not to mention a myriad of other calamities that routinely befall us), the need for effective communications becomes even more compelling. While it would be easy to affix the problem as one of equipment incompatibility, it is far more pervasive than that. Indeed, even the most cursory observation will reveal disparate procedures, practices, protocols, nomenclature, and symbols. Even more alarming is that as technological advances provide increased abilities to communicate with data rather than voice, we are in danger of perpetuating the same incompatibilities. While an inability to easily communicate with voice is problematic, it is especially perturbing with data. This is because the most strategically oriented information is captured and created at command posts in the form of text, annotations, maps, diagrams, drawings, charts, matrices, illustrations, photographs, and the like. Factors and influences affecting field activities that are all but impossible to effectively convey with voice communications are conspicuous and clear when displayed.

Currently, there are nearly 200[1] emergency management software programs available, the majority developed by defense contractors for military applications. These powerful programs provide tremendous advantages for managing emergency responses, such as plotting incidents, establishing containments, locating command posts and staging areas, managing evacuations, and tracking friendly forces. In spite of the potential benefits for domestic applications,

[1] A recent study done by the U.S. Navy identified 192 separate commercially available C4I software programs

however, they remain in the defense domain with little chance of being adapted for domestic emergency response applications. There are two predominate reasons for this. First, the software programs were funded by the Department of Defense and developed by defense contractors and federal laboratories specifically for military applications. Because there has been little demand from local safety services for the same capabilities on a national basis, defense contractors and corporations seeking profit have not seen domestic law enforcement as an appealing market. Moreover, because of the competitive nature of these companies, there is a disincentive for them to even be compatible with each other. Second, despite the large numbers of public safety agencies in the United States,[2] each of which are free to solve local problems without concern for national, or even regional compatibility, the market is tremendously fragmented. With no common voice, much less common standards, large corporations have been understandably reluctant to spend money on such a risky venture.

The most oft cited solution for communications interoperability issues between the various agencies, disciplines, and jurisdictions has been to create national guidelines, or even national standards, to compel participants to conform to mandated conventions and equipment specifications. This proposal grossly oversimplifies a solution and underestimates the allegiance that agencies have to their current methods and equipment. Consider that there are nearly 17,800 local law enforcement agencies in the United States, each with their own jurisdictions, budgeting, political oversight, and individual problems and, more important, complete autonomy in how they solve a problem and what they choose to use. The problem is further compounded when the more than 30,000 fire departments are included. Indeed, the mere suggestion for such a solution arouses emotions to the point where even seemingly benign issues quickly become controversial, even contentious. Even if such a remedy were possible, it would take millions of dollars and years of effort to get the necessary “buy in” while being challenged and confronted at every step by stakeholders ranging from individual government jurisdictions to defense contractors and private investors seeking to sell their wares. Further, it ignores the time, effort, and expense of retraining personnel to use the equipment and comply with the protocols and procedures. While such a solution might someday provide universal capabilities, it is inconceivable that it would be any time soon. Herein lies the root of the problem because waiting is not an appealing option, and recent history is replete with examples of the communication problems associated with the attacks of 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, the riots and earthquakes in Los Angeles, and working with the military on border protection and drug interdiction.

With the development of a National Response Plan, the importance of a national communications plan to support it would seem self-evident. And, while no one seriously disputes the advantages of a robust, full-featured system designed from the ground up to provide reliable communications in the most austere circumstances, no universally accepted solution appears likely in the foreseeable future. Waiting for an ideal solution dooms the interim to the status quo. Even the most minimal ability to exchange information between agencies,

[2] Even the most conservative estimates place the number of law enforcement and fire services at about 50,000 agencies.

disciplines, and across jurisdictional boundaries is preferable. To paraphrase General George Patton, a good plan implemented now is better than a perfect plan implemented later. Given the current state of affairs, this course of action seems prudent, indeed. Thus, a "work around" seems in order.

In developing a work-around solution, it is important to recognize that the current preferences that follow the conventional thinking of developing bridges and patches for voice communications and developing new or exploiting existing software applications for data communications have not provided any meaningful solutions. Nor are any expected in the near future. Thus, new thinking is in order.

Access to the World Wide Web is nearly ubiquitous in the United States, and the features, tools, and information on it are already being recognized and exploited by the safety services. It is not at all unusual to arrive at a field command post and observe law enforcement officers and fire fighters using laptop computers wirelessly connected to the Internet to get information on weather, generate maps, view satellite photographs, check traffic flow, or get travel directions. While these capabilities are currently being used to augment existing emergency response systems, it takes only a little bit of imagination to envision a single system incorporating all of them into an ensemble for emergency management.

If a Web-based emergency management software program was developed and made available to first responders, they would gain many of the same capabilities of the far more expensive commercial software programs. The most likely method would probably be the use of a "mash-up" program. A mash-up program is an application that resides on the Web and combines data from more than one source into a single integrated tool.[3] Current mash-up programs already provide useful information for tactical operations such as length of routes on maps, terrain profiles, digital dashboard displays,[4] and other important information. Because mash-ups can also incorporate data from internal hard drives, an ability to access data and customize a program for an individual agency—or even a single event—is possible. The value of functions of a program specifically designed for emergency management would rival many of those already in use without purchasing, licensing, or buying subscriptions—and with minimal training.

Some of the advantages of such an approach include:

- A Web-based emergency management capability that provides an ad hoc, easy to use, and universally available "backbone" for sharing vital disaster information.
- Because the software resides on the World Wide Web, even agencies and disciplines that do not routinely use emergency management software would be capable of sharing information at a regional level without the purchase of additional hardware or software. Nongovernmental agencies, such as the American Red Cross or Salvation Army, who often support emergency operations, could also be included.

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[3] Description taken from Wikipedia

[4] A digital dashboard display provides several different types of data on a single, at-a-glance display from disparate "parent" programs. For example, for an emergency response a user might simultaneously choose a weather forecast from Weather.com, map of current traffic flow from Traffic.com, a satellite photo from Maps.Google.com, a live video Webcam, and even a phone book or operations plan from his/her own hard drive.

- Training time and effort would be minimal because such a program would exploit the same Web features and conventions that make them simple to learn and as easy to use as those of the “parent programs.”
- Widespread acceptance would be far easier to achieve than even the best commercial disk-resident programs because the Web-based program would be less expensive or even free to the user, and it would require no additional hardware or software.
- Changes, updates, and additional features would be instantly available to all because editing is done once for everything on the web. The addition of a feedback loop would encourage users to participate in refining and developing the ensemble.
- Synergy would occur naturally and easily through increased understanding and collaboration.
- Controversial and confusing issues, such as standardized symbology, procedures, protocols, and practices, would become a matter of common convention without necessitating oversight committees, focus groups, or mandates. Indeed, the acceptance of these common conventions would create national de facto standards by consensus, not committee.[5]

The Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department has already begun explorations into such a program and has identified many of the requisite features. Initial suggestions include collecting features unique to a particular discipline into modules. Each module would be devoted to a single discipline, such as law enforcement, fire services, utilities, traffic control, and so forth. Icons necessary for tracking units and identifying organizational components (such as field command posts, staging areas, refugee centers, etc.) use those already identified in the National Incident Management System (NIMS). These can be augmented by incorporating common drawing features such as lines, circles, rectangles, and the like, and provide an ability to identify containments, plume clouds, fire lines, evacuation routes, and so forth. Each of these features can be annotated with a text feature. Even in the most rudimentary form, e-mailing a “screen shot” would provide an ability to remotely view deployments, as well as provide adjacent commands a greater situational awareness and higher headquarters a common operational picture. Moreover, administrators and subject matter experts not physically present could view an unfolding situation and offer input from remote locations without the lag time associated with travel. Other advantages to this approach include:

- Because anyone with a need to know could be given instant access, when responses to emergencies and disasters exceed the resources of the handling agency, a regional response would tremendously benefit by being able to anticipate such things as what type of resources would be most needed, by whom, and where they would be best deployed
- When complex responses involve more than one discipline, each of the annotated maps would become an electronic “overlay” for emergency operations centers who can build a “picture” of an ongoing operation by simply showing or hiding the various overlays on a monitor.
- Because information can be stored locally and shared regionally, a net-centric approach to disaster

[5] Knowing what symbols and practices are universally meaningful and acceptable would also provide inestimable value to commercially available emergency management software.

management and emergency responses would be possible. Individual agencies would be free to gather, securely store, and maintain whatever information they believe important and then share it on a regional level when appropriate. The synergistic advantages of such an approach hardly need further comment.

- Using open standards, companies wishing to continue developing disk-resident solutions could create interfaces in much the same way that information is currently exchanged using Rich Text Format (RTF) or Portable Document Format (PDF) for exchanging files.

As might be imagined, such an approach would require a robust, fully functional capability immediately upon implementation. Any lackluster effort simply perpetuates the perceptions of the past and dooms the entire effort to skeptical comparisons of the failures to date. While it is unlikely in the near future that Web applications will provide the rich features of disk-resident programs, any functionality is better than continuing to wait. The good news, however, is that such a project could be implemented in less than 6 months and would cost less than half the cost of even adapting existing military applications. Furthermore, maintenance and upgrades would cost cents on the dollar in comparison to conventional methods. Perfect is the enemy of good. And good is better than nothing.

Police and the Military: Lessons Learned and After Action Reports

Wayne Rich and Mary O'Dea

U.S. Military Definition:

Lessons learned: "Capitalizing on past errors in judgment, material failures, wrong timing, or other mistakes ultimately to improve a situation or system" (Defense Systems Management College).

For the most part, a common language of terms and acronyms does not exist between civilian law enforcement and the military, which is also true among different branches of the military. In the ever-increasing drive for the U.S. military to avoid being service-centric and to work jointly with other agencies, Joint Military Doctrine has been written in the attempt to standardize terms and acronyms to create a common language. This solution, though, is not a cure-all. In fact, quite far from it; for as the military is progressing towards jointness, it is also viewing a future in which it needs to become more interagency (civil law enforcement) and international (coalition forces). Clarifying or even annotating the sheer multitude of acronyms, jargon, slang, and idioms appears an impossible task. Nonetheless, we need to begin learning how to talk with one another. This article explains just one significant communications difference between law enforcement and the military (specifically joint military operations). Both law enforcement and military use the terms "after action reports" and "lessons learned." They are used to identify different products, though. Discussing these differences is only one step in understanding the hurdle of linguistic variations, but it is one step in helping us discover what we can learn from each other.

After Action Reports: Historical Records that Form the Basis for Lessons Learned

According to Joint military doctrine, after action reports (AAR) represent selected after action comments and recommendations that are designated to assist and benefit future planners and executors of similar evolutions (*Joint Publication 1-02*). They are actual, physical reports of events that form a historical archive. They record events and may or may not assess a particular situation. The reports are stored in databases referred to as lessons learned. However, lessons learned are more than just databases—they are those lessons that can be learned from the archived after action reports. One after action report could, for example, lead to three or four or any number of lessons learned. Units might conduct assessments of training and operational performances and provide opinions and recommendations in the form of lessons learned for future training exercises and operations that are of a similar nature and in a specific region or terrain. Lessons learned also provide situational awareness for both current and future operations in the same area of operation. AARs and lessons learned are used in Research and Development (R&D) of equipment and for the development of Tactics, Techniques, and Plans (TTPs) to carry out mission sets.

AARs usually contain, but are not limited to, the following descriptive information: parent organization, geographical location, security classification, operation, sponsor,

conducting unit, actual event date, releasable information, operation type, start date, and end date. AARs normally have implications in the following specific areas: Forces, Intelligence and Information Systems, Maritime and Rotary Wing, Fixed Wing, or Special Programs, with additional implications directed to Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership/Education, Personnel, or Facilities.

Within the military, AARs are generated at all levels of command and from all ranks of military personnel. Traditionally, the senior military commander or his designated representative will compile the AARs based on his personal observations and firsthand knowledge, but he also relies on his subordinates and members of his team, squad, platoon, company, etc. depending on the circumstances. This method of recording is key because then the information is firsthand and not secondhand. The firsthand knowledge and reporting provides important creditability to both the report and the information it contains. Within Special Operations Forces (SOF), for example, all members of an operational element collect information with the knowledge that it will be used as part of an AAR upon completion of that mission, training, or event. This collection method is vital; the thought process here is that the more eyes on a situation, the more intelligence is gathered, collected, and retained to ultimately produce better results in the future, i.e. *lessons learned*.

How important are lessons learned to SOF? Important enough that Lesson Learned Centers have been funded, established, and manned at every level of major command within Special Operations. These centers allow for the cross components: U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), Naval Special Operations Command (NAVSOC), Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), and Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) to share information. The data are routinely kept up-to-date and searchable by numerous methods; no small task on a day-to-day basis and no less maintained even during a state of continuing conflict. The fact that the databases are kept up-to-date, shared, and easily accessible by any security-cleared Special Operations service member increases its usage immensely. The lessons learned databases are essential and recognized as such by the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command down through the chain of command.

While this information establishes the “now,” the future must be attended to. What the future must bring us is a mind-set of using lessons learned without even thinking about it: making it second nature, automatic, like checking out your weapon from the arms room before a mission. The service member must make it routine to go online, enter select key coordinates (a phrase, a word, an event, etc.), and pull down all the pertinent information that is available. The *user* then determines what he or she will require to successfully complete the mission. The lessons learned databases of the future must be more robust, instantaneously accessible, and immediately updateable. Direct contact with the data inputer is a requirement in order for users to ask specific questions, get clarifications, and be able to receive the answers directly from the data source. The integrity of the information is paramount; otherwise, it becomes useless.

Somewhere in Iraq

An actual course of events: Somewhere in Iraq a U.S. Army sergeant is told by his platoon sergeant that his

squad is being tapped to conduct a patrol of a volatile area of a city within the next 24 hours. The squad is no stranger to these particular missions. However, what makes this one different is that the squad has never patrolled in this area before, and so they are unfamiliar with it. The platoon sergeant tells the squad leader that he'll have an up-to-date intelligence report on the area prior to their starting the mission. With this information, the squad leader assembles his squad to discuss the upcoming mission, stating they will have an operation brief 8 hours before departure time and a final situation update 1hour before departure.

The squad members break up, returning to their tents to prepare their personnel and squad equipment for the mission. As part of their preparation, two of the members independently decide to go online, one to a local military blog populated by in-country service members. The other goes to an established NCO-collaborated Web site. They search for any firsthand information about the area they will be patrolling in the next 24 hours. Both men are successful. One finds an AAR filed by other squads in the battalion Lesson Learned Database. The other finds unofficial but informational data filed by individual troops who actually patrolled the area as recently as 2 days earlier. They download their respective information and take it with them to the initial brief, sharing it with the squad leader and the squad. They repeat this procedure again prior to the final operation update. Now the squad is better prepared to meet the threat, accomplish the mission, and return back to base safely.

Being better prepared to meet the threat, in this case, could save any number of lives. Saving lives, especially one's own, is a grand motivator for taking initiative to be as aware of one's surroundings as possible. Young service men and women already take this initiative. When they do, the rewards can go beyond just personal satisfaction or security. But questions remain: how do we promote this culture, and how do we ensure that it's not done only on an ad-hoc basis? The answer to the first of the two questions is relatively easy. The young men and women in service today have grown up with today's technology. They assume the technology will be available and part of their lives. It is natural for them, as a generally individualistic and inventive group, to turn to the Internet or any other type of information they can get to enable their own self-awareness. They are used to interactive relationships with others, welcome opportunities to share what they've learned, and recognize that knowledge is power. They are very good at multi-tasking, giving them increased ability to handle different levels of a given situation at all times. These attitudes are evidenced simply by the number of available blogs and communications sites that have grown quickly in Iraq and Afghanistan. Computer technology in the hands of the individual is already part of the service culture. Still, we must move forward, taking advantage of this culture. Can we require every man in the unit to check the blogosphere and lessons learned before each mission? Is that necessary on a team? It seems to defy common sense NOT to want to gather all possible information; perhaps it's just a matter of institutionalizing the process, empowering everyone involved.

Increasing Situational Awareness: Lessons Learned and Technology

Bill Maki

Both the military and the police operate in worlds where the next minute may find members at great risk. The uncertainty and diversity of experiences attracts many of the people who work in these worlds. Success in these worlds is needed to preserve the safety of communities and the nation. At a personal level, success in these worlds is necessary for preserving the safety of individuals. Learning lessons from our actions and being able to share them with others who come behind us has always been useful. The method of after action review has been a mainstay for improvement in organizations. However, does after action review still meet the need for our organizations to analyze what we have done and ensure the lessons from the past are communicated to the members of our organization who need to know?

As the world changes under us, many of us are finding the ways we have successfully done things for years are starting to fail. We find ourselves struggling to cope with new problems and old problems with new twists. How can we keep up? How can we build the skills necessary to be effective in the coming world and not be left behind? How can our new members achieve competence fast enough to become contributors rather than casualties? Today demands we be better and tomorrow will expect even more. How will we succeed? Working together and sharing lessons learned seems to be a characteristic that survives time and the changes associated with time. But how are we to work together and share the problems we face and the solutions we find?

In policing, the management of information is becoming a reality for many departments. Policing is increasingly able to bring the strength of the great quantities of information collected to bear against problems. Our crime report databases contain a wealth of information about the who, what, when, where, why and how of incidents that happened. In the very recent past, many of our crime/incident reports were on paper that went into files, never again to see the light of day. A small number of officers might be tasked or take the initiative to know all about a department's police activities, but the majority of officers knew about some small, fractional portion. The collective knowledge of most departments was unreachable. However, that has changed today. Searchable records management systems available to any or all of a department's members now give to more people a greater chance to see the big picture about problems faced by the police in a community. Some departments have been able to transport this search capability to the street so officers in real time can check police involvement of people, property, and entities. In the high-intensity world of policing, capturing the activity in a way it can be researched later is often a challenge in itself.

Jane Doe hears a noise during the night that wakes her up. Is the problem a rapist coming through her window or a bird that can't tell the difference between an open or closed window? She calls 911 because she is scared. An officer responds and checks the area, the yard, the house, if she wants, and determines that there is no breach of her home and no evidence of anyone trying to enter. She calms down and goes back to sleep. In most police departments across America, the officer leaves and no written

report is generated other than an electronic record (or maybe it's still paper in some places) of the incident in the dispatch center. It may have some notes recorded by the dispatcher provided by the responding officer or, perhaps, the dispatcher overhears the radio traffic and adds a few comments to the incident record. However, the officer does nothing formal other than handle the call and return to service for the next call. Will this piece of the puzzle be saved or lost?

Suppose we add a small change to that scenario. Jane Doe hears a noise during the night that wakes her up. Someone is trying to enter her home. A drunk who thinks he is at his own house doesn't understand why his key won't work in the door. He starts trying to break the door down due to his lack of anger control and intoxication. He succeeds in forcing the door open and is going inside just as officers arrive. The officers take him into custody and likely charge him with trespassing or burglary or whatever law was broken. Now that a crime has occurred, a crime report will likely be generated in most any police department in America. The purpose of the crime report is to memorialize what happened contemporaneously with the event and the response of the police. Officers will collect information about location, time, the victim's name, the arrestee's name, property damaged, all sorts of identification information, etc. This is for the purpose of documenting the facts of the incident because the officers will be going to court later, and the reports are often used to make prosecution decisions, refresh officers' memories, provide insurance companies with people to sue for damages, and to provide an internal record of what was done that can be reviewed by supervisors to be certain the police work was properly done. This puzzle piece will likely be saved but can it be found later in another situation when it might benefit another officer with a similar problem?

In the police department I joined many years ago, both of the above scenarios would have been lost to all but the responding officers. Paper records were a storage problem, not the collective knowledge of the police department. However, in the police department we have become today, the records from these scenarios are easily located by computerized records management and dispatch systems for review. As technology matures, even the lessons from the most insignificant incident can be found and communicated to the most junior officer of the department.

What sort of technology does this? It is technology that provides the information to the point of need. Officers responding to emergency calls don't have time to stop on the way and research a location, person, or problem. Technology exists today that can do that for the officer by sweeping department and public databases for locations, people associated with a location and problems at a location and then making comparisons to warrant files, alert files, NCIC, etc. The "hits" from those searches create raw information for the officer that can be reviewed for interpretation after a few screen touches. This information can be available to any authorized officer with access to the records management system. But to accommodate the emergency nature of policing, where the time to plan often is minutes and a plan is formulated on the emergency drive to the call, the information needs to be available at any time and anywhere officers happen to find themselves.

Situational awareness is a significant advantage for an officer in the field. Increased situational awareness enhances officer safety. Capabilities exist today for computerized records

management systems to add great value to the information collected by a police department. When these systems can provide lessons learned to the officers on the street in real time no matter where they are, their value is great. This is the future we have been talking about for years, and it’s here today for some police departments.

Public Perception

Nicholas E. Libby

The convergence of the military and police has numerous associated benefits, as detailed elsewhere in this monograph. Anyone familiar with the goals, missions, and struggles of a modern police force can readily recognize the potential impact that military cooperation with the police in the arenas of information sharing, technology and equipment applications, and personnel training may have on police efficacy, efficiency, and safety. Before these benefits can be realized, however, important factors must be taken into consideration. One such factor includes the legal aspects of military and police convergence and cooperation, which has already been discussed. Another caveat, which could be easily overlooked by officials, is that of public perceptions of military influence on domestic policing.

Currently, many citizens have tarnished views and opinions of the police and the military and police nexus. The beating of Rodney King by Los Angeles Police Officers in 1991 is still popular in discussion of police brutality, and the shooting and killing of Sean Bell by the New York Police in 2006 is a fresh example of possible misuse of deadly force by the police. On the other end of the spectrum, many people may still find a cognitive association between the military and police nexus and the Kent State incident on May 4, 1970 in which four students were killed and nine wounded by the Ohio National Guard. Though this occurred over 30 years ago, the incident has attained historical significance, as evidenced by annual commemorative rallies held by Kent State students on the anniversary of the incident. Within the past decade, the public eye has fixated on issues such as police corruption with the LAPD Rampart Scandal and challenges of ineptitude in intelligence, information sharing, and investigation, which result in tragedies such as the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

These types of incidents are relatively rare considering the amount of work conducted by law enforcement officials in the United States every day that is in no way related to scandal or a misuse of authority. However, they are high profile, highly publicized, and play a part in shaping the perceptions and attitudes of the general populace toward the police and, by association, the government itself. Within recent years, these perceptions seem to have led to an attitude of mistrust toward law enforcement and the government for some, especially after the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act. Some criticisms rest on aspects of delayed information sharing and release to the public (i.e., Stern, 2004). Others argue that the civil liberties, constitutional rights, and freedoms of American citizens are being challenged, including the right to question or criticize the government, which is becoming increasingly secret and adopting a policy of deflection and dismissal instead of previous policies of informing and discussing (i.e., Martorella, 2006; Wheeler, 2005).

Harsher viewpoints have been expressed as well, such as the Patriot Act enabling “a system of surveillance and control that may be beyond the bounds of national security concerns” (Martorella, 2006:131) and that, due to legislative changes and policies of law enforcement and the government, the United States is approaching the Orwellian dystopia from the novel *1984* (Strossen, 2004). At a more local level and relating more clearly

to the military-police nexus, Reiman (2001) has argued that police are becoming increasingly hyper-militaristic, fostering more of an “us versus them” mentality among police towards citizens. Wozniak (2005) furthers this argument, suggesting that the convergence between the military and the police is a vehicle to suppress dissent and enforce political ideology through force. He also argues that paramilitary units, such as SWAT and tactical operations teams, foster situations in which violent outcomes are likely. For example, proactive policing, such as serving outstanding arrest warrants on violent offenders, is meant to create an environment where violence is provoked and paramilitary police units are able to justify violent means.

It is beyond the scope of this work to engage in debates as to how much credibility these claims and accusations have. However, it is necessary to keep in mind that these perceptions exist, and without any attention to these viewpoints, it is possible they will become more intense and widespread as the link between the military and domestic policing becomes stronger. If that does indeed occur and government or police officials are not forthcoming with information that could prove contrary to the seemingly obvious or are not proactive enough in reaching out to the general public, then the citizen trust placed in our law enforcement organizations may be undermined. Furthermore, as public perception shapes not only public trust but also public behavior, perceptions leading to strong mistrust may result in officials being voted out of office or, in worst case scenarios, significant social unrest (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). This is especially true in an era consisting of numerous political interest groups, many of whom are critical of law enforcement and related policy implementation concerning areas of funding and adequate training (Haider-Markel, 2004).

Compounded by a lack of citizen contact and information sharing initiated by the police, other mechanisms may serve to reduce levels of public trust. Relating back to the expressed concern over government spying and secrecy, Los (2002) associates these two factors with authoritarian police states where the police lack benevolence and concern for the public and citizens come to distrust government and law enforcement. Furthermore, incidents of police misuse of force, which are often highly publicized, may be interpreted as actions of social discipline, especially if misuse occurs within certain structural locations, such as minority or immigrant areas (Choongh, 1997; Goldsmith, 2005). Members of the same group of victimized individuals may perceive themselves in conflict with the police (Cunneen, 2001), especially if their misuse of force has the appearance of being sanctioned. Once again, the Rodney King incident and related riots come to mind. In addition to potentially violent reactions to these situations, long-term issues may arise as members of the public view the police as targeting and discriminating against particular groups. When misuse of force begins to be perceived as police brutality against certain sections of the public, it becomes associated not only with poor appreciation for principles of human rights but it further distances police from the community, which makes volunteered information from citizens to the police problematic (Goldsmith, 2005).

In relation to withholding information from the public being regarded as operations of secrecy, it can also undermine trust in police by fostering misperceptions. For example, failures in explaining police responses to calls for service from citizens or citizen complaints

of a particular problem may make it appear as though the police are neglecting or are indifferent to the concerns of the public. Additionally, failure to respond to these reported matters may lead to misperceptions, which result in the public viewing the police as inept or incompetent (Goldsmith, 2005).

Public trust in the police is often regarded as an essential, albeit delicate, component of law enforcement. More recent trends of community-oriented policing has increased contact between agents of law enforcement and the public, which may serve to mitigate the aforementioned "us versus them" mentality that some officers may develop, a mentality inherently detrimental to reciprocal trust and cooperation between police and citizens. Increased trust in the police can also increase the public's view of law enforcement as a legitimate organization, which has the effect of increasing public cooperation in ways that assist in increasing police efficacy (Goldsmith, 2005). While much can be gained through a convergence between the police and the military, it is important to note that these aspects of trust and mutual respect are beneficial to both the public and the police. Becoming too paramilitaristic, however, may actually harm the image of policing in the minds of the general public, as well as distance the police from the citizens they are supposed to serve and protect (Murray, 2005), resulting in decreased efficiency, efficacy, and popular support.

Fortunately, many agencies have mechanisms in place that can help foster communication between the police and the public. Agencies that have adopted community policing styles have officers who communicate and cooperate with the public. Not only does public opinion improve when citizens believe that community policing is being practiced in their neighborhoods and cities (Weitzer & Tuch, 2005), but satisfied citizens are also thought to have become the "eyes and ears" of the police (Cordner, 1995). However, it has been found that involvement in community policing is rarely presented in news coverage (Chermak & Weiss, 2006). Many departments already have public information officers (PIOs), who have a duty to maintain police-media relations in order to manage their department's public image. Unfortunately, though, only about 40% of media personnel believe that the police do a good job of keeping them informed about community policing, even though 80% of media personnel report that citizens are interested in news about local law enforcement agencies (Chermak & Weiss, 2006). Having PIOs increase communication with media personnel and increasing the amount of effort spent on managing police image may not only build relationships between the police and the media but also keep the public informed of news, developments, and successes in matters regarding local law enforcement. This could be achieved through such means as holding press conferences or community meetings, simply running a weekly newspaper column with the purpose of having the police keep the public informed, or provide a neutral ground for the public to have question and answer sessions with police representatives. Periodic news about proactive police activity and successful operations in law enforcement also foster the image that police are effective and efficient investigators of crime (Christensen, Schmidt, & Henderson, 1982).

In addition to lone PIOs, third parties can be brought in to provide input to the police and some amount of community oversight. Some agencies have already

incorporated Community Relations Units, which create working relationships between the police, other city agencies, city government officials, and the community as a whole (Lemmie, 2003). This can provide a mechanism for citizens to express their views to the police, and it also establishes a network of contacts for the quick processing and dissemination of information pertaining to incidents that are high profile and may gather a lot of attention. Additionally, citizen review boards can be developed to provide outside oversight and investigation into allegations of serious police misconduct or misuse of authority, such as major uses of force and deaths that occur while a suspect is in custody (Goldsmith, 2005; Lemmie, 2003).

Military and Policing Recruiting and Retention: Common Threads

Marshall Jones & Lin Huff-Corzine

The success of any organization rests on the talent and skills of its members. Recruiting and retaining highly qualified members is one of the greatest challenges facing law enforcement[1] today (Mckeever & Kranda, 2000).

Recruitment concerns for civilian law enforcement are nothing new. The past decade has proven challenging for law enforcement agencies, regardless of size. A downsized military in the 1990s, a healthy economy, and increased retirement numbers from civilian law enforcement officers hired in the 1970's have created a shortage of quality applicants. The increasing complexity and sophistication of the workplace requires that candidates possess good cognitive ability, excellent social intelligence (a.k.a. common sense), and technical aptitudes that were not required in the past. The introduction of TASERS and other less-lethal technologies, patrol car cameras and computers, crime analysis software, and the instant media presence has required departments to more carefully scrutinize candidates.

The military is suffering recruiting and retention problems that are very similar to civilian law enforcement issues. While many practitioners and academics spend time pointing out the differences between civilian law enforcement and the military, they often dismiss the utility of the best practices and research across the two environments. The importance and utility of studying workplace "critical incidents" across both domains should not be overlooked by either law enforcement or the Services.

Differences

For the purpose of creating a mental model useful for discussing similarities in civilian law enforcement and military recruiting and retention, there are important differences that must first be identified.

1. *Level of Discretion:* There is a general difference between military police and their civilian counterparts in the level of discretion at the line level. Civilian law enforcement officers are generally given broader discretion in daily duties than their military counterparts. The difference is a direct result of the nature and environments of the respective missions and assignments.

2. *Training:* Most states have established minimum standards for law enforcement officers. The programs generally provide the basic training needed to prepare a new law enforcement officer to enter a field training program. Some training academies have more extensive training requirements. Most practitioners agree that the "real" training of new officers takes place during the Field Training and Evaluation (FTOP) programs that nearly all civilian agencies have implemented. The military trains military police in a much more standardized manner across branches. Non-MP military units assigned to peacekeeping and policing duties are provided redeployment training, but the actual demands of policing civilian populations can be demanding. Both civilian and military law enforcement organizations screen and select individual members with aptitudes toward police

[1] In this article, the term "law enforcement" is used to refer not only to civilian and military police but also to law enforcement roles the military has served in as witnessed in the Iraqi and Afghanistan missions.

work. Peacekeeping and policing demands using non-MP personnel can be problematic. Individuals in police work (both military and civilian) volunteer for that duty and have better training and much clearer expectations than military personnel tasked to that same type of duty.

3. *Command and Control:* There are thousands of local law enforcement agencies in the Unities States. The majority of the local police and sheriff's departments are small, employing fewer than 30 officers. Most states have several state law enforcement agencies, and the federal government has dozens of law enforcement agencies. The agency structure, policies, procedures, and perhaps most importantly, the cultures of each are as different as they are similar. Civilian agencies are guided by the communities they serve and extremely diverse in their structure and mission priorities.

By contrast, the military has an overarching command structure that begins with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is executed by the Joint Staff, who sets forth requirements that are provided to each of the services for their implantation and service uniqueness. This unified command and control helps establish protocols for training, performance appraisal, promotions, and transfers that are accepted as universal within the environment. These same areas often prove difficult for many civilian law enforcement agencies to effectively handle, especially the personnel decisions that ultimately relate to recruiting and retention issues.

Similarities

The similarities between the various civilian law enforcement organizations and the military are not very surprising. Both environments are unique to most other professions and frequently involve life and death decisions made in situations not created by the individual. Both require members to function in an increasingly complex world in which they are expected to follow orders and work within a chain of command while also exercising the individual initiative and problem-solving required for community policing and quality of life issues. These evolving dual expectancies in law enforcement and the military require specific recruiting and selection methods that are not commonly in place.

Existing Research

It is very important to examine existing research in problem identification and solving. There is actually little empirical research on the topic of police recruiting and retention, and the studies that do exist tend to examine recruiting as a singular problem. Recruitment and retention are strongly related and should be examined in unison. Proper recruiting strategies can lead to more satisfied members and thus, result in fewer turnovers. In turn, retention requires less recruitment and builds a positive culture that attracts potential candidates. Chase (1999) suggests that recruitment is a key retention strategy, where if the right individuals are recruited, retention will be influenced significantly (Chase, 1999).

The Florida Police Chiefs Association (FPCA) commissioned a recruiting and retention study in 2000 to examine the state-wide problems of recruiting and retaining officers. The FPCA study, in partnership with the Florida Institute of Technology's Industrial and Organizational Psychology Program, explored a theoretical foundation for recruiting and retention strategies. The 2 year project

concluded with some recommendations that passed both the "best practices" and "theoretical foundation" tests and since then have proven valuable across organizations.

Attraction-Selection-Attrition Model

Schneider (1987) proposed the Attraction-Selection-Attrition (ASA) model (illustrated in Figure 1) that states that people are *attracted* to a particular organization because they perceive they share the same values as the organization. Organizations naturally *select* people who they think "fit" into the organization and culture; and once people are hired, *attrition* can occur if the "fit" does not materialize. This theory, along with person-environment (P-E) "fit" theory, is supported in the field of industrial/organization psychology, sociology, and vocational psychology.

Figure 1.



Schneider, Smith, & Goldstein (2000) caution regarding the ASA model and suggest that there is a "dark side" to a good fit. ASA can create a cycle that lacks innovation, increases groupthink, discourages risk taking, and creates adverse reactions to the diversity of persons, places, or processes. As the term "diversity" is starting to include diversity of thought and ideas, the homogeneity cautioned by Schneider and his associates may not be as much of a concern in the future. With various viewpoints and experiences proving valuable in community policing and in enhancing the quality of life of those collectively served, it is the futurist viewpoint that organizations embracing a diverse variety of thought and expectations will thrive while homogeneous organizations will be forced to struggle, change, or turn to outside consultation.

Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) and Perceived Organizational Support (POS)

Leader-member exchange (LMX) and Perceived Organizational Support (POS) are interrelated organizational factors that are critical to organizational outcomes and retention. These factors operate alone and interact and result in either a positive, neutral, or negative outcome for an agency and its culture.

LMX and POS are not new concepts, but they have been recently used in examining law enforcement recruiting and retention. LMX is defined as an exchange between the employee and his/her supervisor (Graen & Scandura, 1987). Exchanges can be positive, negative, or neutral and can be either outcomes of leadership or management style or interpersonal relationships between supervisors and subordinates.

POS is defined as an exchange between an employee and the organization (Eisenberger, Huntington, Hutchison, & Sowa, 1986). POS is

witnessed in regard to training, equipment, resource allocation, and other factors that demonstrate an organizational commitment to the members and as perceived as support by the member. POS can have positive, negative, or neutral effects on the perception of the members and, ultimately, their decision to stay in the organization. These effects can also shape how current members portray the organization to others.

Positive LMX will occur when both the subordinate and the supervisor view each other as being valuable and when both sides view the exchange as equitable or fair. POS is high if members develop global beliefs concerning the extent to which the organization values their contributions and demonstrates concern about their well-being. Research has demonstrated that both LMX and POS have been associated with positive performance and attitude exhibited in members. For example, when LMX is high, workers demonstrate higher quality and quantity of performance, increased job satisfaction, stronger organizational commitment, positive role perception, increased positive organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs), and lower intentions of quitting (Gerstner & Day, 1997).

The interaction of LMX and POS is of growing interest as it relates to recruiting and retention. Recent research suggests that generational differences may sway research results. Generation “X”ers, for example, are more impacted by POS than LMX. This finding was based on a focus group of experienced officers that had resigned from smaller law enforcement agencies to go to work for a bigger department. These officers discussed a variety of “little things” about the agency that created a desire to leave. Some of the issues included slow equipment repair (laptops in particular), lack of opportunity for advancement, availability of take-home cars and, most important, the reduction of specialty assignments (Vice, Canine, Motors) to meet the minimum staffing needs of patrol. These were critical to their decision to leave. Many of the officers who had worked their way off of patrol were especially frustrated when they were pulled back to patrol to meet staffing demand. Money was not mentioned as a critical issue, and nearly all of the officers liked their sergeants. These findings warrant additional research to explore whether the shift in power between LMX and POS is an environmental issue or a generational issue and is equally important to the military as law enforcement.

One issue from the focus group that crossed agencies was laptop computers for patrol cars. Many agencies obtain grant money for laptops and other technology to enhance performance. Unfortunately, grants often do not cover repairs, and agencies may overlook budgeting for maintenance or replacement of this equipment. It can be more damaging to provide a tool that cannot be maintained long term and eventually taken out-of-service than to not provide the tool at all. Officers assimilate the tool as a method of agency support but see it as a lack of support when it cannot be maintained. It is critical that maintenance and replacement considerations be included in grant or other new equipment or technology acquisitions.

LMX and POS are also important in organizational stressors. Issues such as promotional process and selections, consistency of performance appraisals, developmental feedback and goal setting, car and equipment assignments, and specialty unit assignments, are central to POS and moderated greatly by LMX. Members, especially Gen “X” ers,

express frustration when they do not get feedback. Supervisors express frustration about the lack of timely support from the agency, as well as a good system of consistent evaluation. As research is obtained from the "millennial" generation, this shift in generational values will be of growing concern as technology and globalization effects are stronger of the workforce.

Recent Trends

The FPCA project identified several sources of member frustration and subsequent stress stemming from leadership and organizational support. Too often these stressors stem from internal organizational issues such as perceived inequities, selection processes for promotions and lateral transfers, and resource allocation, rather than mission-specific stressors, as they are often expected and known threats.

A common stressor to both the military and police is the promotional process as noted above. The military has invested the resources to establish a promotional process that establishes clear and consistent standards for promotion and allows members to develop clear expectations.

Most law enforcement agencies struggle with promotional processes. Among most small and mid-sized agencies, promotions are infrequent, which adds to the anxiety. The promotional tests/processes range from direct appointment to multiple sophisticated processes. Issues associated with expectancy theory, organizational politics, and perceived fairness all come into play with these processes in civilian law enforcement. Timely and transparent promotional processes that test based on written directives and anchored to a job description tend to reduce anxiety and provide the best candidates for command staff to promote.

Once promotions are made, the issue of training the new supervisors becomes an issue. The military have established both Officer and Non-commissioned Officer schools to prepare them for promotion both before and after such has occurred. These are a known entity and one that all professional service members are made aware of, but their civilian law enforcement counterparts are, for the most part, left with few options. Some states have recognized the issue and have worked toward addressing the void in supervisory training, but small agencies struggle with losing the personnel resource for extended periods.

Performance appraisals and evaluations are extremely problematic in law enforcement and the military, most often because of the instrument design. The service members are further hampered by both real and imaginary performance and assignment curves that affect their evaluations. Some use general employee evaluations that have little, if any, context, while others address some context-specific areas, but may be too broad to define "good" performance.

The common thread between the military and civilian worlds is the need for standardized assessor training and standardized deployment of modernized rating scales. Often, performance ratings are used for specialty assignments and promotions; thus, performance appraisals without standard anchors are problematic. The result of this faulty performance evaluation process can manifest as challenges to the processes. Even more important, however, such processes may create perceptions of unfair selection or rejection and create animosity toward the process, the

organization, the assessors, or even the selectees.

While the military can certainly claim several of the aforementioned stressors, currently the main enemy is that of the operational tempo as it directly relates to the individual service member and his/her family's quality of life. This appears to be a major cause for an exodus of current service members, both from the enlisted and officer ranks, and has grown to such proportions since 9/11. Historically, a service member, upon entering active duty, could expect a short- tour unaccompanied assignment (e.g., Korea) overseas every 3–5 years, normally broken up with an accompanied overseas tour of 3 years (e.g., Germany), but that was before the current on-going conflict. Now, the average deployment to overseas duty into a combat zone is on a rotational basis of a minimum of 6 months every 18 months if the service member remains in the same home assignment. Quite often, service members who have completed a deployed assignment are at the end of their home assignment rotation and are reassigned to a new home station only to be redeployed earlier than 18 months. Meanwhile, these same service members are still eligible for the normal unaccompanied and accompanied tours. This constant disruption of family life, pulling up stakes, moving, and starting all over again, is very hard on any family, but more so recently. This, more than anything else, is the reason for current service members opting out of the military.

Other organizational stressors in both the military and law enforcement can come from inconsistencies between policy and practice. Practices often continue, even though policy prohibits them. One law enforcement example is the offer of free or reduced meals for officers in uniform. Agencies that ignore conflicts between policy and practice are at great risk for diminished job satisfaction and perceptions of unfairness once a member is accused of violating a policy that has been a practice.

Future Oriented Suggestions

Research is not useful to practitioners if it does not translate into better practices or innovations. Although some suggestions may not be fiscally possible for every agency, research, and suggestions that result from such efforts, offers a point for organizational discussion and perhaps additional exploration of alternative practices.

Recruiting: Realistic Job Preview

Studies show that tenure and job satisfaction are increased when an individual's pre-selection expectations about a job or assignment and the ultimate reality are aligned (Premack & Wanous, 1985). Applicants with realistic job expectations are more likely to be retained. A Realistic Job Preview (RJP) is an instrument that creates that realistic expectation.

An RJP can take the form of a flier, brochure, video, or other advertisement for an agency. The critical aspect of a RJP is an honest and accurate depiction of what the job entails. Many military and civilian recruiters are rewarded on the number of candidates they recruit; therefore, they are not best served by telling potential recruits about the downsides of the job. The agency, however, can be best served by offering the negative aspects of the job or the agency and then allowing the candidate to self-select out. If those candidates stay and are fully informed, there is not a

sense of disenchantment after 2 or 3 years on the job.

A classic example of how a recruiter may paint a positive picture of what to expect from an agency pertains to permanent shift work. A police recruiter should tell an applicant that he or she will likely work midnights for 3 to 4 years and then get an opportunity for an assignment on day shift. All too often, the recruiter tells the story of the member who spent 18 months on patrol and then became a detective. By giving the exception to the rule, the recruiter builds a false hope in the candidate and establishes a course for disappointment. Recruiters should provide the worse-case scenario and let the candidate decide.

Both civilian law enforcement agencies and the military can also look at the family and spouse of prospective or active members looking for specialty assignments and assist with an RJP as well. A candidate or member may not factor in the family consequences of his or her decision, and having a program for spouses and families can establish a realistic expectation and allow for family discussion that, ultimately, may assist in establishing a supportive home life.

Candidates without appropriate RJPs form expectations about the "day in the life" of the career or position they seek. Police candidates cite the popular TV show *COPS* as the mechanism that establishes their mental model of law enforcement. Such hyped-up perceptions create not only recruiting issues, but can also lead to performance issues in the field.

Incorporating a RJP in the recruiting process will not only allow applicants to self-select out of the process but there is also a good chance that incumbents will have a realistic idea of what to expect on the job, thereby increasing job satisfaction and the tenure of seasoned officers.

Recruiting: Recruiter Training

Recruiters need to be trained. Even small agencies or units that recruit specialty assignments and cannot afford the personnel for a full-time recruiter need to invest in teaching basic personnel selection procedures, RJP, and marketing skills.

Law enforcement may be able to look at the example of the military, where there are established recruiter schools and curriculum, which produce service-specific personnel within a recruiter career field, whose primary responsibility is to draw perspective candidates from the civilian community. Additionally, the services have specific training programs for retention of non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers that are located at company and above level expressly for the purpose of enticing service members to remain in military service.

Retention: Value the Agency

Chiefs and commanders can improve their retention and increase job satisfaction by assessing and understanding their organization's unique culture as it pertains to LMX and POS. This understanding and subsequent strategies to improve each have synergetic outcomes that actually feed into one another while developing a culture and membership capable of advancing to the next level with attraction.

A systematic and timely reward system creates a belief in officers that their contributions are valuable. A word of caution is warranted here. Many officers report a "watering down" of their

department reward system. Executives interviewed share a perception that new officers want constant rewards for doing expected work. The goal should be frequent developmental feedback from sergeants, with a timely reward system (monthly, but no later than quarterly) that has strict standards. Some agencies have instituted immediate reward systems, such as coins or other symbols of good work, from the squad level that can be redeemed for time off or other incentives. This system allows for immediate recognition from the squad and maintains the integrity of the departmental award system. Every organization has its unique culture, and care should be taken in assessing what is likely to positively impact officers.

Web Presence

Recruiting the right candidates for both the military and law enforcement requires more sophisticated and technologically diverse methods than routinely used today. The candidates themselves have a higher expectation of a professional and contemporary Web-presence, and the image of the department is more and more predicated by such generational benchmarks. Agencies with a professional Web presence have a recruiting advantage. The days of allowing an organizational member to build the department Website are past. Successful agencies in the future will view their Web presence as important as they view the physical department itself.

Recruiter Training and Goals

Agencies' and units' demands for both internal and external recruiting vary as drastically as the variety of missions. Central themes for improvement lie in the training and goals of the particular organization. Large organizations with dedicated recruiters should avail themselves of training that incorporates a regard for long-term recruiting and uses accurate expectations and a realistic job preview component. Smaller agencies or agencies that assign the recruiting function as a collateral duty need to seek training. Employment law is a growing issue, but the tenants of recruiting for the long-term, rather than “filling slots”, is in some cases a paradigm shift. People should be trained for the tasks at hand and rewarded and judged by their performance—not only on the quantity but also on the quality of the recruits they find. Recruiting demands can be reduced greatly by programs aimed at retaining current members.

Develop a Realistic Job Preview

An RJP can be the most important tool an agency uses to select the best individuals for the job, and so it also has tremendous influence on job satisfaction and retention. An RJP should present a snapshot of a day in the life of a member performing the function the candidate seeks. Having a professional video presentation that can be streamed onto the department Website or given out on CD and DVD can present the candidate with interview clips of existing members discussing or demonstrating what they do at the organization. In the absence of a detailed RJP, potential candidates are left to their preconceived notions about the job and agency. Having candidates self-select out saves time, money, and potential litigations. Another important aspect of an RJP, especially for small departments, is that some candidates may be looking for opportunities that the small agency just cannot offer. A young

police candidate, for instance, may be looking for the opportunity to ride motorcycles or serve on a SWAT team. A small agency without those units might hire the candidate and then find themselves looking for a replacement when the young officer leaves the agency for additional opportunities at a larger agency. On the other hand, some military retirees or retired cops might like the environment that smaller agencies offer. Keep in mind that the large majority of military retirees are in the early to mid-40s age group and fully capable, and possibly willing, to enter the world of law enforcement with many good years to provide. Military retirees are unique in this aspect with regard to retirees from other career fields. An RJP can help candidates form realistic expectations that, when met, lead to reduced turnover and increased satisfaction. An RJP also gives agency recruiters and members a common message to present to the public and candidates.

Establish a Member Recruiting Program

Who better to market the organization than members themselves? Who has a greater interest in selection than the operational members? Some agencies have employed recruiting reward systems with great success. Rather than rewarding the recruitment of a “warm body,” the recruiters are rewarded once the candidate completes training or probationary periods. These programs typically involve recruitment packets that contain agency literature (preferably an RJP) and clear contact information. Finding potential members who have a vested interest in the community or environment can help build loyalty and commitment, as well.

Performance Management System

Traditional performance appraisals are typically negative chores for supervisors and an uncomfortable time for the members. Studies of Gen”X”ers suggest that members of that generation welcome and even solicit feedback. Newer performance management systems incorporate regular developmental feedback and goal-setting along with traditional semi-annual or annual performance appraisals. The feedback and goal setting aspect of this process provides the member frequent feedback on performance and provides opportunity for correction prior to a performance evaluation. It also helps foster rapport between the supervisor and the member, encouraging a stronger LMX. Supervisors need training on these systems, but once training is accomplished and the organization accepts and facilitates developmental feedback, the organization then has an internal, constant mechanism to train and mentor while building trust and value rather than perceived punitive alternatives in poor performance reviews.

Performance appraisal systems designed for the specific job assignment must be developed to capture the behavior the agency desires. Training supervisors and providing behavioral anchored scales reduces the time it takes to evaluate the members, and it assists greatly in rater reliability by reducing the various rater errors or halo effects and other similar rating issues.

It is ironic that new-hire law enforcement officers are often evaluated with a Daily Observation Report (DOR), as established initially by the San Jose Model of field training and subsequent adaptations, on common knowledge, skills, and abilities of a patrol offer. But then have inadequate performance measurement tools once they are out of

field training. The universal need for performance scales for community policing are a definite area for future research and development.

Supervisor Training

Not all members have the desire or the attributes to be leaders or managers. Law enforcement often uses the term "leadership" as a synonym for supervision and management. Leadership, management, and supervision are not the same, and organizations need them all. Simply put, leadership is influence that can be seen at every level in the agency and is often independent of supervisory rank. Management, on the other hand, is most simply defined as authority and may or may not be practiced by a person with leadership abilities. The need to understand the dynamics of leadership and management and to develop within the members of an agency future-oriented mind-sets is paramount to continued professionalism in both the military and law enforcement. The environment in which law enforcement and the military operate is more demanding, sophisticated, and under scrutiny like never before. Discretion and decision making is being placed to the lowest possible levels so that officers who are on-scene can assess situations or problems and then deal with them in a less bureaucratic manner. This not only means that the need to properly hire and train recruits is increasingly important but also that developing the newest members for their next progression needs to take place sooner.

There are more opportunities for law enforcement command-level members to find training for newly promoted line-level supervisors, such as the FBI National Academy, Southern Police Institute, and other regional executive leadership programs. The critical area for future development lies in line-level training for sergeants or their organizational equivalent. "One-day-on-patrol, the-next-day-the-boss," has interpersonal dynamic issues long known to law enforcement, but given the requirements for feedback, member development, and decision making, sergeants are too often promoted and left on their own to figure things out. The military does an excellent job of addressing these issues with various Non-commissioned Officer schools and various command schools, but in civilian agencies it is generally a nonexistent part of the organizational culture.

Reward Systems

A common failing of many organizations is not rewarding the desired behavior. This is another aspect of proper performance management systems. It is also important to members that their contributions are recognized and that they are viewed as valuable to the organization. Timely rewards and recognition of a job well done sounds like an easy concept, but it can prove difficult. While private-sector members often get bonuses and financial incentives based on the profit line, public-sector employees don't usually have that option. Reward systems do not always require financial incentives, however.

Some progressive civilian agencies have adopted some of the military approaches. It is commonplace for ribbons and medals to be awarded for meritorious service and bravery, but some trends suggest that smaller recognition in terms of "challenge" coins given by supervisors or time off (which is very valued with many GenXers) are having positive results on job satisfaction.

Conclusions

As we look to the future, the key to recruiting and retaining members for the increasingly sophisticated world is education. Law enforcement must continue the professionalization movement started in the 1970s and encourage at least an associate degree-level of education among line officers to increase their tolerance, problem-solving skills, and the knowledge to understand how to think outside the box. The military should encourage non-commissioned officers to earn the same level of education as they advance through enlisted ranks and, perhaps, become officers. Law enforcement and local military commanders need to partner with local higher education institutions to build working relationships and tap into interdisciplinary resources currently not widely utilized. Opening the door to the closed culture of law enforcement is critical for agencies to gain sophisticated and technological expertise that is becoming more necessary in a complex and shrinking world.

Troops to Cops: Changing Uniforms, Changing Missions?

Joseph Schafer and Bernard Levin

Introduction

The more than 17,000 U.S. law enforcement agencies are highly heterogeneous. Though all employ sworn personnel and embrace some minor variation of the duty to "protect and serve," variability still dominates. One piece of common ground since the mid-1990s has been a constriction of qualified applicants within hiring pools. In this essay, we posit that general shortfalls of applicants will remain for the foreseeable future, absent markedly increased shrinkage of the overall job market. While we could dwell on various reasons or excuses for the emergence of this problem, the assertion is not much in dispute except by those inclined towards wishful thinking. Law enforcement agencies across the country are much interested in improved methods to meet their staffing needs. For many, interest in former members of the military as prospective employees may have increased. There are several possible advantages to employing former military personnel in policing, making them an attractive (and possibly easy-to-access) pool from which to draw future employees. The purpose of this chapter is to lay out some of the pros and cons of such an approach.

We do not attempt to predict or even list alternative futures for policing agencies because they are so variable, and we expect that variability to remain. Some agencies may become more oriented toward "combat" policing and some less so; some agencies may acquire more enlightened leadership and some less so, etc. What some agencies see as the benefits of hiring former military personnel will to others serve as disincentives to this practice. Overall, we believe agency characteristics will be a wash. Thus, we leave it to the reader to evaluate how the following can best be applied to recruitment and general human resources functions in the reader's agency.

Policing has long relied on a nexus with military practices and behaviors, including the hiring of former military personnel. Though some have argued the extent of the nexus is overstated and misapplied (Cowper, 2000), there are clear patterns of similarities between the two institutional environments. Hiring retired or former military personnel has been a common practice in policing for several reasons. First, there are significant similarities between military and policing environments. Second, many policing agencies have found that former members of the military have worked out well as police officers. Both environs rely on comparable rank and control systems, require the wearing of uniforms and carrying of firearms, place primacy on a set of somewhat similar values, and may attract similar personalities. For the police, hiring former military personnel may seem natural, as it is assumed these prospective employees already have knowledge and habits that will translate well into policing organizations.

Many U.S. policing agencies perceive a shortfall in their recruiting pools (Koper, Maguire, & Moore, 2001; Taylor et al., 2005). In prior eras, the military was viewed as a "go to" source for prospective employees. Anecdotally, many officers hired in the late 1960s and early 1970s began a policing career after serving in Vietnam. These officers were often drafted at a young age, trained to wear a uniform and use a firearm, and, upon

their return to America, policing may have seemed an easy transition given their existing skill sets and training. The hiring of former military personnel has been a less visible practice in recent decades, though, certainly, exceptions abound across the more than 17,000 U.S. agencies. The purpose of this chapter is to take what has become a relatively small area of human resources within policing (the military as a source of applicants) and suggest how best we can take advantage of present opportunities.

Why Are Military Personnel An Attractive Recruiting Pool?

For years, police agencies have turned to the military as a preferred source of new employees. This was particularly common during the Vietnam era, as returning soldiers traded one uniform, weapon, and mission for another. Many individuals who have served in the armed forces are likely to find appealing our society's traditional notions of policing, including values toward service, mission, duty, and protection. Policing may have a comfortable "feel" that makes it attractive to those preparing to complete a term of military service. The Army values (loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity and personal courage) seem reasonably consistent with civilian policing.[1] An oddity is that while the military services are quite serious about infusing values throughout organization and function, we in policing do not intentionally teach or model consistent values to frontline employees. We then wonder why some police officers do not discriminate right from wrong in their own behavior. While police departments could and should increase their teaching of appropriate values, an infusion of military veterans might help balance and fill the present void.

Military veterans bring to the job a number of skills and abilities that make them attractive as new employees. In the short run, veterans are used to wearing uniforms and maintaining their personal appearance. They know how to keep their shirttails tucked in during the performance of their duties and will not question policies regarding hair length and facial hair. Veterans are familiar with weapons and defensive tactics, though usually not the varieties employed in policing. The current emphasis on urban warfare means many veterans understand how to read an area and make tactical choices, though they are frequently geared toward a different set of outcomes. Veterans may have gone through leadership training and development. It is no coincidence that military values and policing cultures both place primacy on duty, honor, and allegiance to agency and peers, although, as noted above, policing is not very good at making those values happen.

Many policing agencies have experienced a recent decline in qualified applicants, while anecdotal media reports suggest men and women leaving military service are sometimes having trouble finding quality employment.[2] Policing offers reasonably attractive material benefits: good pay relative to educational requirements, job security, early retirement, and respectable health care benefits.

From the outside, the structure and operation of policing might also seem consistent with military settings, making it appear the transition from one to the other might be relatively smooth.

[1] http://www.goarmy.com/life/living_the_army_values.jsp

[2] http://sptimes.com/2006/07/16/Business/Young_veterans_new_ba.shtml

Although such benefits and conditions may have been appealing to those of the baby boomer generation (those born from 1943–1960), we cannot discount their relevance for “X”ers (those born 1961–1980) or “Next”ers (those born 1981–2000) (Zemke, Raines, & Filipczak, 2000). In each generation, there will be members who prefer the structured environment that policing presently requires. Those are the target population for police recruiters. Unfortunately, that population may be smaller in the more recent generations.

As a group, military veterans are more physically and mentally fit than their peers in the general population. The military has done policing the courtesy of assuring that these candidates are pre-filtered on at least some variables, such as education, intelligence, a degree of altruism, criminal behavior, reasonable mental health, ability to negotiate organizational behavior, and ability to function as a team member under duress. Assuming honorable discharge, a recent veteran is likely to do well in traditional police testing and screening processes, as well as in training academies.

Military veterans are increasingly familiar with situations of violent conflict, physical danger, psychological duress, and competing missions and values. In many urban areas, such working conditions are common dimensions of policing. Military veterans may be more adept at addressing rapidly changing circumstances to achieve an acceptable outcome to a given situation. Will military veterans be more likely to understand that “stuff happens” and be able to cope with it in a preferred fashion? We expect that the veterans will do well because the military likely would have filtered out people who were less able to perform when bad things happen. For these and many other reasons, military veterans are a pool from which police agencies might continue to draw prospective applicants.

What Questions Might There Be About Hiring Military Personnel?

We do not see clear reasons that would make military personnel an “unattractive” recruit pool. Rather, in considering the interface between military and policing organizations, operations, missions, and tactics, some questions emerge. These questions do not have definitive answers. Individual agencies will have to examine their objectives, contexts, and resources in determining their individual answers.

Police agencies have often assumed that there was a clear, smooth, and linear transition from military to policing services. Because both kinds of careers involve uniforms, firearms, and service, it has been assumed that the transition from one to the other would be simple for employees. In reality, there are critical distinctions in the missions and tactics that should lead agencies to be a bit cautious about hiring military veterans. This is not to say that veterans make inadequate employees; in fact, we suspect they are on balance considerably more functional than typical recruits. Rather, all new employees (former military or not) must be given an explicit understanding of how policing differs from military services in areas, such as strategies, tactics, methods, and outcomes. Each of these four dimensions needs tending, but exactly how they must be inculcated and what specific content should be included will vary significantly from one police agency to the next.

Values represent another dimension that needs careful attention. The soldier’s

creed[3] would seem, on the surface, to be consistent with civilian values. However, military values may conflict with values expected in civilian policing. For example, the very notion of an enemy is inconsistent with modern civilian policing. Civilian policing requires use of the minimum necessary force. The military constructs of proportional response and rules of engagement do not have exact civilian versions. "Warrior" does not fit what we expect police to do, even though we do talk about combat policing. "I stand ready to deploy, engage and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat"[4] is inconsistent with any policing model with which we are familiar.

Conflicts are not apparent when one looks at the values taught in the U.S. Navy.[5] The Air Force core values[6] and those of the Marine Corps[7] also seem to be, on the surface, compatible with policing. However, implicit values may be problematic, because shifts in context often have unintended consequences. If nothing else, one might expect conflicts between the military veterans who have been taught to appreciate values and the non-veteran police who may have picked up conflicting values or no particular orientation toward organizational values at all. Conflicts over values can, of course, be addressed through targeted training and education. Whether these conflicts will be addressed and whether the training and education will be effective, are open questions. Over time, we would expect employees to adopt a level of value convergence toward existing police agency norms, regardless of the employee's prior veteran status.

The Coast Guard[8] is explicit about one value that may conflict with organizational culture in much of policing: "We encourage creativity through empowerment." Police chiefs may vary in the extent to which they seek creative and empowered employees; police organizations will vary in their capacity to allow such individualization. Some civilian law enforcement leaders may not be aware of how far the military has moved toward empowering its lower echelon troops. Policing might well benefit from creative and self-motivated employees, though many policing agencies are not oriented toward supporting this type of employee conduct.

In a military context, we condition people to be courageous, ready, and vigorous warriors while also seeking to create engineers, agriculture specialists, social workers, and various other job characteristics to support the military's emerging nation-building and peace-keeping model. In many military settings, proportional responding is expected. In contrast, many police agencies want officers to use the minimum amount of force necessary to overcome resistance. These standards are not the same. It is possible that veterans may, under stress, revert to their previous standard. Though that prior standard may not be appropriate in policing applications, it is likely the military did a better job training the officer to operate within those parameters versus the often-mediocre training police agencies provide officers in making appropriate decisions under field conditions of duress.

In many agencies and contexts, we want police warriors who are disinclined to use the maximum level of allowable force—we seek what one chief has

[3] http://www.army.mil/thewayahead/creed.html

[4] http://www.army.mil/SoldiersCreed/flash_version/index.html

[5] http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/traditions/html/corvalu.html

[6] http://www.usafa.af.mil/core-value/cv-mastr.html

[7] http://www.marines.com/page/Core-Values.jsp

[8] http://www.uscg.mil/DIVERSITY/values.htm

termed “reluctant warriors.” This term is not universally appealing across the range of American police agencies. There are, however, a growing number of agencies and executives who would prefer that their officers show restraint in the use of force due to liability, philosophical, or other concerns (see Carter, Sapp, & Stephens, 1989).

While hiring former military personnel has some potential benefits, a strong policing focus on hiring former military personnel might suffer from some significant limitations:

1. This pool of recruits is and will remain small relative to the former military pools from previous eras. Active-duty U.S. Military numbers have dropped significantly over the past several decades. The percentage of military participation is difficult to calculate, but one source provides evidence that the percentage of soldiers under arms during the Gulf War was about one quarter of that during the Vietnam War.[9] Total military recruits in 2002 were less than half that in any of the years from 1973–77.[10]
2. There is and will be considerable competition for that relatively small pool. The private sector and other governmental organizations are not ignorant of the advantages military service provides. Service-minded veterans interested in careers in law enforcement, intelligence, security, and homeland security will have myriad job opportunities in the public and private sectors. Medium and small agencies and even some large ones will have difficulty offering a work environment and benefits package that will compete. This situation may strain the existing problems medium and small agencies have recruiting and retaining female and minority applicants (Taylor et al., 2005). At the same time, the level of conflict and violence faced by many military personnel might make a “quiet” job policing Anytown, USA seem quite attractive to an individual preparing to complete a term of military service.
3. Some military veteran applicants will bring with them a variety of mental and physical disabilities. These disabilities will be to some degree because military recruiting and retention standards have varied from time to time and to a greater degree because of trauma incurred during service. Some of these concerns, particularly emotional problems, may not be obvious until specific policing situations provide a context for them. Traditional testing aimed at civilian applicants may or may not detect these conditions. While the United States Veterans Administration has significantly improved screening, assessment, and treatment standards for post-traumatic stress following combat related duty, there still exists a noteworthy potential for its presence. Moreover, symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder can be delayed for 6 months or longer, increasing the likelihood of implications for policing.[11]
   Recent research (Cabrera et al., 2007) points out that exposure to childhood adversity dramatically increases the likelihood of post-traumatic stress disorder, whether soldiers had high-combat experiences or not. Based on other evidence (e.g., Felitti et al., 1998;

[9] http://www.cwc.lsu.edu/cwc/other/stats/warcost.htm
[10] http://www.dod.mil/prhome/poprep2002/appendixd/d_03.htm
[11] http://www.ncptsd.va.gov/ncmain/information/

Dong et al., 2005), childhood adversity negatively affects the adult behavior, as well as the adult health, of civilian populations. Thus, the present authors recommend careful background investigations into the childhood of both veteran and non-veteran applicants.

4. In general, those with honorable discharges are not a random sample of young Americans. They are more fit, more stable, more mature, and more comfortable within a structured environment. On the other hand, there are specific and non-zero risks associated with these populations. Suicidal and homicidal propensities are not unheard of (Hill, Johnson and Barton, 2006), and various psychological responses to perceived trauma are not infrequent, particularly among soldiers who have been deployed multiple times or for extended periods to war zones.[12] We should not mistake soldiers as necessarily having maintained the physical fitness of trained athletes (e.g., Rubal, 1989), although overall their physical fitness likely exceeds that of the average police officer.
5. Veterans will be accustomed to higher quality training than is available in policing, a more ethical environment, more modern equipment, greater mission clarity, and an orientation toward team, rather than individual, performance. Police agencies may have difficulty retaining military veterans who become frustrated with constraints that are and are likely to remain a sad reality in many police agencies.
6. The fit of veterans with police departments will vary. Veterans, like police departments, are not all homogeneous. They bring different life experiences, work experiences, education, interests, and ambitions to policing. Some personnel will fit quite well in policing. Some organizations will be desirable work environments. The authors offer generalizations upon which police leaders might ruminate. In the end, the idiosyncrasies of individual officers and agencies will drive the fit of veterans in policing.
   Recruits with military experience must be taught that policing is a political enterprise and that they need to attend to opinions of stakeholders. Their early police training must provide them more sophisticated understanding of human resources law, including but by no means limited to, risk management.

Conclusion

In the private sector, organizations adapt or die. In the public sector, including policing, agencies and practices sometimes endure long past the point of usefulness. They get out-of-step with the times, they get disrespected, and they enter pointless conflicts with those they are supposed to protect and serve. The public sector may be missing existing opportunities, such as recruiting veterans. We know some of the futures we are likely to be facing, and we know what we must do to prepare for those futures. The infusion of military veterans into police agencies provides great potential. Veterans bring with them significant positive attributes. However, if police agencies are to maximize this opportunity, the agencies themselves will

[12] http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/83322.php

have to carefully consider the possible concerns with this strategy and examine whether their organizational environment does (or should) appeal to former military personnel.

As a practical matter, the question is not whether to hire from the pool of former military members. Instead the question is whether we can attract them. We are experiencing a nationwide shortage of police recruits. The limited quality of the civilian pool from which many agencies draw has been discussed ad nauseum at endless conferences and police bars. If someone with military experience walks up to the average police recruiter for the average agency, absent obvious disqualifiers that person will very likely be hired.

Thus, the dimensions discussed throughout this paper are presented to inform rather than to caution against hiring former military members. In addition, we encourage agencies to prepare for some associated challenges with which they may not have been familiar.

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Paths Forward: Similarities, Differences, and Evolution

Joseph Schafer and Bernard Levin

In the early evening of September 29, 1829, several hundred men were sent out to conduct foot patrols in central London. The newly created London Metropolitan Police Service represented a substantial new way of envisioning police, police organizations, and governmental responses to crime and disorder. The structure and operation of the newly created "Met" was heavily influenced by Sir Charles Rowan, a former military man who had been appointed as one of two joint commissioners of the force. Rowan's influence reflected his military background, and that influence persists to this day[1] in most American police forces (Cowper, 2000).

This volume has laid out a number of parallels and distinctions between the military and policing worlds. Though these two fields are distinct, they share a number of similarities and appear to be evolving in a parallel fashion. In this chapter we endeavor to provide an overview of the current volume as well as the trends (both current and emerging) influencing (and will influence) the military and policing worlds. This includes consideration of the similarities and differences between these two worlds, and a discussion of the seemingly parallel evolutions they are experiencing. In many regards, these two worlds, while still distinct, are perhaps more alike today than at any point in the past 200 years.

Similarities, Differences and Evolutions

As others have noted within this volume, the military and police share a number of commonalities. Police agencies are clearly influenced by military thinking about structure and function, in part because the former has for decades tended to draw new personnel from the ranks of the latter. Recent shifts in the role of the armed services have in some ways pushed the military to look more closely at policing to see what lessons might be learned. Despite commonalities, these two fields have been and will continue to be distinct. Fundamental differences in mission and method will continue to ensure that military and police remain distinct from one another. This distinction is a fundamental dimension of American culture and government. Within the milieu of these similarities and differences, both the military and police are undergoing evolutions in their roles, missions, and modes of operation.

Physical Context

Military futurists are properly concerned with the physical aspects of their operational environment. Military doctrine defines an operational environment as "a composite of conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander."[2] The concept of an operational environment implies that the range of concerns influencing a military unit and its commander extends beyond the opposing force; it includes

[1] Though as Thomas Cowper (2000) noted, the ties between American policing and the military may not be as strong the former conventionally espouses, perhaps even to a detrimental extent.

[2] http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/o/03921.html accessed April 8, 2008.

considerations of economy, society, government, culture, technology, and the environment, among other factors.

Though local policing exists in an environment where operational factors are considered, the latter may not be as deeply integrated into the thinking of the “unit commander.” It is a rare police chief who worries much about global warming. This, too, is easily understood. Civilian police operate in a well-understood and typically stable physical environment. Even though global warming may effect some local change, the scope is narrow, and the changes rarely are surprising. For the military, the scope may be literally worldwide and the changes not well-known or well-understood. Thus, for the military, shifts in logistical, supply, manpower, training issues, and even technology development may be crucial for missions. On the other hand, civilian police typically do very nicely with technologies left over from yesterday’s war.

Scale and Hierarchy

The majority of U.S. police departments have 20 or fewer officers. They report to no one more exalted than a local mayor or city council. They are characterized in general by intense knowledge of very local people, things, and relationships. Their weakness, now in the process of being patched by such entities as fusion centers and JTTFs, has been and remains information sharing. The simpleminded but vital three intelligence sharing questions (what do I know, who needs to know it, have I told them) is generally a foreign language. Most information sharing still takes place through informal networks (donut shops or for younger officers, bagel shops) without knowledge of those in the upper strata of the hierarchy.

The U.S. Military is structurally almost the antithesis of civilian policing. The military is steeply hierarchical, with fairly clear and well-defined relationships between even distant parts. We do not mean to imply that the relationships function perfectly, but unlike much of civilian policing at least the relationships exist in a reasonably concrete form. The size of the military also means that reliance on formal hierarchy and communication protocols is of greater necessity.

Ironically, despite being on opposite ends of the scale and hierarchy spectrum, the police and military both struggle with effective communication and flexibility, though for opposing reasons. The military is highly centralized, but massive in size. This results in armed forces that are not always as agile, adaptive, and informed as would be ideal, though the military is constantly working to improve its flexibility, information systems, and responsiveness to current missions, constraints, and environments. In contrast, American policing is small in scale, but highly fragmented. Much less is being accomplished in terms of integrating agencies and their information systems to provide a more comprehensive understanding of crime and terrorism in our nation. Though rhetoric of information sharing abounds, there is still vast room for improvement.

Psychosocial Context

Military futurists may be interested in how best to develop new relationships in cultures not well understood. Civilian police, particularly at the local level, worry about that only with emerging immigrant subcultures. For civilian police, the cultures typically are well understood and relationships are to be enhanced and improved. The personnel and organizational demands placed on military and civilian police units, thus, dramatically differ.

Change: Evolution, Although Sometimes It Feels Like Revolution

Both military and civilian policing are evolving rapidly. At times, neither is sure how to prepare for likely futures or even whether such preparation is possible. What we find interesting is that, given the material presented in this volume as well as materials presented elsewhere (See previous FWG volumes), the evolution is parallel, rather than convergent. Under no likely scenario do we foresee a convergence of military and civilian policing. Culture, mission, legal structure, and practical politics all argue against more than increasing cooperation and increased sharing of information. Mission and organizations will remain distinct, although increasingly complementary. As cooperation and information sharing increase, the appearance will approximate the mating of porcupines, each new to the mating game.

In recent decades, we have seen policing undergo a transformation in which it has become accepted that the mandate of policing is broader than the simple regulation of crime. Contemporary policing discourse includes discussion of solving social problems, strengthening and empowering communities, ensuring homeland security, and meeting the needs and expectations of a range of local citizen interests. Likewise, the military is undergoing a similar transformation. The modern military is about more than simply preparing for large-scale armed conflict. The mandate of the armed services has expanded to include addressing a range of situations both domestically and on foreign soil. How will both the military and police continue to adapt, evolve, and respond to expanding organizational mandates? How will military and police organizations recruit, equip, and train personnel to deal with a growing set of tasks and objectives? NOTE: This also means in both worlds we see the rise of privatization to fill the void emerging when there is neither the will nor the resources to meet need/demand for services.

Implications

1. We must develop means for military units to build relationships with civilian police departments in advance of need. When a crisis happens it is too late for relationship building.
2. We must carefully delineate mission and resource boundaries so that the emerging relationships do not result in emergent internecine squabbles
3. As has been noted endless times (including #1 above), it's about relationships—individual relationships. It's about base-level networking. If people are to work together, they must know each other well and must also know people and other resources in common.
4. Not unrelated, an environment where MOU's are the primary basis for relationships will not and cannot function in a meaningful way, whether between military and civilian police or between either of them and other information-age entities.
5. Hiring criteria for both military and civilian personnel must focus on social intelligence and social skills. Finishing various training schools, whether military or civilian policing, can do only so much. There must be solid material to start with.
6. Both types of organizations must move more toward outcomes assessment and become less oriented toward "bean counting" and

institutional politics. On the other hand, members of both types of organizations must be taught that they are political actors in a highly complex and politicized environment, where cooperation is valued more highly than competition.

7. Both types of organizations must develop as their goals leaving situations better than they found them and building long-term relationships, including virtual relationships.
8. Both types of organizations must become more transparent, both to their members and to external entities. Our enemy, increasingly, will be our inability to share information in a timely manner and to call upon pre-existing relationships to aid in problem prevention and resolution. Our enemy will not be nation-states nor will it be centralized, organized crime monoliths.
9. “Moving through the chairs,” “getting one’s ticket punched,” and similar industrial-age traditions in both the military and policing will have to give way to different career pathways.
10. Leadership in both contexts will be redefined to mean leadership in acquiring and building effective teams by means of resources external to the formal organization.
11. "Training” increasingly will give way to education targeted at increasing understanding of emerging zeitgeist, economic, and socio-demographic trends.
12. The notion of combat policing (Myers, Broadfoot, Levin ca 1996), which provides an apparent link between policing and the military, will need clarification. Some of policing is moving more toward combat (SWAT teams, warrant service teams, etc.), while much of the military seems to recognize that combat is what one does when relationships have failed.
13. The jurisdictional limitations of policing will increasingly become polite fictions, much as will *posse comitatus*. Blurring boundaries will characterize the operational environment for both the military and civilian policing.
14. The military notion of “light fighter” may be moving more toward that of combat policing; at the same time, that much of policing is recognizing that fighting is less useful than finding common ground. Of course, this and many other issues depend on values exploration and more strategic thinking than is generally found in most civilian police agencies. Instead, they tend to think in terms of budget biennia and the terms of elected politicians.
15. Decades ago, Tom Peters, and Peter Drucker, and Dorthy Deming provided us with what now seems obvious advice for getting jobs done through organizations. Concepts, such as flat, empowered, transparent, information-based, team-based, knowledge workers, and quality focused are old-hat in many civilian environments but still not well-executed in either civilian or military environments. Both have taken tentative steps in helpful directions, e.g., with community policing and a focus on special operators, but much more needs to be done.
16. One military concept could, if widely adopted, could assist both civilian police and military. That is the concept of OODA, or (Observe,

Orient, Decide and Act), which is a concept used by the military in planning both commercial and combat processes at the strategic level. While OODA (or OODA loops as it is referred to when employed in an iterative process) customarily has targeted tactical environments, it is long past time for it to be applied to organization-level decision making. Information-based environments are not survivable if one relies on an industrial-age pace of decisions.

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